


VEDĀNTA
PAÑCADAŚĪ

CHAPTER-1, TATTVA-VIVEKA
(DISCOVERING YOUR INNATE GREATNESS)



COMMENTARY
BY
SWAMI SUDDHABODHANANDA

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P R E F A C E

To the persons who know fully well the limitations of the phenomenal world, to those who are not content with the fleeting joys that even the best sense objects can offer, and to those who have developed the maturity of mind to investigate the real purpose of life, Vedānta reveals that the real nature of one and all is nothing but limitless *ānanda*, free from mortality and ignorance. For this discovery one needs to put in consistent efforts with firm commitment to the pursuit wherein Vedānta Pañcadaśī serves as an indispensable treatise.

Popularly known as simply Pañcadaśī, it unfolds one's real nature in some of its chapters, based on our day to day experiences which we can never miss. The first chapter is one of them. Also, the vision contained in the first chapter is elaborated in the remaining text. Though there are some short glosses or translations with some notes available in English, on Pañcadaśī a thorough commentary in that language on this text is still lacking. So, I have undertaken to write on at least a few of its selected chapters and this text is the first in that direction.

Certain portion being based on reasoning is found to be difficult in the first chapter. It has been explained in greater detail and in simpler terms. There is also a reference to *vāsanā prakriyā* about which some confusions are prevailing. I had to delve into the very origin of this *prakriyā*, for the sake of clarity of my own understanding and I have shared my findings here. Following the footsteps of the authors of this text, let me assure that all along I have explained what *śruti* has to say without indulging in any speculation.

Vedānta is the body of the highest knowledge which originates verily from *Īśvara* and has come to us through the teacher taught lineage (*guru-śiṣya paramparā*). There is nothing that we can claim as exclusively belonging to us in this respect, except discovering ourselves the truth contained therein. So I bow down with reverential gratitude to all those masters, of past and present, from whom I have learnt directly through their teaching and indirectly through their books. This commentary is written in a teaching style and in its context I am reminded of the following couplet:

“यदत्र दूषणं किञ्चित्तत्र तेषां ममैव तत् ।
यदत्र भूषणं किञ्चित् तत्तु तेषां न वै मम ॥”

"Whatever deficiency found in this work does not belong to those masters, but it is verily mine; whereas whatever good thing found here is theirs and certainly not mine."

While giving the meanings of Sanskrit words of the verse, its prose order is followed. For the benefit of those who are not familiar with the terminologies in Vedānta, besides giving their meaning immediately after those words, a separate Index is provided with the references of relevant pages. To facilitate printing and for the benefit of those who cannot read Devanāgarī script, many Sanskrit words and phrases are transliterated in the body of the commentary. It is true that such usage at times may have a jarring effect while reading, on those who are conversant with Sanskrit and yet they are requested to overcome it by acquainting themselves with the keys to transliteration.

Many of my students have helped devoting time or otherwise with total dedication to bring about the book in its final form. They will be embarrassed if I thank them and so I pray to *Īśvara* that they get liberation in this very life.

I conclude by offering this book unto the ONE to whom all knowledge legitimately belongs.

“त्वदीयं वस्तु गोविन्द तुभ्यमेव समर्पये ।”

"Oh Lord! I offer verily unto you, your own thing."

SWAMI ŚUDDHABODHĀNANDA SARASWATI

Bombay

November 23, 1994

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Key to Transliteration & Pronunciation of Sanskrit Letters

अ	a (<u>but</u>)	ट	ṭ (<u>start</u>)*	} tongue on upper palate
आ	ā (<u>mom</u>)	ठ	ṭh (<u>anthill</u>)*	
इ	i (<u>it</u>)	ड	ḍ (<u>dart</u>)*	
ई	ī (<u>beet</u>)	ढ	ḍh (<u>godhead</u>)*	
उ	u (<u>put</u>)	ण	ṇ (<u>under</u>)*	} tongue on teeth
ऊ	ū (<u>pool</u>)	त	t (<u>start</u>)*	
ऋ	ṛ (<u>rhythm</u>)*	थ	th (<u>anthill</u>)*	
ए	e (<u>play</u>)	द	d (<u>father</u>)*	
ऐ	ai (<u>high</u>)	ध	dh (<u>godhead</u>)*	} tongue on teeth
ओ	o (<u>toe</u>)	न	n (<u>numb</u>)	
औ	au (<u>loud</u>)	प	p (<u>spin</u>)	
◌ं	ṁ - Anusvāra (nasalization of preceding vowel) written like the dot above अ in अंशः	फ	ph (<u>loophole</u>)*	
◌ः	ḥ - Visarga (aspiration of preceding vowel) written like the two dots after श in अंशः	ब	b (<u>bin</u>)	} tongue on teeth
क	k (<u>skate</u>)	भ	bh (<u>abhor</u>)*	
ख	kh (<u>blockhead</u>)*	म	m (<u>much</u>)	
ग	g (<u>gate</u>)	य	y (<u>young</u>)	
घ	gh (<u>log hut</u>)*	र	r (<u>drama</u>)	} tongue on teeth
ङ	ṅ (<u>sing</u>)	ल	l (<u>luck</u>)	
च	c (<u>chunk</u>)	व	v (in-between <u>wile</u> and <u>vile</u>)	
छ	ch (<u>catch him</u>)*	श	ś (<u>shove</u>)*	
ज	j (<u>John</u>)	ष	ṣ (<u>bushel</u>)	} tongue on teeth
झ	jh (<u>hedgehog</u>)*	स	s (<u>so</u>)	
ञ	ñ (<u>bunch</u>)	ह	h (<u>hum</u>)	
		क्ष	kṣa	
		ज्ञ	jña	

* There are no exact English equivalents for the letters listed with an asterisk.

INTRODUCTION

PRAKARAṆAGRANTHA

In communication in general, and writings in particular, one can be brief at the cost of clarity, or be clear at the cost of brevity, but it needs a genius to be both clear and brief, without any repetition.

In literature, repetition is considered as a serious defect. The saying goes among literary circles that grammarians consider the shortness of even half a letter like a festive occasion of son's birth. To them, it means something that makes the work light, at the same time more impressive.

It may be so in literature. But as for the teaching, repetition is unavoidable, because the teacher's main concern is to make the student understand whatever that is taught. Therefore repetition is necessary. At the same time one should also summarise the entire subject matter in a nutshell. So, for an effective teaching, both the elaboration and summarisation have to be employed. Expansion and contraction of the topic is a must. Such a teaching alone can be grasped well by the students.

This method is all the more adopted in the teaching of Vedānta. To make the subject matter very clear we have got the help of texts called *Prakaraṇagranthas*, written by several great teachers, which do play a very important role in the unfoldment of Vedānta. The basic Vedāntic scriptures like *Upaniṣads*, *Bhagavadgītā* and *Brahmasūtra*, called also *Prasthānatrayī*, establish the Truth of the individual, the world and *Īśvara*. This is further elaborated in the *Prakaraṇa* treatises (*Prakaraṇagranthas*).

Generally *Prakaraṇagranthas* are translated as introductory Vedāntic treatises or texts, but they need not necessarily be so. Of course, there are many of them which are certainly introductory in nature. Take for example *Vivekacūdāmani* by Ādi Śaṅkarācārya. No doubt it is so in the beginning, but later on, the subject matter is elevated to a lofty height without any compromise. *Upadeśasāhasrī* can also be cited as a treatise having very in-depth subject matter. So, more precisely the translation of *Prakaraṇagranthas* should be subject-wise or topic-wise treatises. They are defined as

शास्त्रैकदेशसम्बद्धं शास्त्रकार्यान्तरे स्थितम् ।

आहुः प्रकरणनाम ग्रन्थभेदं विपश्चितः ॥

"The learned people define the division of a treatise called *Prakaraṇa* as that which is related to a particular part (i.e. aspect) of *śāstra* (main treatise - scripture), but devoted to a purpose other than that of *śāstra*."

A given *śāstra* unfolds all the aspects of the subject matter. As for Vedānta *śāstra*, the main topic is to unfold and establish the Truth along with the description of the persons to whom it is addressed, the means which one has to equip with, and the result that can be accomplished. If necessary, the other schools of thought are also refuted in the context. But it has no leisure to find out whether the *mumukṣu*, the one who strives for freedom from limitations, has understood it. There may be some difficulty on the part of the *mumukṣu* in understanding it but *śāstras* have their own limits as to what topics they have to establish. On the contrary the *prakaraṇa* treatises do cater to such needs which *śāstras* do not handle. While the subject matter of such treatises is based on the main Vedāntic text, they strive in particular to make the *mumukṣus* understand it more clearly taking into account their difficulties. They also develop the subject matter that is unfolded by *śāstras* with the help of reasoning and the author's own intimate experience - *svānubhava*, called *aparokṣānubhava*. Here the authors have enough elbow room which *śāstras* cannot afford. Elsewhere it is said -

प्रकरणे नु शास्त्रनिर्णीतोऽर्थः युक्त्या स्वानुभवेन च

परिपोष्य बोधयितुं शक्यते । अनुष्ठानप्रकारश्च

साधकानामनुग्रहाय विस्तरेण बोधयितुं शक्यते ।

"It is indeed possible to communicate in the *prakaraṇas*, the subject ascertained in *śāstras* by developing it further with reasoning and one's own experience. It is also possible to advise in detail the mode of practice of required means for the blessings of the seekers - *mumukṣus*."

More often than not, *mumukṣus* are not mature enough to grasp the truth unfolded in Vedānta for want of certain adjustments in one's personality. In such cases either the group of four qualifications - *sādhana catuṣṭayasampatti* - may need revamping, or the indirect

*sādhana*s - means to develop the purity and steadiness of the mind - need to be recommended suiting to their mental texture. These may not be found in very great detail in the main texts. So the *prakāraṇa* treatises fulfil such demands also.

Further, these texts furnish the aids to take to an effective *manana* - reflection - and *nididhyāsanam* - contemplation - which are indispensable after *śravaṇa*- self-inquiry. Thus they can also serve as the effective means to dwell on one's own real nature, which is the purpose of Vedānta and which alone is the only preoccupation of a completely eligible *mumukṣu* after *śravaṇa*.

From the foregoing details, it should be clear that the *prakāraṇa* treatises are not just the elementary treatises, since their utility is something unique and, therefore, an in-depth study of at least a few of them is an indispensable supplementary means to any earnest *mumukṣu*. Pañcadaśī is a *prakāraṇa* treatise. It makes use of reasoning to a great extent wherever that is necessary.

THE AUTHORS

Śrī Vidyāraṇya Muni is the co-author of this text. After the celebrated *Vedāntic* masters Ādi Śaṅkarācārya and his immediate disciple Vārtikakāra Sureśvarācārya, the brightest luminary on the horizon of Vedānta is verily Śrī Vidyāraṇya Muni.

He was a very great scholar and was known earlier as Mādhavācārya. It is said that due to dire poverty, he undertook severe religious austerities invoking the Goddess of Wealth. The Goddess revealed herself to him in his vision and blessed him indirectly by conferring upon him the power that can make the person whom he blesses to be very rich. So Mādhavācārya patronised the two brothers by names Hukka, also called First Harihar, and Bukka. Through them, he was instrumental in establishing the famous Vijayanagar empire.

Some opine that before entering into the order of *sannyāsa*, Vidyāraṇya acted as the minister of Hukka. This may not be totally true since there seems to be some confusion over the name Mādhava. Historically we find that there were, at that time, three persons by the same name Mādhava. One of them was Vidyāraṇya. The other was his brother Sāyana Mādhava who has written a commentary on the Vedas. The third person was the minister Mādhava who perhaps is mistaken for Ācārya Mādhava leading to a wrong conclusion that earlier, Vidyāraṇya was a minister of Hukka. There are evidences to reveal that these two were different persons.

His mother's *gotra* - family lineage - and *guru* are different from those of *Ācārya* Mādhava. The former had no brothers whereas the latter had one. Therefore, Vidyāraṇya cannot be taken as the minister Mādhava. However, it is left to the historians to ascertain these aspects.

The co-author is Śrī Bhāratīrtha who is also an independent author of many texts and *guru* of Vidyāraṇya Muni before his taking to *sannyāsa*. There is some difference of opinion as to the number of chapters written by each. According to the majority including Rāmakṛṣṇa whose gloss on this text is well known, the first six chapters were written by Vidyāraṇya and the remaining nine by Bhāratīrtha. Swāmi Niścaladās who has also commented upon this text opines that the first ten chapters are by Vidyāraṇya, whereas the last five belong to Bhāratīrtha.

COMMENTARIES

There are about seven or eight commentaries written on this text.

Presently available are -

Rāmakṛṣṇa's commentary - *Tattvadīpikā*, published by Nirṇaya Sagar Press, Bombay and also by some other publishers.

Acyutarāya's *Pūrṇānandendukaumudī*, published by Uttar Pradesh Sanskrit Academy, Lucknow.

Kalyāṇapīyūṣavyākhyā by Rāyaprolu Liṅgana Somayāji from Guntur - also a very useful commentary.

PAÑCADAŚĪ UNFOLDS ŚRUTI

All along in Pañcadaśī the attempt of both the authors is to unfold the truth contained in the *Upaniṣads* and not to propound something through mere reasoning. In its eighth chapter we find a clear statement to this effect -

श्रुत्यर्थं विशदीकुर्मो न तर्काद्वचि किञ्चन ।

(Ch. VIII- 67)

"I explain the meaning of *śruti*, but do not speak anything based on mere speculative logic."

A *mumukṣu* should resort only to *śruti* by giving up the *kutarka* - fallacious arguments or reasoning just for the sake of arguments

without any relevance to *śruti*.

So the loving advice of the authors is -

कुतर्कं सन्त्यज्य मुमुक्षुः श्रुतिमाश्रयेत् ।

(Ch.VIII- 68)

"Having given up the fallacious arguments the *mumukṣu* should resort to *śruti*."

This does not mean that reasoning has no role in Vedānta. It does employ the three touch-stones to ascertain the final truth viz. *śruti*, *yukti* - reasoning - and *anubhava* - one's own experience. The phrase "*śruti-yuktyanubhūtibhyaḥ*" in Chapters VI-56 and XI-89 is ample evidence to this effect. Hence the exhortation

तर्क्यताम् मा कुतर्क्यताम् ।

(Ch. VI- 30)

"Certainly one should take to sound reasoning, but never to fallacious arguments."

Lord Yama also points to this aspect in *Kāthopaniṣad* -

नैषा तर्केण मतिरापनेया ।

(*Kātha*, 1-2-9)

"This self-knowledge cannot be acquired through reasoning."

The very same statement can also mean that this knowledge cannot be negated by reasoning. *Bhāṣyakāra* - commentator (Ādi Śaṅkarācārya) - also remarks -

न हि कुतर्कस्य निष्ठा क्वचिद्विद्यते ।

(*Kātha Bhāṣya*, 1-2-8)

"Never there is any finality to the fallacious arguments. Thus, what needs to be discarded is *kutarka* and not reasoning."

Sound reasoning has its own place. It is well said -

युक्तियुक्तं वचो ग्राह्यं बालादपि शुकादपि ।

युक्तिहीनं वचस्त्याज्यं वृद्धादपि शुकादपि ॥

"A statement given to reasoning should be accepted even if uttered by a child or a parrot (*śuka*). But a statement devoid of any reasoning though declared by elderly persons like Sages Vasiṣṭha or Vāmadeva or even by Sage Śuka (son of Vyāsa) should be rejected."

THE WORD "PAÑCADAŚĪ"

The word "Pañcadaśī" can be resolved in two ways.

i) पञ्चदशप्रकरणान्यस्मिन् ग्रन्थे सन्तीति स्त्रीलिङ्गप्रत्ययेन पञ्चदशी ।

"The text which in itself has fifteen chapters, in the sense of 'matup' suffix i.e. that which is endowed with. Finally the word takes a feminine suffix."

ii) पञ्चाधिकानां दशानां प्रकरणानां समाहारः ।

"A collection of ten plus five chapters as a numerical determinative compound. Here also it finally takes a feminine suffix."

In either case, it means a text that contains fifteen chapters. If so, does this not mean that any text on any subject having fifteen chapters can be called as Pañcadaśī? Certainly this being so, we have to specify it as "Vedānta Pañcadaśī". For example *Śataśloki* means a composition having a hundred verses. By this name there is a famous book in Vedānta, composed by Ādi Śaṅkarācārya. But there is also another text by the same name containing hundred verses on surgery in *Āyurveda*. Therefore, it is desirable to prefix "Pañcadaśī" by the word "Vedānta".

Sri Rāyaprolu Liṅgana Somayāji in his commentary on this text gives indirectly a novel interpretation of the word "Pañcadaśī". According to *Amarakośa* - a Sanskrit dictionary - the word "Pañcadaśī" means either the new moon or the full moon - *pakṣāntau pañcadaśyau*. In the present context the meaning - full moon - is taken and thereby through implied sense, the word "Pañcadaśī" is considered to mean moonlight. It is well known that moonlight is soothing and comforting in the night to those who are scorched by the heat of the sun during the day. Similarly the *mumukṣus* who plunge into Vedānta to discover the truth,

in the beginning are faced with an uphill task of ascertaining the exact meaning which saps them away of their entire enthusiasm. They are no better than those who are parched in the scorching heat of summer. To such *mumukṣus* who are caught up in the heat of study of Vedānta, this text *Pañcadaśī* serves as the moonlight, soothing them by an easily understandable mode of presentation of teaching to unfold the final purport. This is true to a great extent except in the case of the First Chapter wherein the student may face some rough weather when confronted with terse logic.

SAT, CIT, ĀNANDA - THREE SECTIONS

Some interpreters divide the fifteen chapters into three sections, viewing them as an exposition of *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda* aspects of oneself. Of course the authors have not done so. But it is only a viewpoint like dividing *Bhagavadgītā* into three sections of six chapters each by presuming it to be the unfoldment of *tat tvam asi*. - So according to these, the first five chapters - *Viveka Pañcaka* - are taken as the unfoldment of *sat*. The next five chapters - *Dīpa Pañcaka* - reveal the *cit*, whereas the last five - *Ānanda Pañcaka* - exhaust themselves in ascertaining *ānanda* as our real nature. As already told, this is just a way of looking at the text and one should not conclude that the other two aspects are not dealt with in the remaining sections.

Another greatness of this text is that though all the chapters are interconnected, each by itself presents an independent mode of inquiry which is self sufficient in ascertaining the Truth. A student who takes to the study of any particular chapter is not at a loss, only because the others have not been studied.

Let us now enter into the study of the First Chapter - *Tattvaviveka* - the discrimination of *Tattva* - one's real nature.

VEDĀNTA PAÑCADAŚĪ

TATTVAVIVEKA PRAKARAṆAM

MAṄGALĀCARAṆA

Śrī Vidyāraṇya Muni begins the treatise by offering salutations to *Īśvara* and the *guru*. While doing so, he also hints at the *anubandhacatuṣṭaya* - the four essential aspects of any treatise.

The success of any endeavour depends on three factors. They are: the appropriate and adequate efforts; certain period of time that one has to wait for the efforts to fructify; and the third called *daivam* which is guided by one's *karmaphalas* - results of past actions. While the former two are within our purview, we have no direct control over the third. If *daivam* is favourable, there can be spectacular success. On the contrary if it is unfavourable, in spite of the best of efforts the result may not be upto one's expectation or it may even fail to yield any result. To ensure success, the scriptures recommend *maṅgalācaraṇam* - an auspicious introduction in the form of a prayer for the attainment of success, at the beginning of any undertaking or of any work of composition.

MAṄGALĀCARAṆA - WHY?

Mainly *maṅgalācaraṇa* is done keeping in view the following three motives:

- i) *Parisamāpti* - for the successful completion of the work that is undertaken without any obstruction.

Here, one may point out to certain works wherein *maṅgalācaraṇa* was done and yet they were not completed, and even say that there are other instances wherein the things are completed without any *maṅgalācaraṇa*. The possible reasons can be two. The intensity of past obstructions can be so strong that present efforts are incompetent to counteract them. Such prayers may also lack *śraddhā* and hence are unable to accomplish the desired results. *Maṅgalācaraṇa* can also be mental, in which case it may not have been expressly recorded in the composition in spite of its desired effect. It is also likely that in a particular case there may not be any past obstruction to warrant any prayer and the work that is undertaken can have its own completion.

We should always bear in mind that prayers can never go waste though there are a few factors which govern their efficacy.

ii) *Pracayagamanam* - propagation among the people of posterity.

A *Vedāntic* master who has accomplished the final goal of life has nothing to gain from this world. Yet these masters do take to such acts of writing or teaching out of their fullness and love for humanity so that people at large who are in need of this knowledge can derive maximum benefits. Naturally there is an expectation that such compositions should reach the many. None has any doubt that Lord Kṛṣṇa was the one who had no duty, for he had nothing that was not accomplished nor had he anything still to be acquired. Even then when he imparted the teaching of the *Gītā*, he did have the expectation that not only Arjuna, but also the future generations should gain the knowledge. Keeping this purpose also in view the masters offer *maṅgalācaraṇa*.

iii) *Śiṣṭācāra* - the practice of wise men.

It is a commonly observed norm in the world that the masses follow the classes of great men. The *Gītā* also confirms it in "*Yadyadācarati śreṣṭhaḥ tattadevetaro janaḥ*" - whatever an exalted person does, others follow suit (*Gītā* 3-21). Therefore to set an ideal conduct before the common people, the great masters follow this convention. In fact a person of the stature of Śrī Vidyāranya Muni does not need any prayers. After all, prayers are meant either to ward off the obstructions or to attain a desired end. For the one who has discovered the truth that everything is *maṅgalasvarūpa* - ever auspicious Brahman - where is the room for anything that is obstructive or inauspicious, or something else that needs to be desired? From their standpoint, the prayers are redundant. It is said -

सर्वदा सर्वकालेषु नास्ति तेषाममङ्गलम् ।

येषां हृदिस्थो भगवान् मङ्गलायतनम् हरिः ॥

"Under all conditions and always, there is nothing that is inauspicious unto those in whose heart *Īśvara*, the very abode of auspiciousness, abides."

The author certainly fits in the category of such great masters. Yet he offers *maṅgalācaraṇa*, just to set an ideal for others who certainly need it.

MAṄGALĀCARAṆA - HOW?

Iṣṭadevatāgurunamaskāralakṣaṇam: It is of the nature of salutations to *Īśvara* in the form that one invokes and to one's *guru*. Either the author expressly records it in the composition or in rare cases does so mentally. Here we have the same in the form of the first verse.

नमः श्रीशंकरानन्दगुरुपादाम्बुजन्मने ।
सविलासमहामोहग्राहग्रासैककर्मणे ॥१॥

namah śrīśaṅkarānandagurupādāmbujanmane
savilāsamahāmohagrāhagrāsaikakarmaṇe - (1)

सविलास-महामोह-ग्राह-ग्रासैककर्मणे - to the one whose main function is to destroy (*grāsaikakarmaṇe*) the crocodile (*grāha*) of basic ignorance (*mahāmoha*) along with its effect (*savilāsa*) श्रीशंकरानन्द-गुरु-पादाम्बुजन्मने - to the lotus feet (*padāmbujanmane*) of *guru Śrī Śaṅkarānanda* नमः (अस्तु) - (let) the salutation (be there).- (1)

1. Salutation to the lotus feet of (my) *guru Śrī Śaṅkarānanda*, whose only function is to destroy the crocodile of basic ignorance along with its effect.

Namah: I offer my salutation.

To whom?

To the lotus feet of the *guru* - the teacher *Śrī Śaṅkarānanda*. *Vidyāraṇya* had three teachers. From the salutation offered to *Śrī Śaṅkarānanda* here and in another *Vedāntic* treatise called "*Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgraha*" it is clear that *Śrī Śaṅkarānanda* was his *Vedāntic guru* after the *sannyāsa*. Previously he had other two masters viz. *Śrīkanthācārya* and *Bhāratīrtha*. This can also be verified from his salutations as *Mādhavācārya* to these two masters in a book called "*Kālānirṇaya*".

ŚRĪ ŚAṅKARĀNANDA AS THE GURU

Śrī means wealth which serves as the means that gives joy and wards off sorrow. The greatest wealth must be the one that can confer the limitless happiness besides the total destruction of sorrow. *Brahmavidyā*- self-knowledge - alone can be such *Śrī*. So *Śaṅkara* who is endowed with *Śrī* is *Śrī Śaṅkara*.

But who is *Śaṅkara*?

Śaṃ karoti iti śaṅkaraḥ - the one who confers śam - limitless happiness (*sukhaṃ, niratiśayaṃ ānandam*).

How can he accomplish such a feat?

He does it by the teaching which makes one discover the real nature to be nothing but *ānanda*, without any trace of sorrow because its very root is destroyed. All that Vedānta has to reveal is that your nature is verily *ānanda* and that sorrow is totally foreign to you. But due to ignorance you have disowned it. Please cultivate a ready mind with right attitude by which you inquire and discover this truth.

The one who is both Śrī Śaṅkara and *ānanda* (*Śrī śaṅkaraḥ ca asau ānandaḥ*) is Śrī Śaṅkarānanda.

What is *ānanda*?

Ānanda is *paraṃ Brahma*. This can be verified from *Taittirīya Śruti* which declares - "*ānando Brahmeti vyajānāt*" - Bhṛgu discovered that *ānanda* is Brahman (*Taittirīya Upaniṣad 3-6*).

Thus the one who is Śrī Śaṅkara and also Brahman, the *ānanda*, is Śrī Śaṅkarānanda. In other words Śrī Śaṅkarānanda is the one who has discovered oneself to be Brahman (*Brahmabhāvam āpannaḥ*). Thus Śrī Śaṅkarānanda can be taken as the *guru* of Vidyāraṇya Muni to whom the salutation is offered.

ŚRĪ ŚAṅKARA AS ĪŚVARA

The words "Śrī Śaṅkara" can also be taken to mean *Īśvara*. In this case Śaṅkara is the *paramātmā* who confers *ānanda* to the entire creation, being the very source of any *ānanda* because "*cṣa hyevānandayati*" - because this *paramātmā* alone delights the world (*Taittirīya Upaniṣad 2-7*). Śrī in this case is the limitless powers at the disposal of *Īśvara*. So Śrī Śaṅkara is *Īśvara* endowed with such powers.

IDENTITY OF JĪVA AND ĪŚVARA

The word "*ānanda*" in the name Śrī Śaṅkarānanda can also be taken as the real nature of *jīva* - the individual - which will be deduced by the author in verse 8. Because the words "*śaṅkara*" and "*ānanda*", being in the same declensional case, enjoy the state of relating to the same given thing, called *sāmānādhikaraṇyam*, this reveals that the *Īśvara* as expressed by Śrī Śaṅkara and the *jīva* indicated by *ānanda* are both same in their real nature, viz. Brahman. Such Śrī Śaṅkarānanda himself is the *guru*. *Īśvara* also is the first *guru* being the *guru* of all *gurus*.

Pādāmbujanmane: Unto the lotus (*ambujanmane*) feet (*pāda*) of Śrī Śaṅkarānandā either as *guru* or as *Īśvara*, the salutations are offered. The word "*pāda*" (foot), though singular, signifies the species and so indicates both the feet.

THE FUNCTION OF THESE LOTUS FEET

What type of lotus feet are these? What is their nature? Or what function do they do?

Their only function is to destroy the basic ignorance of our real nature along with its effect, the entire creation. *Vilāsa* means the entire aggregate of effect in terms of the creation i.e. *śṛṣṭirūpakāryasamūhaḥ*. The creation, *jagat*, also includes my embodiment and *ahaṁkāra* - the "I" notion. It is not just destruction of the effect, the *jagat*, but also its root cause. The *mahāmoha* the basic ignorance of ourselves - is compared to a crocodile. Just as a person who is under the clutches of a crocodile finds it impossible to get freed from it in the normal course, so difficult it is for a common person to get freed from the grip of ignorance. So, the only job of the lotus feet of the *guru* is figuratively described as swallowing this crocodile of ignorance along with its effect (*savilāsa*). In other words the *guru* destroys the *saṁsāra* with its root cause, the ignorance, by imparting the self-knowledge.

WE SHOULD INQUIRE

Here one may argue that the *guru's* benevolence befits his generous disposition. Let him be busy with his only job, whereas we can mind our sole preoccupation of pursuit of sense objects in the world! After all, is he not bound to destroy our ignorance?

It is not so, just as one's hunger is not appeased if someone else eats the food. Howsoever efficient and industrious the physician may be, unless the patient makes oneself available to the therapy, no cure can ever be effected. So are we; unless we deliver ourselves in the hands of the *guru* through the right exposure to teaching, he is helpless to come to our rescue. This is indicated by the act of salutation - *namaḥ*. The word "*namaḥ*" expresses the *prahvibhāva* - the suppliant attitude. It is like the attitude of surrender. The *guru* can certainly help. But the *mumukṣu* should also be ready in terms of *sādhana* *catuṣṭayasampatti* and take to inquiry as guided by the *guru* and *sāstras*.

ANUBANDHACATUṢṬAYA

The verse also hints at the *anubandhacatuṣṭaya*.

The four essential aspects of any treatise are grouped as *anubandhacatuṣṭaya*. They are - *viśaya*, *prayojanam*, *adhikāri* and *saṃbandha*.

i) *Viśaya* - the subject matter.

As seen earlier the words "*śaṅkara*" and "*ānanda*" being in *sāmānādhikaranyam* reveal the identity of *jīva* and *Īśvara* which is the subject matter of this text.

ii) *Prayojanam* - the purpose.

All the pursuits are prompted by the corresponding promised results. Even a foolish person will not undertake any work without knowing the result thereof. One's own discovery of the knowledge unfolded by Pañcadaśī reveals the limitless *ānanda* nature of oneself. This is the purpose, besides the total destruction of *saṃsāra* characterised by the swallowing of the crocodile of *mahāmoha* along with its effect.

iii) *Adhikāri* - eligible person.

A writer writes for a particular class of readers. A speaker speaks to a specific set of audience. So is the teaching of Vedānta addressed to those who are mature enough to imbibe and assimilate the unfoldment of oneself. Who they are will be clear from the next verse.

iv) *Sambandha* - the relation between the text and the purpose to be accomplished.

To know the *saṃbandha* some understanding about the roles played by *karmakāṇḍa* and *jñānakāṇḍa* portions of Vedas is desirable. In *karmakāṇḍa* varieties of rituals and sacrifices are described as the means to fulfill variegated desires entertained by an equally large number of persons. Therefore, the topics are different and *adhikāris* are different. The *phalas*, the results, are also different. The means - the *karmas* - too are different. A given person has to exercise one's will to choose the end and the means. Again, mere understanding of the means will not yield the results. Appropriate action should follow.

In contrast to this, in *jñānakāṇḍa* which contains the *Upaniṣads*, the only topic is the knowledge of identity between *jīva* and Brahman; the *adhikāri* is one who has the required maturity of mind; and the result is only one, viz. *mokṣa* - the freedom from the existence of limitations

and sorrows and thereby discovery that one's real nature is limitless *ānanda*. In fact this is not the result of any actions, but only the owning up of our real nature which was ever free from bondage and yet appeared to be bound due to ignorance. Thus the role of *jñānakāṇḍa* is to make us inquire into our real nature and remove the wrong notions about ourselves by the destruction of ignorance. It does not produce our real nature. Thus *jñānakāṇḍa* serves as *bodhaka* (that which reveals) or *pratipādaka* (that which unfolds), whereas *bodhya* (that which is revealed) or *pratipādyā* (that which is unfolded) is my own real nature. This is the relation between the *jñānakāṇḍa* and the goal to be achieved by it. Because *Pañcadaśī* is an elaboration of what is told by *Upaniṣads*, it also enjoys the same *sambandha* as that of *jñānakāṇḍa*. Though this is not hinted at in the text, we have to infer so in its context.

In the next verse, having told the secondary purpose of this text, the *adhikāri* is mentioned. Thereafter the topic of this chapter is introduced.

तत्पादाम्बुरुहद्वन्द्वसेवानिर्मलचेतसाम् ।
सुखबोधाय तत्त्वस्य विवेकोऽयं विधीयते ॥२॥

tatpādāmburuhadvandvasevānirmalacetasām
sukhabodhāya tattvasya vivekoyam vidhīyate - (2)

तत्पादाम्बुरुहद्वन्द्वसेवानिर्मलचेतसाम् - of those who have pure mind (*nirmalacetasām*) by the service (*sevā*) of the lotus feet (*pādāmburuhadvandva*) of the *guru* (*tat*) सुखबोधाय - for the easy understanding अयं - this तत्त्वस्य - of the real nature विवेकः - discrimination विधीयते - is accomplished.- (2)

2. This discrimination about the real nature is accomplished (here) for the easy understanding of those who have pure mind by the service of the lotus feet of *guru*.

ADHIKĀRI

Tatpādāmburuhadvandva - *Tasya guroḥ* (of that *guru*) *pādau* (two feet) *eva* (themselves are) *āmburuhe* (the two lotuses), *tayoḥ* (of those two) *dvandvam* (a pair).

The two feet of the *guru* are compared to a pair of lotuses.

Tasya sevayā - By the service of this pair.

Nirmalacetasām - of those who have developed pure mind. That this treatise is composed for their easy understanding, will be seen later.

Pure mind is the one which is free from likes, dislikes etc. and so is relatively calm and composed. Service to the lotus feet of *guru* is shown as the means to develop such a mind. Service presupposes *śraddhā*. *Śraddhā* is the firm conviction (*āstikyabuddhi*) that what is told by scriptures and taught by the *guru* is true. Until we ourselves verify the truth, *śraddhā* serves as a seed capital in a business. It is not a blind belief wherein one never cares to verify the truth of what has been accepted.

And mere *śraddhā* by itself is not sufficient. One should have the firm commitment to accomplish the goal along with mastery over the senses.

Lord Kṛṣṇa also has described the means of gaining the self-knowledge as -

श्रद्धावाँल्लभते ज्ञानं तत्परः संयतेन्द्रियः ।

(*Gītā* 4-39)

"The one who is endowed with *śraddhā*, committed to the means of gaining the knowledge like service of the *guru* etc., and who has mastery over the senses, gains the knowledge."

Here the word "*sevā*" - service - is indicative of the entire *sādhana* *catuṣṭayasampatti*. It also includes the indirect means like *karmayoga* etc. Actions performed with the right attitude are meant to purify the mind though they cannot reveal our real nature directly. Knowledge can be gained by self-inquiry alone.

Ācārya Śaṅkara has clarified the role of these two in the following:

चित्तस्य शुद्धये कर्म न तु वस्तूपलब्धये ।
वस्तु सिद्धिर्विचारेण न किञ्चित्कर्मकोटिभिः ॥

(*Vivekacūdamāṇi* - 10)

"Action is meant for the purification of the mind and not to gain the real nature of oneself. Real nature can be gained by inquiry and not by crores of actions."

Actions being the product of ignorance are not opposed to it and hence are incapable of destroying it. Knowledge alone which is

opposed to ignorance, like light to darkness, can destroy it.

Those who have the purified mind as described by the phrase *nirmalacetasām* are the *adhikāris* to expose to this treatise. Others who do not have such disposition, should acquire it if they are intent on gaining their freedom from the present existence of limitations and sorrows called *saṃsāra*.

SECONDARY PURPOSE

This text is meant for the easy understanding - *sukhabodhāya* - of those who are matured as described in the first line of this verse. *Pañcadaśī* unfolds the same truth as contained in the *Upaniṣads*, adopting elaborate but simple modes of inquiry, and thereby makes the subject matter easier to grasp. From this standpoint the meaning of *Pañcadaśī* as moonlight fits well. Such an easy presentation is also a secondary purpose of this treatise.

TOPIC OF THIS CHAPTER

Tattva is the real nature.

But the real nature of what?

Here it is the real nature of oneself.

In the context of Vedānta according to the *mahāvākya tattvamasī*, the word "*tat*" stands for Brahman. *Tvam* indicates the individual *jīva*. When the real nature of *tvam* - *jīva* - is ascertained, it is discovered to be the same as Brahman - the all pervasive pure awareness principle which is revealed by the verb *asi* - are. So the real nature of the individual is same as Brahman. This real nature of oneself is *tattvam*. Its *viveka* (*tattvasya vivekaḥ*) - discrimination or inquiry into its real nature in contrast to the false, which is taken as real - is conducted (*vidhīyate*) here in this chapter.

The method adopted is that of *Pañcakośaviveka*. Though in the beginning the reasoning is employed, later it will be substantiated by the declaration - *tat tvam asi* - in the *śruti*. Finally *saṃādhi* - the state of total absorption of the mind in the knowledge of one's real nature - will be discussed.

SAMVIT IS INDESTRUCTIBLE

"I" - IS SAT CIT ĀNANDA

The inquiry that is being conducted is very methodical. Proceeding step by step, it will be shown that the *jīva*, in other words "me" in reality is *sat*, *cit*, *ānanda* and is identical with Brahman. Generally the words "*sat*", "*cit*", "*ānanda*" are translated as existence, knowledge and bliss respectively, but they have to be understood in the right perspective.

In this world of transactions, the word "existence" means, to us, the existence of a given object, being or event. For example, a tree is; a bird is; and after their destruction they are not there. Therefore, such an existence is subject to destruction, whereas *sat* means that existence principle which is always there, but is never destructible. Again, what we mean by "knowledge" is the knowledge of a given thing which is limited in nature. In contrast to this, *cit* is that indestructible knowledge principle because of which we know all that we know including what we know not. So also the word "bliss" is commonly understood by all as either any sense pleasure, serene happiness, a cause of great delight or happiness or some ecstasy presented by certain mental frame. Such bliss is limited and depends on many factors. According to the English dictionary, bliss also means the ecstasy of salvation and spiritual joy. These words by themselves will not convey the right sense unless they are properly unfolded. Even the word "*ānanda*" is commonly used for *viśaya sukha* - the sense pleasure. When the word "*ānanda*" is used to unfold one's real nature, it is to be taken in the sense of limitless *ānanda*, independent of everything.

In fact all words without any exception including the word "Brahman," being relative have their own limitations and hence fall short of what the real nature of Brahman is. Yet they are to be stripped of their accompanying limitations in the common usage and then made to convey. This is the task of a *Vedāntic* teacher. This is the style of *Vedāntic* teaching. *Upaniṣads* themselves have adopted this style. To describe the *Brahmānanda* - the limitless *ānanda* -, *Taittirīya* and *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣads* in their *ānandamīmāṃsā* sections analyse all the possible *ānandas* in this creation that are due to embodiments beginning from an exalted human being to *Hiraṇyagarbha*. This is done only to point out that the sum total of all these *ānandas* is just an

infinitesimal fraction, as it were, of *Brahmānanda*, like a droplet of water in contrast to the whole ocean. Thus the limitation that accompanies any possible *ānanda* in the created world is negated to unfold the limitless *ānanda*.

In the inquiry that is adopted here, while revealing the *sat, cit, ānanda* nature of *jīva*, first of all in verses 3 to 7 the *cit* aspect, called here *saṁvit*, is proved to be *nitya* - indestructible - being free from time. As seen earlier *saṁvit* or *cit* is the knowledge principle and not the knowledge of a given thing. To begin with, the *jīva* - "me" - is *saṁvit*. Further, this *saṁvit* - "me" - is shown to be limitless *ānanda* which is also indestructible. Therefore "me", hitherto mistaken as *saṁsārī*, is nothing but *sat, cit, ānanda*.

WE ARE WHAT WE SEEK

Actually all of us want to be free from mortality, death, and to live forever. Everyone wants to be free from sorrow and be happy forever and no one wants to suffer ignorance. Nobody is an exception to this. Truly the inquiry based on *śruti* is going to reveal to us that in reality we are what we seek. On account of ignorance alone we take ourselves to be contrary to our real nature which is *sat, cit, ānanda*. Therefore, the inquiry that is going to be conducted should culminate into the appreciation of our real nature leading to *nididhyāsana* - contemplation.

VIṢAYI-VIṢAYA

Before entering into the inquiry, it will be helpful if we know the broad division that this world can be subjected to and how perception takes place.

The world can be divided into two categories. One is *aḥam* - "I" - and the other is *iḍam* - this. Removal of remoteness can reduce whatever that is called "that" into "this". "I" is always the subject whereas "this" ever remains as the object. So the same division can also be viewed as *viṣayi* - the subject "me" - and *viṣaya* - the sense object. The sense objects are *śabda* - sound, *sparga* - touch, *rūpa* - form, *rasa* - taste and *gandha* - smell. They are called *viṣayas* because they bind (*viṣinoti, badhnāti*) the individuals in terms of their dependence on them due to the wrong notion that they can give happiness. That is why we hanker for sense objects, to be happy. Whenever the desired objects are obtained we are happy. Though at the outset it appears to be so, really we are not interested in the *viṣayas*. What we want in fact is the pleasing "me" - the pleasing self - which we hope to get

through the *viṣayas*.

For instance, there is a desired object which one thinks is capable of giving happiness. But after acquiring, when it is found that it is not so, that object is discarded with the least hesitation. Therefore the *viṣayi*- the subject - seeks the *viṣayas*- the objects - not for the sake of themselves, but for the sake of one's happiness. Hoping to get the pleasing me, the happy me, through the sense objects is based on the wrong notion that "I am sorrowful and *viṣayas* are capable of giving me happiness."

I AM ĀNANDA - FREE FROM SORROW

If my real nature is sorrow, I can never be free from sorrow, because none can be separated from one's real nature. If that were the case, all should be basically sorrowful, with some happiness coming and going now and then at the backdrop of my sorrowful nature. Is it not so? Are there no moments in our life when we are away from sorrow at least temporarily?

All of us certainly know that in sleep we are happy without any trace of sorrow, which is universally recollected. This would have been next to impossible if our real nature were sorrow.

From the foregoing, one has to conclude that "sorrow cannot be my real nature and the very fact that I am seeking happiness all the time, without any compromise, shows that *ānanda* must be my real nature, but somehow disowned. To begin with, I may court sense objects but it is only to regain the pleased me and not for the sake of the very objects." This also should give a clue that "I am *ānanda* free from sorrow."

PERCEPTION

If the subject is to desire sense objects, they should be known. They are known through perception. The sense organs backed up by the mind contact the sense objects. Actually the *antaḥkaraṇa* - the mind - goes to the objects through the channels of sense organs and takes the form of the respective objects by itself undergoing modification. *Antaḥkaraṇavṛttis* or thoughts, being inert, cannot give the knowledge of objects independently. They need to be illumined by the knowledge principle - *saṃvit* or *cit*, the pure awareness. Because of the ever present *cit* in the *antaḥkaraṇa*, there is *cidābhāsa* - the reflected *cit* - which illumines the thoughts enabling them to impart the knowledge of objects.

The author attempts now to trace back the very knowledge principle which illumines the thought patterns whereby we gain the knowledge of the objects.

शब्दस्पर्शादयो वेद्या वैचित्र्याज्जागरे पृथक् ।
ततो विभक्ता तत्संविदैकरूप्यान्न भिद्यते ॥३॥

*śabdasparśādayo vedyā vaicitryājjāgare pṛthak
tato vibhaktā tatsaṁvidāikarūpyānna bhidyate - (3)*

जागरे - in the waking state वेद्या - the things to be known
शब्दस्पर्शादयः - the sound, touch etc वैचित्र्यात् - because of being
distinct पृथक् (भवन्ति) - differ ततः - from them विभक्ता - separated
तत्संविद् - their knowledge ऐकरूप्यात् - because of being identical
न - does not भिद्यते - differ. - (3)

3. In the waking state, the objects to be known viz. sound, touch etc. differ (from each other), because of being distinct. Their knowledge, separated from those known, does not differ because of being the same.

WAKING STATE

Waking is the state wherein sense organs and organs of action are both pressed into function - *sarvendriyāṇāṁ vyāpāradaśā*. It is the state wherein we perceive by the sense organs and act through the organs of action.

Waking state is also defined as

इन्द्रियैः अर्थोपलब्धिः जागरितम् ।

(पञ्चीकरणम्)

"gaining the knowledge of objects through the sense organs."

This also indicates the actions by the means of organs of action. The word "*indriya*" - senses - is added to these definitions to exclude the dream wherein we appear to perceive and act but without the use of senses.

VEDYA DIFFERS

Vedya comprises all that can be the object of the function of

knowing or all that one can be aware of. They are specified as *śabdasparśādayaḥ* - sound, touch and the like. The rest of these can be form, taste and smell, to begin with; but the list is not complete with these, as all those which are distinct from each other (*vicitrāḥ* - variegated) fall in this category. Therefore, the sense organs, organs of action, five elements and the entire world made up of these elements, are also *vedya* because no two things in the world are the same. All these are the objects of our knowledge and are different from each other.

SAMVIT IS ONE AND THE SAME

Now we have to separate *saṃvit* - the knowledge principle - from the knowledge of a given known thing. All that we know is presented to us through *antaḥkaraṇavṛttis* - the thoughts either in terms of perception or otherwise. All that we cognise is through the instrumentation of thoughts only, and not directly through the object. That is the reason why erroneous knowledge is possible. A rope may be mistaken for a snake. But thoughts themselves being inert need to be illumined by *saṃvit* - the knowledge principle. Thus the knowledge of a given thing consists of the thought of the form of the thing plus *saṃvit*. Discard the thought from that particular knowledge and what remains is the knowledge principle - *saṃvit*. Thus we have to discriminate. This is the *saṃvit* of those known things, separated (*vibhaktā*) from their respective objects which differ from each other.

Tataḥ - *vailakṣaṇyena pratiyamānebhyaḥ viśayebhyaḥ* - from the objects which are known to be distinct from the other.

Tat saṃvit-teṣāṃ vedyānāṃ saṃvit-saṃvit, the knowledge principle belonging to those known varieties.

Ekarūpā - means the same or identical.

Aikarūpyāt therefore means - because of the status of being identical.

Saṃvit, so separated from those known varieties does not differ, because it is one and the same principle though the objects known were variegated. Knowledge of sound (*śabda saṃvit*) differs from that of form (*rūpa saṃvit*) etc., but the knowledge principle is one and the same.

For example, you see various objects having different forms in the presence of light. Though the forms differ the light is one and the same. According to physics bare light cannot be seen. What is seen is the light reflected from the objects. So, according to the objects

the forms seen in the light do differ, but not the light by itself.

Take different pots of different capacities. Their volumes do differ, but not the space in each. It is the same. Again, imagine glass jars of different colours, say red, yellow, pink, blue, green etc. Fill them up with water. What you see now is red water, yellow water, pink water, blue water, green water etc. Really water is one and the same. But the colours of the jars make the same water appear differently.

UPĀDHI

Here we say that the coloured glass jars serve as the *upādhi* for water. An *upādhi* is that which makes a given thing appear different from what it is without any intrinsic change in the thing. In the case of the above example, actually the water did not change though it appeared to be coloured.

Udayanācārya, a great logician, etymologically interprets the word "*upādhi*" as -

उप समीपवर्तिनि आदधाति संक्रामयति स्वीयं धर्मम् इति
उपाधिः ।

" *Upādhi* is that which imparts its own attribute to a nearby object."

But the etymological derivation needs a qualification that it appears to impart the attribute, but really does not. Only then can it be called *upādhi*. Otherwise it will be the cause of some *pariṇāma* - change.

Similarly the different *antaḥkaraṇavṛttis*- thoughts corresponding to the forms of variegated known objects- serve as the *upādhi* for *saṃvit*. Though *saṃvit* is one and the same, totally unaffected and independent of these, it appears as though different in accordance with the knowledge of a particular object. That is why we have to separate *saṃvit* from the particular types of knowledge and discover it to be one and the same.

VEDYA IS TRANSIENT

Further we have to ascertain as to who is transient and who is permanent among the *vedya* and *saṃvit*. Perception, as we have seen, is on account of the *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* travelling through the channels of respective sense organs to the object. There it takes the form of the object which is illumined by *cidābhāsa*- the reflected pure awareness. Thus the knowledge of the object is gained.

To understand this, let us take an illustration. You take a mirror and go in the open sunlight. The mirror shines, and all the objects that are in front of the mirror are also faithfully reflected.

Because of what does the mirror shine?

The mirror shines because of sunlight.

Let us presume that all the objects in front of the mirror are removed. There are no objects whatsoever in front of it. In the open sunlight, will the mirror shine or not? It does shine because its shining is on account of sunlight, and not due to the objects that are in front of it. Let us now suppose that the mirror itself is removed.

Does the sun shine or not? Or does the sun say "Oh my god! The mirror is removed. How can I shine now?"

Certainly not. The sun verily shines. The mirror shines because of the sun, but the sun shines independent of the mirror, whereas the objects in front of the mirror are reflected only when the mirror, which shines on account of the sunlight, is there. So the sunlight is always there, independent of the mirror and the objects. This means that the mirror and objects reflected are transient.

Let us apply our findings to the illustrated. This *antaḥkaraṇa* of ours, wherein the *cidābhāsa* is available, is like the mirror. *Samvit* is like the sun. *Vedyas* are like the objects reflected in the mirror. When *vedyas* come in contact with the *antaḥkaraṇa* through the channels of the sense organs, we gain the knowledge of them. If *vedyas* are not there, i.e. if the objects known are not there, the *antaḥkaraṇa* still continues to be there with the *cidābhāsa*. So it is independent of the *vedyas*.

Now this *antaḥkaraṇa* shines on account of *cidābhāsa*, the reflected *samvit*. Even if the *antaḥkaraṇa* is not there, as in sleep, *samvit* - the knowledge principle - is still there.

Therefore, *śabdādi vedyas* come and go, whereas *samvit* is always there. Thus, the transient *vedyas* differ from each other in contrast to the permanent *samvit* which is the same. This will be clearer when the dream and sleep states also are considered.

This fact about the waking state is now being extended to the dream state. The attempt of the author is to show that this *samvit* is one and the same. It does not change in the waking and the dream, irrespective of the different *vedyas*. Thereafter it will be shown that in the deep sleep also, *samvit* does not change, being one and the same. So, *samvit* in the waking, dream and deep sleep states is the

same, without any change.

तथा स्वप्नेऽत्र वेद्यं तु न स्थिरं जागरे स्थिरम् ।
तद्भेदोऽतस्तयोः संविदेकरूपा न भिद्यते ॥४॥

*tathā svapnetra vedyam tu na sthiram jāgare sthiram
tadbhedotastayoh samvidekarūpā na bhidyate - (4)*

तथा - so (is) स्वप्ने - in the dream अत्र - here वेद्यं - known object
न - (is) not स्थिरं - lasting जागरे - in the waking state तु - on the contrary
स्थिरं - lasting अतः - therefore तद्भेदः - the difference between them
तयोः - of both एकरूपा - identical संविद् - knowledge principle न - does
not भिद्यते - differ. - (4)

4. So is the case in the dream. Here the known object is not lasting. On the contrary (it is) lasting in the waking state. Therefore (there is) difference between them. (But) the identical knowledge principle of both the waking state and the dream state does not differ.

DREAM STATE

Dream is defined as -

करणेषूपसंहतेषु जागरितसंस्कारजः प्रत्ययः सविषयः
स्वप्नः । (पञ्चीकरणम्)

"When the senses are withdrawn, the experience along with the objects that is born of waking state impressions is dream".

All the dream experiences including the objects therein are the projections of *antahkaraṇa* when both the sense organs and organs of action have withdrawn from their respective functions.

SIMILARITY BETWEEN WAKING AND DREAM

Just as in the waking state the variegated sense objects differ from each other, but their *samvit* being the same does not differ, so is the case (*tathā*) in the dream (*svapne*). In the dream also the dream objects differ from each other but not *samvit*.

CONTRAST BETWEEN WAKING AND DREAM

If there is no distinction between the waking state and the dream,

as *saṃvit* does not differ, though the sense objects in both the states do, a doubt can be raised as to why do we distinguish between both the states. The answer follows in the very verse itself. In the dream (*atṛa*), the *vedyas* are not *sthira*, *sthāyi* - lasting - and in the waking on the contrary, they are relatively lasting.

Whatever that is dreamt is not going to be there for a long period of time because the moment the dream ends it is no more there. In contrast to this the *Vedyas* in the waking are available for a longer period of time. Generally we can deal with them even later, being available for perception. These have the *vyāvahārikasattā* - the transactional reality - whereas the dream objects are subjective projections. The former is tangible, but not the latter.

Thus on account of this distinction of lasting and not lasting nature of the objects, there is a contrast between these two states.

SAME SAṂVIT IN BOTH STATES

Again, there is room for another doubt. If waking and dream states differ from each other, should it not be equally true that their *saṃvit*, viz. *jāgarasaṃvit* - waking state *saṃvit* - and *svapnasaṃvit* - dream state *saṃvit* - also differ from each other?

This cannot be so.

Why?

The *antaḥkaraṇa vṛttis* corresponding to the objects of waking or dream, which serve as the *upādhisto saṃvit*, differ, but the knowledge principle - *saṃvit* - is one and the same, as seen earlier. *Saṃvit* is *ekarūpā* - identical - irrespective of the particular types of knowledge belonging to waking or dream states.

To summarise, *vedyas* - the known objects - in the waking and the dream differ. *Saṃvit* is the same all along and does not differ.

INQUIRY ABOUT SLEEP

We should now focus our present inquiry on the deep sleep state. Are there *vicitra vedyas* in sleep, or is there any *vedya* at all in the state of sleep? Also, is *saṃvit* present in sleep?

In both waking and dream states the variegated *vedyas* along with *saṃvit* are there. We also know from our experience that in deep sleep there are no variegated *vedyas*. Then perhaps *saṃvit* alone may be present in sleep to the exclusion of all the *vedyas*. In that case, should we not know it the moment we enter into sleep? After all, our

aim is to discover this *samvit* as "me" and how nice it would have been if we can know the same in sleep! Unfortunately, it is not so. We are none the wiser after sleep.

We hastily concluded that there is no *vedya* in sleep, only because the variegated *vedyas* are not available. However, there is a *vedya* in sleep, which is not variegated, though not available as a present fact of experience.

The presence of such a *vedya* is indicated in the next verse, after which the author proceeds to show the presence of one and the same *samvit* in sleep also.

सुप्तोत्थितस्य सौषुप्ततमोबोधो भवेत्स्मृतिः ।

सा चावबुद्धविषयाऽवबुद्धं तत्तदा तमः ॥५॥

*suptotthitasya sauṣuptatamobodho bhavetsmṛtiḥ
sā cāvabuddhaviṣayāḥvabuddhaṁ tattadā tamaḥ - (5)*

सुप्तोत्थितस्य - of the one who has woken up from sleep सौषुप्ततमोबोधः - the knowledge of ignorance during sleep स्मृतिः - a memory भवेत् - should be सा - that (memory) च - and अवबुद्धविषया - (is) the one which pertains to an earlier experienced object तदा - then तत् - that तमः - ignorance अवबुद्धं - was experienced. - (5)

5. To a person who has woken up from sleep, the knowledge of ignorance during the sleep is a memory and that memory is the one which pertains to an earlier experienced object. (Therefore) that (viz. I did not know anything) ignorance was experienced in sleep.

SLEEP

Sleep is defined as

सर्वप्रकारज्ञानोपसंहारे बुद्धेः कारणात्मनाऽवस्थानं
सुषुप्तिः ।

(पञ्चीकरणम्)

"When all types of knowledge and activities are withdrawn, the abidance of *antaḥkāraṇa* in the form of its cause is sleep."

At that time all the senses along with the *antaḥkāraṇa* withdraw themselves from their respective functions.

MEMORY REVEALS IGNORANCE IN SLEEP

Suptotthitah - *Suptam* means sleep. Thus the term means the one woken up from sleep or a person who had slept earlier and woke up thereafter.

If you ask such a person - "What did you know in the deep sleep state?" - the universal answer will be - "*na kiñcidavediṣam* - I did not know anything".

This ignorance (*tamaḥ*) of everything including that of "me" in the sleep is called *saṁsṛta tamaḥ*. Everyone has its knowledge (*bodhaḥ*), because we know that nothing was known in sleep.

The question now arises: "how do you know that you did not know anything in sleep; was it a direct experience, or is it just an inference or memory?"

If you say it to be an experience, it should be either a direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) or inference (*anumāna*). It cannot be a perception, which inevitably needs the contact between the sense organs and the objects perceived (*indriyasannikarṣa*). In the deep sleep state, the contact between the sense organs and sense objects was absent. In fact even the senses were not available there.

It cannot be inference also, because an inference presupposes a *liṅga* - a mark - which is directly perceived and should be capable of providing a *hetu* - a reason. This too is not possible. Therefore, the knowledge that "I did not know anything in sleep" is not an experience but verily mere memory.

EXPERIENCE PRECEDES MEMORY

A memory is certainly preceded by an experience. Without an experience, no memory is possible. Anything that is memorised is certainly experienced in the past.

If "I did not know anything in the deep sleep state" is a memory, then it should necessarily be preceded by an experience. Let us recall that our attempt is to find out whether, in the deep sleep state, there is any *vedya*. In this context we have to show that this memory on waking up - that I did not know anything in the deep sleep state - is preceded by an experience. During sleep, was I available as the knower of ignorance (i.e. "I do not know anything") as a present fact

of experience like the many things that we do not know in the waking state? Certainly not, because unlike in the waking state, in sleep one cannot say, "I know that I don't know." Then how can we assert that there was at that time an experience of not knowing anything?

Yet, we cannot deny its memory and therefore infer that there was a corresponding experience during sleep. That memory is the one which has an experienced (*avabuddha*) object (*viśaya*) as its content. This statement is based on an invariable concomitance or invariable coexistence, called *vyāpti*, viz. whatever that is memorised should be preceded by an experience like - "she is my mother". When you say "she is my mother", it is a case of memory and not perception. "Here is a lady", is a fact verifiable by perception. But when you say that she is your mother, you recollect that this lady tended you, she took care of you, she brought you up with affection. So that is memory and not perception.

Similarly, "I did not know anything in sleep" is a memory. It should necessarily be preceded by an experience of that ignorance. Though I was not available as a knower during sleep due to the dormant condition of *antaḥkaraṇa*, the experience of that ignorance can certainly be inferred based on this invariable coexistence of memory with its precedent experience (vide Appendix, for details on inference).

IGNORANCE IS VEDYA IN SLEEP

Thus during sleep (*tadā*), the ignorance (*tamaḥ*) viz. "I did not know anything" (*tad*) was experienced (*avabuddham*). This ignorance is the vedya in sleep. It is not variegated (*vicitra*), unlike the *vedyas* in the other two states.

EXPERIENCE PRESUPPOSES *SAMVIT*

No experience is ever possible without the basis of *samvit* - the knowledge principle. Therefore the very fact that we experience ignorance during sleep proves that *samvit* is verily present in that state also. Otherwise it is just impossible to have that experience and the corresponding memory.

This *samvit*, on account of whom the experience in sleep is possible, is different from its object, the ignorance. This is the very same *samvit* which is present in the other two states. These two facts are now presented and thereafter *samvit* is shown to be the indestructible, self-luminous principle.

स बोधो विषयाद्भिन्नो न बोधात्स्वप्नबोधवत् ।
एवं स्थानत्रयेऽप्येका संवित्तद्वद्दिनान्तरे ॥६॥

मासाब्दयुगकल्पेषु गतागम्येष्वनेकधा ।
नोदेति नास्तमेत्येका संविदेष्टा स्वयंप्रभा ॥७॥

*sa bodho viṣayādbhinno na bodhātsvapnabodhavat
evam sthānatrayeṣyēkā saṁvittadvaddināntare - (6)*

*māsābdayugakalpeṣu gatāgamyeṣvanekadhā
nodeti nāstametyekā saṁvideṣṭā svayamprabhā - (7)*

सः - that बोधः - knowledge विषयात् - from (its) object भिन्नः - (is) different स्वप्नबोधवत् - like the knowledge in the dream बोधात् - from (other) knowledge न - not (different) एवं - thus स्थानत्रयेऽपि - in (all) three states of experience also संवित् - the knowledge principle एका - (is) one तद्वत् - likewise दिनान्तरे - in other days. - (6)

अनेकधा - in various मासाब्दयुगकल्पेषु - in months, years, ages, and world cycles गतागम्येषु - in the past and future संवित् - the knowledge principle एका - (is) one न उदेति - is not born न अस्तमेति - does not get destroyed एषा - this स्वयंप्रभा - (is) self-effulgent. - (7)

6. That knowledge is different from (its) object (i.e. ignorance) like the knowledge in the dream. (That knowledge) is not different from other knowledge. Thus in (all) the three states of experience also the knowledge is the same. Similarly (it is the same) in other days (too).

7. (So also) in various months, years, ages and world cycles, past and future, the knowledge is the same. (Therefore it) is not born. (It) does not get destroyed. This (knowledge is) self-effulgent.

SAMVIT IS DISTINCT FROM IGNORANCE

Bodhaḥ - saṁvit, the knowledge principle - because of which we experience ignorance in sleep, is distinct from its *viśaya* - the object, viz. ignorance, as we have already seen that *viśayi* - the subject - is different from the *viśaya* - the object.

To this the illustration of *svapnabodha* - the knowledge in the dream - is given. Just as the knowledge principle in dream is distinct

from dream objects, so is this *saṁvit* in sleep different from its *viśaya* - the ignorance.

This *saṁvit* in sleep is not different (*na bhinnāḥ*) from that (*bodhāḥ*) in the other two states. Here too the *svapnabodhavat* illustration can be applied, but in a different way. Just as the *saṁvit* in dream is not different from that in the waking state, so is this *saṁvit* in sleep not different from the *saṁvit* in both the waking and dream states.

As seen earlier the *vedyas* which serve as an *upādhi* to *saṁvit* differ from one another, as a result of which types of specific knowledge differ. Due to lack of discrimination, these differences are attributed to *saṁvit*. In reality *saṁvit* is one and the same without any change.

SAMVIT IS ALWAYS THE SAME

So far we have seen in this sample analysis that *saṁvit* is one and the same in all the three states of experience which together constitute the experiences of a given day. This should necessarily hold true for *saṁvit* on any day. Thus Vidyāraṇya Muni extends this discovery to other days.

Similarly (*tadvat*) in other days (*dināntare*) *saṁvit* is one (*ekam*) and the same.

Whatever that holds true for any day is equally so for any period of time, is shown further. The word '*tadvat*' - similarly - has to be connected to *māsa* - month etc. *Abda* means a year. *Yuga* is an age of the world. They are four in number, viz. *Satya*, *Tretā*, *Dvāpara* and *Kali*. Presently we are in *Kaliyuga*. There are certain connecting periods also in the beginning and the end of each *yuga*. All these four *yugas* put together is called *caturyuga* along with the connecting periods. One *caturyuga* is equivalent to 4.32 million human years. One thousand *caturyugas* amount to a *kalpa* which corresponds to the span of a day of *Hiraṇyagarbha* - puranically called *Brahmā*. Then comes the dissolution which is the night of *Hiraṇyagarbha* having the same duration as that of *kalpa*. In *Bhagavadgītā* (8-17) also we find that a day of *Brahmā* is one thousand *yugas*. There the word "*yuga*" means a *caturyuga*.

During all these spans of time *saṁvit* is one and the same. This applies not only to a given *kalpa*, but also to all the *kalpas* in the past (*gata*) or in the future (*āgāmya*) to come.

Therefore, *saṁvit* is *nitya* - the everlasting. Actually it is free from time because time is a *vedya* - a known entity illumined by *saṁvit*. It being the same all the time without any change, should necessarily

be *satyam* - the indestructible - which we are going to discuss now.

SAMVIT IS SAT

Samvit nodeti - the knowledge principle is not born. *Na astameti* - it does not get destroyed. If it were to be born, there should be a sentient principle which marks its birth just as the birth of a child is noted by someone. This is true for destruction also. But *samvit* being only one, there cannot be another *samvit* to note its birth or destruction. Birth and destruction of something which cannot be the object of knowledge of anyone, is not proved.

If birth and destruction of *samvit* cannot be known because there is no other *samvit*, perhaps it can know itself on its own.

Anything that is born does not exist before its birth. If *samvit* were to be born at a given period of time, it does not exist as *samvit* even a microsecond prior to it. If so, how can a nonexistent *samvit*, which is not yet born, know its own birth? Similarly after its destruction, it is no more there to know its own destruction. Thus, for *samvit* to know its own birth and destruction is not possible.

Just to get rid of these problems, if we accept perforce another *samvit*, further problems will arise. The other one also being *samvit*, itself will be subject to birth and destruction, to know which still another *samvit* would be necessary. This problem will continue without any end. This is called *anavasthādoṣa* - defect of absence of conclusiveness or finality, also known as regress ad infinitum.

Moreover, there can be yet another problem. If there is another *samvit*, how do you know that it is there? Knowledge of anything is possible only by the knowledge principle - *samvit*. In that case, which *samvit* will know the other? If you accept any *samvit* to know the other, the outcome would be that any known *samvit* will no more be *samvit*, because whatever that is known is *vedya* or *dṛśya* and is different from *samvit*, and gets reduced to the status of being inert which lacks the knowledge principle. This is absurd. So the presence of a second *samvit* is not tenable.

Therefore, it is rightly said that *samvit* is neither born nor destroyed.

This generalisation is also in accordance with the *Upaniṣads* and the *Gītā*. *Na jāyate mriyate vā vipaścit* (*Kaṭha* 1-2-18) - *ātmā*, the pure awareness principle, is neither born nor dies. *Na jāyate mriyate vā kadācit* (*Gītā* 2-20) - *ātmā* is never born, and never (it) dies.

The absence of birth and death of *samvit* is also an indication of the

absence of rest of the modifications, viz. *asti* (exists as an object), *vardhate* (grows), *vipariṇamate* (undergoes metamorphosis), and *apakṣiyate* (declines). In other words *saṁvit* is free from all the six modifications (*ṣadvikāras*).

Such a changeless entity is necessarily *satyam* or *sat*. *Yadrūpeṇa yanniścitaṁ tadrūpaṁ na vyabhicarati tat satyam* - that which does not give up its nature by which it is determined to be so, is *satyam* (*Taittiriya bhāṣya* 2-1). So the *nitya*, *ekāsaṁvit* is also the *sat*. This also implies that it is *sarvavyāpi* - all pervasive - because the existence of anything other than it means limitations which spell destruction.

SAMVIT IS SELF-EFFULGENT

May be, *saṁvit* is only one without birth or destruction; but how are we to know it? In the world, the knowledge of a given thing depends on many means. Likewise, is it not necessary that we need some means to know *saṁvit*? Or one may doubt: If a second *saṁvit* is absent due to the absence of the knower, this *saṁvit* also cannot be known. This will lead to a state wherein no knowledge can ever be possible and thereby stupor will prevail in the world.

So the answer follows. This *saṁvit* (*eṣā*) is self-effulgent (*svayamprabhā*). It is not illumined by any other means, but is self-evident knowledge principle. If some other *saṁvit* were to illumine it, the question arises as to what illumines the other *saṁvit*. This leads to regress ad infinitum, as seen earlier. If *saṁvit* were to illumine itself by itself, then the subject illuminator itself will be the object, the illumined. This is a contradiction in itself as the subject can never be the object of its own actions.

This can be better understood with the illustration of the sun.

You are able to see this book in front of you either illumined by the light of a lamp or the diffused sunlight. So the book depends on the light other than itself. It is said as *paraprakāśa*. Now look at the sun. It is neither illumined by any other light, nor can you say that the sun illumines itself, because light is its very nature. There is no dark sun. Therefore we say that the sun is self-luminous or *svayamprakāśa*.

Similarly the very nature of *saṁvit* is knowledge principle. Hence neither it needs any other knowledge principle to know itself, nor can it be the object of knowledge itself.

Samvit is not only self-effulgent, but also the illuminator of everything - *sarvāvabhāsaka*. The knowledge of anything that is possible in this creation is on account of *saṁvit* alone.

SAMVIT IS ĀTMĀ AND PARAMĀNANDA

SAMVIT IS ME - ĀTMĀ

The book in front of you is illumined by a principle other than itself. It is a *vedya* - known object. In contrast to this, *saṁvit* is self-effulgent; but why should it not be a known object like this book?

It cannot be so. We have already found *saṁvit* to be distinct from all the *vedyas*. The subject is always different from the object. Yet we are analysing it further only to establish the relation between *saṁvit* and "me".

To begin with, all that is known can be either *pratyakṣa* - directly perceptible - or *parokṣa* - remote in time and space. A remote thing may be available for direct perception provided the gap in space or time is removed. May be there are a few things like heaven etc. which are ever remote, as we cannot perceive them with our present embodiment.

There is also a third category of what is known, which is neither *pratyakṣa* nor *parokṣa*. This comprises our subjective thoughts, emotions etc. called *sākṣipratyakṣa* or *sākṣibhāṣya*. The moment they crop up in our *antaḥkaraṇa*, they get directly illumined by *saṁvit* and are known. They are not available for perception by external sense organs.

Samvit does not fall in any of these three categories. It is distinct from *pratyakṣa*, *sākṣipratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*, all of which put together belong to the *idam* - "this" - group. That which is never available as *pratyakṣa*, *sākṣipratyakṣa* or *parokṣa*, or in other words as *idam*, is *aparokṣa*. Therefore, *saṁvit* is *aparokṣa*.

Earlier we had seen two divisions of this world as *idam* - "this" - and *aham* - "I". *Aparokṣa* as shown above, being different from *idam* - "this", - should necessarily resolve in *aham* - "I". So, *aparokṣa saṁvit* is "I" - *ātmā* - my real nature.

Thus the author has shown us with the help of *vedya* - the known - that their very basis, *saṁvit* - the knowledge principle - is our real nature - *ātmā*. Now where are you going to hunt for *ātmā*? Do get hold of any known thing - *vedya*. If you claim that you don't know anything, at least you do know that you don't know anything. That is enough. That is a "*vedya*". The very basis of that, the knowledge

principle - *saṃvit* - because of which you know it, is "I" - *ātmā*. The next two verses unfold the nature of *ātmā* in accordance with the inquiry conducted so far. These verses are also based on *Varāhopaniṣad* (2 - 7 and 9) from *Kṛṣṇayajurveda*.

इयमात्मा परानन्दः परप्रेमास्पदं यतः ।

मा न भूवं हि भूयासमिति प्रेमात्मनीक्ष्यते ॥८॥

*iyamātmā parānandaḥ parapremāspadaṃ yataḥ
mā na bhūvaṃ hi bhūyāsamiti premātmānikṣyate - (8)*

इयम् - this (*saṃvit*) आत्मा - (is) *ātmā* यतः - because परप्रेमास्पदं - locus of limitless love (अतः - therefore) परानन्दः - (it is) limitless bliss हि - surely (अहं - I) मा अभूवं - may I not be (इति - so) न - not (किन्तु - but) (सदा - always) भूयासम् - may I exist इति - thus आत्मनि - in oneself प्रेम - love ईक्ष्यते - is seen. - (8)

8. This *saṃvit* is *ātmā*. It is limitless bliss because (of being) the locus of limitless love. Surely in "May I never cease to be, (but) may I exist (forever)", - the love for oneself is seen.

This *saṃvit* - the knowledge principle that has been unfolded so far - is *ātmā* - "I". This is my real nature. If I take anything other than this as I, then I have mistaken myself. All that is subject to birth and death or any other changes can never be "I".

ĀTMĀ IS CIT - SAT

The word "*saṃvit*" is synonymous with *cit* - the pure awareness. Therefore *saṃvit*, *ātmā*, is *cit*. In the earlier verse, in the context that *saṃvit* is free from birth and destruction, we had already seen it to be *sat*. Thus *ātmā* which is *cit* is itself *sat* also.

ĀTMĀ IS LIMITLESS ĀNANDA

Perhaps one can have the following doubt. May be I am *sat* and so not subjected to birth and death. I am immortal. It may be also true that I am *cit* - the very knowledge principle, totally free from ignorance. Yet, of what avail are these in the absence of happiness? On the contrary there is every danger of my being sorrowful perpetually due to immortality as seen above.

The answer is that *sat* which itself is *cit* can only be *ānanda* without

the least trace of sorrow. You are verily the limitless *ānanda*, independent of everything.

How can I be limitless *ānanda*?

It can never be otherwise. That you are limitless *ānanda* can be proved right here based on your own experience! First of all, please investigate that which you love the most in this creation, the love for which can never surpass your love for any other object, being and event.

It is a universal fact that every living being irrespective of its species, loves one's own self the most. "I" is the locus of maximum love. This fact itself provides the valid proof that my real nature is limitless *ānanda*.

Yataḥ parapremāspadaṁ (ataḥ) parānandaḥ - because "I" is the *aspadam* - the object (in the sense of locus) - of *paraprema* - the most exalted love, the limitless love, the love which is not occasioned by something - therefore *ātmā* - "I" - is limitless *ānanda*.

We love a given thing because of something else we get in return. We love a child because it is the very embodiment of innocence which pleases us. We love a beautiful fragrant rose because it delights us. Likewise we may love various things because of the joy that we can derive from them. But for what reason do we love ourselves? You cannot say "because the eyes are beautiful" or some similar reason. In such a case you love the eyes which you like because they are beautiful. Our question pertains to the "I" and does not refer to any part of our body.

We fail to find any obvious reason for "I" being the locus of our maximum love. I cannot but love myself. Love for oneself is the very inherent thing in each and every one of us and that is why we love ourselves the most. The word "*para*" in *paraprema* suggests the limitlessness of this love, without any specific motive or a cause. And hence the conclusion that "I" am "*parānandaḥ*". *Para* in this word also means limitless and independent of any cause in terms of time, place or an object. Unlike the happiness that we get on account of many desired things in the world, this limitless *ānanda*, my nature, is not dependent on anything else.

We do know from our experience that without any exception one loves one's own self the most. Based on this fact, let us now analyse and ascertain as to how the "me", the locus of limitless love, is the limitless *ānanda* itself.

Let us take a desired object 'A' which gives us some joy. There is another object 'B' which gives more joy than 'A'. Therefore our love for 'B' is more than that towards 'A'. If there is an object 'C' which gives still more joy, then our love for 'C' will be still more than that for 'B'. Suppose there is something which gives limitless happiness, naturally our love towards it should be limitless.

The corollary of this reasoning is that the entity which is the locus of limitless love should necessarily be the source of limitless *ānanda*. So "me", the locus of limitless love, must necessarily be the limitless *ānanda*. Thus I am *sat, cit, ānanda*.

NEVER DO I DISLIKE MYSELF

Some may question the statement that I am the locus of limitless love. We do at times hate ourselves. Moreover, the person who is on the verge of committing suicide, certainly dislikes himself.

Yes, a superficial observation can lead to such a conclusion, but actually the hatred in these cases is towards the sorrows, frustrations, failures etc. which are superimposed on "I" due to ignorance. If the causes thereof are eliminated, there is no room for any revulsion. I can never be the object of my dislike. The second line of this verse brings this fact to our notice by pointing out the universal desire entertained by one and all.

In the case of a person who desires "may I never cease to be and may I exist forever", the love for oneself is seen or experienced. Now who does not desire so? Is there anyone who wants to die and does not want to live? Even a person likely to commit suicide will desist from the same if a complete solution to the problem that prompted him to take to such a cowardly act is offered. Never I desire "not to be" but forever I desire "to be". This is a universal desire which shows that everyone loves oneself the most. Therefore one's real nature itself is the limitless *ānanda*.

Here one may question the very veracity of the statement - "I am the locus of limitless love". The self being the locus of love can be understood, but the love towards oneself is not exclusive, as we also love quite a number of things in the world. Thus the status of being *parapremāspadam* is not possible for *ātmā*. In that case, *ātmā* as *parānandaḥ* - limitless *ānanda* - cannot be proved too.

The next verse gives us the answer.

तत्प्रेमात्मार्थमन्यत्र नैवमन्यार्थमात्मनि ।

अतस्तत्परमं तेन परमानन्दतात्मनः ॥९॥

*tatpremātmārthamanyatra naivamanyārthamātmani
atastatparamaṁ tena paramānandatātmanah - (9)*

अन्यत्र - elsewhere यत् - whatever प्रेम - love तत् - that आत्मार्थम् - (is) for the sake of oneself एवम् - so आत्मनि - in *ātmā* अन्यार्थम् - for the sake of others न - not अतः - therefore तत् - that परमं - the most exalted तेन - thereby आत्मनः - of *ātmā* परमानन्दता - the nature of being limitless *ānanda* (सिद्धा - is proved). - (9)

9. Whatever love (one has) elsewhere (in wife, husband, children etc.) that (is) for the sake of oneself. In this manner (the love for) *ātmā* (is) not for the sake of others. Therefore that (love for oneself is) the most exalted. Thereby the nature of *ātmā* being limitless *ānanda* (is proved).

LOVE ELSEWHERE IS FOR MY SAKE

No doubt there are different things which we love. But whatever love we have elsewhere (*anyatra*) - towards wife, husband, children, wealth, fame etc. which are other than oneself - is for the sake of oneself (*ātmārtham* - *ātmaprayojanāya*).

This is the fact, whether you like it or not. The sooner we discover this the better it is for us, so that our life can be more purposeful. We hesitate to accept this fact lest we should be branded as selfish. However, we cannot fool ourselves. One loves anything and everything for the sake of only oneself.

In *Maitreyī Brāhmaṇa* of *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (2-4-5 and 4-5-6) the great sage Yājñavalkya has explained this basic fact of life to his own dear wife in unequivocal terms. He said "O, dear Maitreyī, verily the husband is dear to the wife not for the sake of the husband, but it is for her own sake that he is dear. The wife is dear to the husband not for the sake of the wife, but it is for his own sake that she is dear. Children are dear to parents not for the sake of children, but it is for the sake of parents that they are dear. The wealth is dear not for the sake of wealth, but it is for one's own sake that it is dear. The animals are dear not for the sake of animals, but it is for one's own sake that they are dear. The brahmin is dear not for the sake of the brahmin,

but it is for one's own sake that he is dear. The kshatriya is dear not for the sake of the kshatriya, but it is for one's own sake that he is dear. The heavenly abodes are dear not for their sake, but it is for one's own sake that they are dear. Vedas are dear not for the sake of Vedas, but it is for one's own sake that they are dear. The five elements - earth, water, fire, air and space - are dear not for their sake, but it is for one's own sake that they are dear. Verily all is dear not for the sake of all, but for one's own sake that all is dear (*ātmanastu kāmāya sarvaṃ priyaṃ bhavati*)."

The word "*priyam*" used in the above section of *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* is to be taken as dear, pleasing, agreeable or liked. Anything and everything that is *priyam* is not for the sake of those things themselves, but for the sake of oneself.

The world can be divided into four categories based on our varying degrees of love towards it.

i) *Parapremāspadam*: the locus of limitless love. "Me" is the locus of limitless love. Here the love is not on account of any reason.

ii) Desirable objects, beings etc. other than myself: They can be husband, wife, children, wealth, fame, power, possessions etc. which are generally desired.

iii) Undesirable things: Tiger, snake, diseases etc. which are the sources of fear, danger and sorrow.

iv) Objects, beings and events of indifference: A blade of grass, a clod of earth, and a person in whom you are not interested can be the examples towards which you are indifferent.

Among these four divisions of the world, the first one - "me", the locus of limitless love - remains always the locus of limitless love and can never be otherwise, whereas each of the other three categories may change into the other two, depending on the situation under consideration. For example, when you confront a tiger, it is certainly undesirable, because there is a threat to your life, but when you see it yonder on the mountain going away it becomes an object of indifference. On the other hand, if the same tiger is caught and kept in a zoo or trained and tamed as in a circus, it is a source of entertainment and becomes desirable. While the tiger is one and the same, at first it is undesirable, then an object of indifference and afterwards it becomes desirable. It is our attitude that goes on changing towards the objects, events and beings.

The dearest son may become undesirable later when he behaves contrary to the wishes of the parents. There is no hard and fast rule that any object etc. whether desirable, undesirable or indifferent, will always remain the same. It is our approach towards these that goes on changing. But "me" - *Parapremāspadam* - is always the locus of limitless love. Even the love directed anywhere other than me (*anyatra*) is for my sake only (*ātmārtham*).

ME ALONE IS THE ULTIMATE LOCUS OF LOVE

The reverse is not true. The love found for oneself (*ātmani yat prema*) is not for the sake of others (*na anyārtham*).

There is an alternate reading as *ātmanaḥ* (of *ātmā*), in the place of *ātmani* in the verse.

It would mean that whatever one loves other than oneself is for the sake of oneself, and the love towards oneself is for oneself only and never for the sake of others. In short, directly or indirectly I am the ultimate locus of love. Therefore (*ataḥ*) the love for oneself (*tat*) is exclusive and the most exalted (*paramam*). It is something which is neither dependent on nor occasioned by anything other than oneself. It is limitless in nature. In view of this the *parapremāspadam* nature of *ātmā* cannot be questioned.

ĀTMĀ AS PARAMĀNANDA IS IRREVOCABLE

Thereby (*tena*) the limitless *ānanda* nature (*paramānandatā*) of *ātmā* (*ātmanaḥ*) is proved. The locus of limitless love should necessarily be of the nature of limitless *ānanda*. This topic is further elaborated by the author later in the twelfth chapter from verses 6 to 85.

IGNORANCE IS THE CAUSE OF SAṂSĀRA

In reality I - *ātmā* - is *sat*, *cit*, *ānanda* and yet what do we seek in life? We want to live forever, meaning we do not want to die; we want to be immortal. We also want to live happily, without even a trace of sorrow. We cannot suffer ignorance; we want to have knowledge. All these three accomplishments are continuously sought by us without total success in spite of the best of efforts till the end of life. But the inquiry conducted so far has revealed that we are *sat* - free from death or destruction; that we are *ānanda* - free from sorrow; and that we are *saṁvit* - *cit* - the knowledge principle, free from ignorance. Therefore our problem can be summarised as - we are immortal and yet we want to be immortal; we are limitless *ānanda* and yet we want

to be happy; and we are free from ignorance and still we want to get rid of ignorance. Obviously the problem is that of ignorance and of consequent error. The solution is in knowing what our real nature is.

PURE MIND IS INDISPENSABLE

This inquiry and consequent discovery that I am limitless *ānanda* should directly culminate in its appreciation as my nature as clear as daylight. This is *aparokṣa jñāna* or *aparokṣa anubhūti*. On the other hand if one complains - "I can understand this, yet I cannot appreciate I am *ānanda*", - then it is only *parokṣa jñāna* i.e. the person has gathered some information but falls short of direct appreciation. The diagnosis in such cases is not difficult. The *mumukṣu* still lacks the ready frame of mind. In verse 2 the pure mind (*nirmala cetā*) and *sādhana catuṣṭaya saṃpatti* were suggested as the prerequisites. Want of these prevents the *aparokṣa jñāna*. Therefore, one should diagnose the problem without losing courage or giving room for any despair, but take to the means to get the purity of mind. In this context, means like *karmayoga*, prayers, *japa*, *tapas* etc. as the need be, become relevant.

If *ātmanā* - I - is of the nature of limitless *ānanda*, why should one bother about these means like prayers etc.? True. If you know through and through your nature as *sat*, *cit*, *ānanda* without any doubt and vagueness, these are no more required because you have already the ready frame of mind. But if you complain that in spite of inquiry you are unable to appreciate your real nature, you cannot dispense with these means as you still lack the required frame of mind. Otherwise by merely borrowing a few statements from Vedānta, attaching a few labels to *ātmanā* and the world, by itself, cannot solve the problem.

Here is a story which can amply clarify the point. A boy saw his mother struggling in the kitchen to get the different provisions because they were kept in tins. She would open half a dozen of them to find out a required thing. Pitying her plight, he offered to help her by labelling all the tins according to their contents. He took pains to label them and did a neat job. The mother also was very happy. However, in the afternoon while preparing coffee, she could not trace the sugar tin. The boy was summoned, who readily picked up a tin and gave it to the mother. She first verified the content. It was sugar only, but the label read as "RED CHILLIES" in big bold letters! The son was rebuked for the mischief. Pat came the innocent answer - "Mummy, you know how the ants swarm in the sugar. To keep them

away I had deliberately labelled it so!"

Mere labelling "RED CHILLIES" is not going to keep the ants away. So is the phrase "*ātmā is sat, cit, ānanda*" without *aparokṣa jñāna*, incapable of warding off *saṃsāra*.

In spite of the inquiry, the delay in gaining the knowledge is due to the lack of readiness of the mind. There is no hopeless case according to our *śāstras*. Everyone can find a remedial means at one's own level, provided the eagerness to progress to a higher state is there. Indifference towards such means is not desirable, because a pure mind alone is capable of discovering one's own real nature.

SAMVIT IS PARABRAHMAN

Now the real nature of *ātmā* unfolded so far in the preceding seven verses is first summed up and thereafter by revealing that *saṃvit* is verily *Parabrahman*, its identity with Brahman is pointed out in accordance with Vedānta.

इत्थं सच्चित्परानन्द आत्मा युक्त्या तथाविधम् ।
परं ब्रह्म तयोश्चैक्यं श्रुत्यन्तेषूपदिश्यते ॥१०॥

*itthaṃ saccitparānanda ātmā yuktyā tathāvidham
paraṃ brahma tayoscaikyam śrutyanteṣūpadīśyate - (10)*

इत्थं - thus आत्मा - *ātmā* सच्चित्परानन्दः - *sat, cit*, limitless *ānanda*
युक्त्या - by the reasoning (सिद्धः - is accomplished) तथाविधम् - of
such nature परं ब्रह्म - *paraṃ* Brahman च - and तयोः - of those two
ऐक्यं - identity श्रुत्यन्तेषु - in the *Upaniṣads* उपदिश्यते - is taught.- (10)

10. Thus *ātmā* (is) *sat, cit, parānanda* (is accomplished) by the reasoning. *Paraṃ* Brahman is (also) of such nature. The identity between them is established in the *Upaniṣads*.

To begin with, in verses 3 to 7, *saṃvit - cit*, the knowledge principle - was shown to be *nitya* and thereby also as *sat*. Having ascertained earlier *saṃvit* as *ātmā*, in verse 8, its nature as limitless *ānanda* was proved. In fact this is the real nature of the individual - *jīva* referred to as *tvam* in the *tattvamasī mahāvākya*.

YUKTI CORROBORATES ŚRUTI

The method adopted so far has been that of *yukti* - the reasoning - based on the analysis of common experience of people (*lokānubhavaparāmarśa*). We all do know that the sense objects do differ from one another. We also know that the knowledge principle is distinct from them. This universal experience has been analysed by the author to deduce the nature of *ātmā* as *sat, cit, parānanda*.

The goal of any *mumukṣu* is to gain the self-knowledge. This has been achieved here based on *yukti*. Then, one may argue that there is no need of *śruti* — the Vedas. They being superfluous can be ignored when our purpose is served by reasoning.

This is not a correct argument because the attempt so far has been only to understand the *śruti*'s declarations in the light of reasoning. *Śruti* alone is the valid means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) to the final truth. What has been done so far is only *manana* — a reflection. This will be confirmed by the author himself in verse 53. The reasoning employed so far is in accordance with *śruti*. *Śruti* is never superfluous.

ĀTMĀ AND BRAHMAN ARE ONE AND THE SAME

The nature of Brahman is the same as that of *ātmā*. *Tathāvidham* — of such nature - viz. *sat*, *cit*, *parānanda* only, is *param* Brahman. *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* defines Brahman as "*satyaṃ jñānam anantaṃ brahma*". *Satyam* and *jñānam* correspond to *sat* and *cit* respectively. *Anantaṃ* means limitless which is totally free from sorrow, as only limitations spell sorrow. Thereby *anantaṃ* itself being *sat* and *cit* should necessarily be limitless *ānanda*. There is nothing called *ānanda* different from *sat* itself, which is *cit* as well.

Ayam ātmā brahma — "This *ātmā* is Brahman" — is also the declaration of *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (4-4-5).

The identity between these two (*tayoscaikyam*), viz. of *jīvātma* and *paramātmā* or, in other words, the *tvam* and *tat* in the *mahāvākya tattvamasī* is taught (*upadiśyate*) in *Vedānta (śrutyanteṣu)*. *Jīva* and Brahman are one and the same. *Aikyam* means the status of being the same (*ekasya bhāvaḥ*). *Jīva* is same as Brahman though mistaken to be different due to ignorance.

DEFINITION OF VEDĀNTA

Śrutyanteṣu means *śrutinām anteṣu niścītārthāsu upaniṣatsu* - in the ascertained meaning of *śruti* - viz. the *Upaniṣads*. *Śrutyanta* is *Vedānta*. *Anta* also means *nirṇaya* — an ascertainment. *Vedānta* is defined by some as

वेदानां प्रवृत्तिपरकत्वं निवृत्तिपरकत्वं वा इति संशये
प्रवृत्तिपूर्वकत्वं निरस्य निवृत्तिपरकत्वेनैव यत्र अन्तो
निर्णयः कृतः सः वेदान्तः ।

"When there is a doubt whether Vedas are (finally) devoted to the pursuit of action or withdrawal from it, having refuted their being always given to action, wherein it has been ascertained that they are (finally) devoted to the withdrawal from action, that *sāstra* is called *Vedānta*."

Therefore, Vedānta can be only *Upaniṣads* where the one principle which is the basis of *jīva*, *jagat* and *Īśvara* and which is totally free from action (*naiṣkarmya avasthā*) because no actions are ever possible in it, is unfolded.

WHY PARAMĀNANDA IS MISSED?

If I am *paramānanda*, how do I miss it? Actually, I should never miss it, because if *saṁvit*, which is limitless *ānanda*, is something remote from me, then I may not get it. Or, if it were something near me, there remains a possibility of my missing it in spite of its proximity. However, *saṁvit* is verily my real nature and hence neither remote nor proximate, and therefore it should never be missed by me; yet my experience belies it.

The author himself presents this objection questioning the validity of *ātmā* as limitless *ānanda* and then points out the cause which denies us the very *ānanda* nature of ourselves.

अभावे न परं प्रेम भाने न विषये स्पृहा ।

अतो भानेऽप्यभातासौ परमानन्दतात्मनः ॥११॥

abhāne na paraṁ prema bhāne na viṣaye spṛhā
ato bhānepyabhātāsau paramānandatātmanaḥ - (11)

अभावे - if not known परं प्रेम - limitless love न - is not possible भाने - if known विषये - for sense objects स्पृहा - desire न - is not अतः - therefore आत्मनः - of *ātmā* असौ - that परमानन्दता - nature of being limitless *ānanda* भाने अपि - though known (experienced) अभाता - is not known. - (11)

11. If (the nature of limitless *ānanda* of *ātmā* is) not known, the limitless love (for *ātmā*) is not possible. If (it is) known, the desire for sense objects cannot be there. Therefore the nature of *ātmā* being limitless *ānanda*, though experienced, is not known.

The first question that shoots forth is - "Do we know the *paramānanda* nature of *ātmā* or not?" The answer can be "yes" or "no". In either case there is a problem.

PARAMĀNANDA NATURE OF ĀTMĀ IS QUESTIONED

Abhāne - apratītau - ananubhūte sati - If *paramānanda* nature of *ātmā* is not known or not experienced - there cannot be any *paraṁ prema* - limitless love - for *ātmā*. Love for a given thing is possible only

after knowing its desirable features like beauty, pleasing aspects etc. Therefore if *ātmā* is known to be limitless *ānanda*, certainly it can be the locus of limitless love, but when it is not known, such a love is not at all possible. Love towards an unknown thing is just not possible. But limitless love for *ātmā* is a matter of our experience. Therefore perforce you have to say that it is known. Let us now see the consequence in this case.

If *paramānanda* nature of *ātmā* is known (*bhāne*), the desire for sense objects is not at all possible. Sense objects are sought to derive happiness from them. Compared to limitless *ānanda*, even the entire sense pleasure that is ever possible is infinitesimal. Who will hanker for an ordinary morsel of food after enjoying a sumptuous feast? Moreover, we take to sense objects as a means to gain the end - the result, viz. the happiness. A desire for a means is governed by the desire for the end. If the end is accomplished, the desire for its means is redundant and is not born. If I have already appreciated myself to be limitless *ānanda*, where is the occasion for me to run after the paltry sense objects, because my pursuit of them is only due to a vague hope that they will give me some happiness?

Thus the contention is that, even if we accept *ātmā* as the locus of limitless love as a concession based on our experience, it can never be *paramānanda*. It is true that there is a defect in either case. If you say that limitless *ānanda* of *ātmā* is not known, then limitless love for *ātmā* which is experienced will be denied. On the other hand, if you accept that limitless *ānanda* of *ātmā* is known, which is contrary to our experience, the pursuit of sense objects cannot be explained.

PARAMĀNANDA IS KNOWN AND YET UNKNOWN

However, there is a third possibility, entirely different from these two, which resolves this stalemate.

Because there are defects in both the stands taken earlier, therefore (*atah*) the third alternative is that the limitless *ānanda* nature (*paramānandatā*) of *ātmā* (*ātmanah*) though experienced, is not known. In life everyone does experience *ānanda*. Even the most miserable person has got a few moments of joy sometime or the other. We can also consider another aspect of our life. Whenever we are restless or sorrowful, we try to get rid of it, because this state of mind is not desirable to us. Though our efforts may differ, finally what we want is a calm, composed, happy state of mind. Such endeavour of ours presupposes that we had known a happy state earlier, on the basis

of which we strive again.

This is just like a sick person struggling to regain health. Health is our nature and ill health is alien to us. This is a common experience of all. That is why none can rest content until health is regained.

Similarly our efforts to regain a happy state is based on our prior experience of happiness. How long is this struggle going to continue? Lifelong is not the answer, because it continues in any number of lives until no further want of happiness is felt. Such a state is possible only when the limitless happiness which is our real nature is rediscovered.

This reveals that happiness is not completely unknown to us, in which case there is no basis which can prompt us to get rid of sorrow by regaining the happiness. However, the problem is that we know it not to be our real nature. On the contrary whenever we get the happiness in the waking or in dream, we think that the objects gave us the experience of happiness.

The nature of *ātmā* therefore as happiness, even if experienced or known (*bhāne api*), is almost not known (*abhātā*).

OBSTRUCTION MAKES A THING SIMULTANEOUSLY KNOWN AND UNKNOWN

In spite of the explanation given so far, one may still have doubts about this statement. How can a given thing be simultaneously known and unknown? Is this situation tenable? Is there not a contradiction? A given thing to be known and unknown at the same time, means that both ignorance and knowledge co-exist. How is this ever possible? Can light and darkness abide together? This appears to be a wrong statement.

The person who raises an objection like this should be asked - "Is this statement wrong because such an occasion is not seen in the world, or because a given thing to be both known and unknown simultaneously is not given to reasoning?"

If either of the two is given as the answer, it is not correct. The forthcoming three verses discuss the role of an obstruction in presenting a thing both known and unknown together. The first three quarters of the next verse cites an instance wherein a thing is known and unknown simultaneously, and the last quarter shows the rationality of such a statement.

अध्येतृवर्गमध्यस्थपुत्राध्ययनशब्दवत् ।

भानेऽप्यभानं भानस्य प्रतिबन्धेन युज्यते ॥१२॥

adhyetṛvargamadhyasthaputrādhyaṇaśabdavat
bhānēpyabhānaṃ bhānasya pratibandhena yujyate - (12)

अध्येतृवर्गमध्यस्थपुत्राध्ययनशब्दवत् - like the sound (*śabdavat*) of chanting (*adhyayana*) of the son (*putra*) amidst the group (*vargamadhyastha*) of students (*adhyetṛ*) (आनन्दस्य - of *ānanda*) भाने - when known अपि - even अभानं - not known भानस्य - of the knowledge प्रतिबन्धेन - due to an obstruction (भाने अपि - even though known) (अभानं - is not known) युज्यते - is reasonable. - (12)

12. Like the (indistinct) sound of the chanting of the son amidst the group of students, *ānanda*, even when known, (is) not known. Due to an obstruction of knowledge, (the statement - "even though known, is not known") is reasonable.

ILLUSTRATION OF A THING KNOWN AND UNKNOWN SIMULTANEOUSLY

The illustration given here will be clear when the context is known. A father happens to visit the *vedapāṭhaśālā*-school where the chanting of Vedas is taught - of his son. The son is chanting the Vedas in a group together with many other students. Hearing it, though the father can detect and know the voice of his son, he cannot know it as distinctly as in the case if the son were to chant singly. Here is the sound, known in general, but not in particular. Such instances are found in the world. Similarly it is possible that the *ānanda* nature of *ātma* is both known and unknown simultaneously.

OBSTRUCTION IS THE CAUSE

What is the reason that makes the father unable to hear the son's voice distinctly, though he can hear it in general? Is it not the sound of chanting by other students which obstructs the distinct audibility of his son's voice? In the same way, due to an obstruction, even though the general knowledge of a given thing is gained, the particular knowledge gets denied. Hence to say that something is known and unknown simultaneously, is not incongruous with our observation. It is quite reasonable too.

The analogy can be extended to happiness. Though we know happiness, in general, due to some obstruction, we do not know it in particular, to be our real nature. Even our struggle to get rid of sorrow and regain happiness is in fact an instinctive attempt to do away with the obstruction. However, we are not aware of it to be so.

DEFINITION OF AN OBSTRUCTION

If an obstruction denies us our limitless *ānanda* nature, we should certainly destroy it. However, unless we know what the obstruction is, it is not possible to do so. To cure a disease, its diagnosis is a must.

So first an obstruction in general is defined in the next verse.

प्रतिबन्धोऽस्तिभातीतिव्यवहारार्हवस्तुनि ।

तं निरस्य विरुद्धस्य तस्योत्पादनमुच्यते ॥१३॥

pratibandhostibhāitivyavahārārhavastuni

taṁ nirasya viruddhasya tasyotpādanamucyate - (13)

अस्ति - is भाति - is known इति - so व्यवहारार्हवस्तुनि - in a thing available for dealing तं - that (dealing) निरस्य - having denied तस्य विरुद्धस्य - of its contrary (यत् - whatever) उत्पादनं - production (सः - that is) प्रतिबन्धः - obstruction (इति - so) उच्यते - is called. - (13)

13. With respect to a given thing available for dealing as "is" (and) "is known", having denied that dealing, the production of whatever that is contrary to it (like "is not" and "is not known") is called an obstruction.

Suppose there is a thing which exists and is known or experienced by you. You can deal with it appropriately depending on what it is. But we would say that there is an obstruction if, in spite of its existence and being within the purview of your knowledge or experience, it gets presented as — "does not exist" and "is not available for knowledge". Let us say that you have the key of your house in your own pocket. It is there in your pocket. You can feel it. You can open your house by it. Somehow you overlook the fact that it is in your pocket and start searching for it. Then, even though the key continues to be there, neither is it available to you nor can you open your house. The production of such totally opposed dealing is said to be an obstruction. In other words an obstruction denies the existence and knowledge of a thing that is within one's purview.

CAUSE OF OBSTRUCTION

Having defined an obstruction in general, in the following verse its cause is shown in the case of both the illustration, viz. the indistinct voice of the son, and the illustrated, the nonrecognition of the limitless *ānanda* nature of myself.

तस्य हेतुः समानाभिहारः पुत्रध्वनिश्रुतौ ।

इहानादिरविद्यैव व्यामोहैकनिबन्धनम् ॥१४॥

*tasya hetuḥ samānābhihāraḥ putradhvaniśrutau
ihānādiravidyaiva vyāmohaikanibandhanam - (14)*

पुत्रध्वनिश्रुतौ - in the case of audibility of son's voice तस्य - of that (obstruction) हेतुः - the cause (is) समानाभिहारः - simultaneous chanting with many others इह - here (तु - whereas) व्यामोहैकनिबन्धनम् - the main cause of erroneous knowledge अनादिः - the beginningless अविद्या - ignorance एव - alone (अस्ति - is). - (14)

14. With respect to the audibility of son's voice the cause of obstruction is the simultaneous chanting with many others, whereas here (in the illustrated), the main cause of erroneous knowledge is the beginningless ignorance alone.

In the case of the illustration (*dṛṣṭānta*) the chanting by many students together is the cause, because of which the son's voice is not heard clearly, though the father knows that it is present.

Consider now the illustrated (*dārṣṭānta*) - the topic for which the illustration is given. *Avidyā*- the ignorance of myself - is the root cause which denies me my *paramānanda* nature and presents it as known and unknown. This ignorance is beginningless. As a matter of fact, any ignorance is beginningless because either you know a thing or do not know it. If presently you are ignorant of a given thing, earlier you never had its knowledge. If it were there, it is just impossible for its ignorance to co-exist with its knowledge. Ignorance has to be beginningless, but it ends in the wake of knowledge of the thing.

IGNORANCE IS THE CAUSE OF ERROR

Ignorance about oneself is described as the main cause

(*ekanibandhanam*) of *vyāmoha*- the erroneous knowledge including the false projections of self.

Had I known, in the context of my nature, that it is full - *sat cit ānanda* - I would not have anything to be accomplished or not yet accomplished and there would have been no occasion to order any embodiment for myself as well as the necessity to want a creation. Only when I am ignorant, the results of past actions (*karmaphalas*) gain the momentum to produce the body which provides the opportunity to exhaust *karmaphalas* and take to still more accomplishments. Further, the ignorance with false projections gives rise to all types of erroneous notions about myself, the world, the creator *Īśvara* and the relation amongst these. This is the reason why the ignorance is said to be the main cause of *vyāmoha* and due to ignorance, even though *ānanda* is experienced in general by me, it is not known in particular as my real nature.

THE CAUSE OF AVIDYĀ

If self-ignorance produces the obstruction in knowing my limitless *ānanda* nature, it should be destroyed by all possible means. To accomplish this effectively it is desirable to know more about it. Information such as its cause, how it functions etc. will be helpful in destroying it.

In order to explain *avidyā* further, its cause, *prakṛti*, is traced. *Prakṛti* along with its effects is described in the next two and a half verses.

चिदानन्दमयब्रह्मप्रतिबिम्बसमन्विता ।

तमोरजःसत्त्वगुणा प्रकृतिर्द्विविधा च सा ॥१५॥

cidānandamayabrahmapratibimbā samanvitā

tamoraḥsattvagunā prakṛtirdvividhā ca sā - (15)

(या - the one) चिदानन्दमयब्रह्मप्रतिबिम्बसमन्विता - endowed with (*samanvitā*) the reflection (*pratibimba*) of Brahman whose nature is *cit* and *ānanda* तमोरजःसत्त्वगुणा - composed of the *guṇas*, viz. *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* (सा - that (is)) प्रकृतिः - *prakṛti* सा - that (*prakṛti*) द्विविधा - (is) of two types च - and (also one more). - (15)

15. The one that is endowed with the reflection of Brahman whose nature is *cit* and *ānanda* (and) is composed of the *guṇas*, viz. *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* (is *prakṛti*). That *prakṛti* is of two types and (also one more).

Prakṛti is the creative power inherent in Brahman. The word "*prakṛti*" also means a material cause. Neither Brahman, the all pervasive pure awareness principle, can create by itself, nor can *prakṛti*, which is inert by nature do so. *Prakṛti* can create in the presence of Brahman. *Prakṛti* as if gets enlivened by reflection as it were of Brahman. That is why it is told here that *prakṛti* is endowed with the reflection of Brahman whose nature is *sat cit ānanda*. Though the word "*sat*" is not mentioned in the verse, it is implied in the context. The reflection (*pratibimba*) of Brahman is referred to also as *cidābhāsa*.

Prakṛti is composed of three *guṇas* viz. *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. Any creation presupposes three aspects, viz. knowledge, action and matter. These three are accounted for by these *guṇas* respectively.

Prakṛti is of two types - as mentioned in the next verse. Actually it is of three types and the third variety will be told in verse 18. This is suggested by the addition of the conjunction *ca* to include whatever that is not told here. Presently the author focuses his attention on only those two types which are relevant to the current topic.

One more special feature of this analysis is that Vidyāraṇya Muni is distinguishing between *prakṛti* and *māyā* which are considered synonymous in Vedānta. Of course he makes this subtle difference for a thorough inquiry and a detailed treatment of the subject matter.

The two types of *prakṛtis*, their respective causes and the consequent effects are as follows.

सत्त्वशुद्धयविशुद्धिभ्यां मायाविद्ये च ते मते ।
मायाबिम्बो वशीकृत्य तां स्यात्सर्वज्ञ ईश्वरः ॥१६॥

sattvaśuddhyaviśuddhibhyāṃ māyāvidye ca te mate
māyābimbb vaśikṛtya tāṃ syātsarvajña īśvaraḥ - (16)

सत्त्वशुद्धयविशुद्धिभ्यां - by the purity and impurity of *sattvaguṇa* ते च
- those two (*prakṛtis*) मायाविद्ये - *māyā* and *avidyā* मते - are known
मायाबिम्बः - the one who is reflected in *māyā* ताम् - that (*māyā*)
वशीकृत्य - having controlled (वर्तमानः - the one who remains) सर्वज्ञः
- the omniscient ईश्वरः - *īśvara* स्यात् - becomes. - (16)

16. By the purity and the impurity of *sattvaguṇa* those two types of *prakṛtis* are known as *māyā* and *avidyā*. The one who is reflected in *māyā* and has control over it, is the omniscient *īśvara*.

DEFINITIONS OF *MĀYĀ* AND *AVIDYĀ*

Māyā and *avidyā* are parts of *prakṛti* in essence, but they differ in their constitution. As we have seen, *prakṛti* is composed of three *guṇas*. *Prakṛti* is called *māyā* when the *sattvaguṇa* predominates. The same *prakṛti* is called *avidyā* when *sattvaguṇa* does not predominate. *Māyā* and *avidyā* function in diametrically opposed ways.

Where there is *viśuddhi*- purity of *sattva* - it is called *māyā*. Purity - *akaluṣikṛtatā*- signifies the predominance of *sattvaguṇa*, because of not being tainted or not overpowered (*anabhibhūta*) by the other two *guṇas*. *Prakṛti* can never be free from any of the three *guṇas* though they may be in varying degrees. The least traces of *rajas* and *tamas*

of course will always be there. Yet their effect is insignificant in the case of *māyā*. *Sattvaguna* is *prakāśātma* - luminous - in the sense that it gives knowledge and confers *ānanda*. *Prakṛti* is always endowed with *cidābhāsa* or *cidānandamayabrahmapratibimba* as mentioned in the earlier verse. *Māyā* which is a facet of *prakṛti* should also naturally enjoy the same *cidābhāsa*. We can define *māyā* finally as -

चिदानन्दमयब्रह्मप्रतिबिम्बसमन्विता विशुद्धसत्त्वप्रधाना
प्रकृतिः माया इति उच्यते ।

"That *prakṛti* which has the predominance of pure *sattvaguna* and is endowed with reflection of Brahman whose nature is *sat cit ānanda*, is called *māyā*."

In contrast to the above, *prakṛti* which has *aviśuddhi* - *na viśeṣeṇa śuddhi* - no particular purity or which has impurity - is called *avidyā*. The impurity is due to mixing of *rajas* and *tamas* in varying degrees with *sattva*. In the case of *avidyā* the other two *gunas* are predominant as a result of which *sattva* is subdued. Like *māyā*, *avidyā* is also endowed with *cidābhāsa* which is inherent in its cause, *prakṛti*. In view of this, finally *avidyā* can be defined as -

चिदाभासप्रतिबिम्बयुक्ता मलिनसत्त्वप्रधाना
रजस्तमोमिश्रिता प्रकृतिरविद्येत्युच्यते ।

"That *prakṛti* which is mixed with *rajas* and *tamas* (and so) is predominant with impure *sattva* and endowed with *cidābhāsa* is called *avidyā*."

Here *ānanda* nature of Brahman is dropped, as the other two *gunas* overpower *sattva*. However, *ānanda* cannot be totally ruled out.

To conclude, due to purity and impurity of *sattva* the same *prakṛti* is known as *māyā* and *avidyā* respectively. The immediate purpose of distinguishing between *māyā* and *avidyā* is to show the resultant *Īśvara* and *jīva*. But the final aim of the distinction is to describe the *modus operandi* of *avidyā* which presents the *jīva* suffering *saṃsāra* - the existence of limitations and sorrows - so that by taking to inquiry, one's real nature can be discovered.

ĪŚVARA

The second line of this verse describes *Īśvara*. *Māyābimbah* means

the *cit*-pure awareness - reflected in *māyā*, i.e. *cidābhāsa*. It can also be taken as *cit* conditioned by *māyā*, resulting in *cidābhāsa*. This *māyābimbaḥ* which has mastery over the very *māyā* is called *Īśvara*. *Īśvara* is the creator principle. From the standpoint of creation Brahman gets the status of *Īśvara*- the one who has overlordship over the entire cosmos.

In the world, different persons may have mastery over different spheres and activities but not over all of them. Unlike them *Īśvara* has total mastery over anything and everything, being the master of all masters.

Īśvara, by virtue of the mastery over *māyā* is omniscient - *sarvajñāḥ* (*sarvaṃ jñāti iti*). The word "*sarvaṃ*" comprises all branches of knowledge including that of creation, sustenance and destruction of the universe. There is nothing that is not known to *Īśvara* either in general or in particular. *Sarvajñāḥ* also signifies *sarvaśaktimān*- the one who is endowed with all powers. Here also the phrase "all powers" refers to those with respect to creation etc. as earlier.

Thus *cit* through the conditioning of *māyā* plays the role of *Īśvara* who is *sarvajñāḥ*, *sarvaśaktimān* and of course *sarvavyāpī*- omnipresent - because Brahman is so.

अविद्यावशास्त्वन्यस्तद्वैचित्र्यादनेकधा ।

सा कारणशरीरं स्यात्प्राज्ञस्तत्राभिमानवान् ॥१७॥

avidyāvaśagastvanyastadvaičitryādanekadhā

sā kāraṇaśarīraṃ syātprajñastatrābhimānavān - 17

अविद्यावशाः - the one who is under the control of *avidyā* तु - on the other hand अन्यः - (is) the other viz. *jīva* (सः - that *jīva*) तद्वैचित्र्यात् - due to its (of *avidyā*) variegatedness अनेकधा - different (भवति - becomes) सा - that (*avidyā*) कारणशरीरं - causal body स्यात् - is तत्र - in that (causal body) अभिमानवान् - the one who has identification प्राज्ञः - *prājñāḥ* स्यात् - is. - (17)

17. On the other hand, the other one, viz. *jīva*, who is under the control of *avidyā*, is different due to the variegatedness of *avidyā*. That *avidyā* is the causal body. The one who is identified with the causal body is *prājñāḥ*.

JĪVA

Avidyāvaśaḥ means the one who is under the control of *avidyā* or subservient to it. It is the *cidābhāsa*, the reflection of *cit* in *avidyā*, who is totally under its control and has no independence, and it plays the role of *saṃsāri jīva*. It can also be taken as *cit* conditioned by *avidyā* resulting in *cidābhāsa* who is under its control.

Tu shows the contrast between *jīva* and *Īśvara* in terms of our experience. *Īśvara* has mastery over *māyā* whereas *jīva* is mastered by *avidyā*. Both of them are otherwise *cidābhāsa* obtained in the different aspects of the very same *prakṛti* called *māyā* and *avidyā*. Yet, the manifestation differs, nay, it is totally opposed, due to the contrasting *upādhis*. Such a difference in the manifestation of one and the same principle can be well understood from the examples of different light bulbs. A thousand watt bulb and a twenty-five watt bulb may vastly differ in their intensity of illumination on account of different *upādhis* of filaments, but the electricity in both is one and the same.

JĪVAS ARE INNUMERABLE

While *Īśvara* is one, *jīvas* are innumerable because of the variegated *upādhis* in terms of *avidyā*. As we know, *avidyā* is *malinasattvapradhānā prakṛti* wherein *sattva* is rendered impure by the mixture of *rajas* and *taṃas*. The mixture of these three is in a varying degree of permutations and combinations wherein these two *guṇas* dominate over *sattva*, as a result of which various types of embodiments like those of deities, human beings, animals, birds, reptiles etc. come into existence.

How these *jīvas* get subjected to *saṃsāra* will be elaborated further so that one can finally discover oneself to be Brahman by discrimination and consequent negation of all that is not "me", but mistaken as "me" due to *avidyā*. This will be shown in verse 42.

The method adopted here is that of *pañcakośaviveka* - the discrimination between my real nature (*ātmā*) and the five sheaths (*anātmā*) with which we identify ourselves by mistake. The five sheaths which are universally mistaken as "I" can be regrouped into three bodies. They are called sheaths, because like a sheath they cover, as it were, and deny the knowledge of our real nature. *Annāmaya kośa* (the food-sheath) is the *sthūlaśarīra* - gross body. *Prāṇāmaya kośa* (the vital air-sheath), *manomaya kośa* (the mental sheath) and *vijñānamaya kośa* (the intellectual sheath) constitute the

sūkṣmaśarīra - subtle body. *Ānandamaya kośa* (the bliss sheath) corresponds to the *kāraṇaśarīra* - causal body. These are only two different types of divisions of one and the same embodiment of ours. Thus *pañcakōśaviveka* is the same as discrimination between "I"-*ātmā* - and the three *śarīras*.

THE THREE BODIES

To conduct this inquiry, I should first know what are the three bodies, made up of five sheaths, which are to be stripped of in terms of discrimination to distinguish and to ascertain my real nature:

CAUSAL BODY - *KĀRAṆAŚARĪRA*

The author starts with the causal body. The same *avidyā* is the *kāraṇaśarīra* - causal body. It is the *kāraṇam* - cause - of both gross and subtle bodies and their modifications. *Avidyā* is the cause not only of these two bodies, but also of the identification subsequently with them, whereby all the characteristics of the bodies get superimposed on *ātmā*.

From the ultimate standpoint *prakṛti* is the cause for the entire creation. It has the great potential to create everything. No doubt, *prakṛti* has no existence apart from Brahman and Brahman is real, whereas *prakṛti* and its effect, the creation - *jagat* - are false. But this is not the topic under discussion at present. *Avidyā* being a particular state of *prakṛti*, is also said to be the cause in the secondary sense.

Śarīram is called so because it decays or withers away (*śīryate, vinaśyati* iti). The physical body is obviously subject to decay and death. But the subtle and the causal bodies get destroyed only in the wake of *tattvajñāna* - the knowledge of oneself. A given physical body will drop off the moment its momentum of *prārabdha* (already begun) *karmaphalas*, is over. But the subtle body will continue taking new embodiments again and again, being backed up by *avidyā* - the causal body. Knowledge of my real nature alone can destroy these two bodies along with the *karmaphalas* which produce further embodiments.

PRĀJÑĀ

Jīva who is the *cidābhāsa* obtained in *avidyā* dons different statuses depending on its identification with these three bodies. Having identification with them means either taking them as "me" or as an inherent part of "mine". When identified with the causal body, *jīva* is called *prājñāh*. Even this name suggests certain characteristic features of *prājñāh*.

Prajñā (note that the word here is not "*prājñā*") in Sanskrit means

the knowledge principle - *jñāna dṛṣṭi*, or what was elaborated here in this chapter as *saṃvit*, - in contrast to a particular knowledge. The knowledge principle as already seen is one and the same, ever existent and hence it is indestructible - *avināśī*. It is the basis for all experiences including their impressions. If *prajñā* is absent, you will not have any of the experiences belonging to waking, dream and deep sleep states including the experience that you are unable to experience these.

The one who is endowed with *prajñā* is called *prajñāḥ*. The word "*prajñāḥ*" itself by certain grammatical process becomes *prājñāḥ*. *Prājñāḥ* is the one who naturally inherits the knowledge principle and yet, in practice is totally ignorant being identified with ignorance - *avidyā*. Deep sleep is the exclusive state of *prājñāḥ* and so the word can be translated in English as sleeper consciousness.

Next in the order is the *sūkṣma śarīra* - subtle body. The creation of five elements of which the subtle body is made, will be told first and thereafter its constituting parts will be described upto verse 22.

THE THIRD ASPECT OF *PRAKṚTI*

The subtle body is made up of the five elements. Earlier only two aspects of *prakṛti* were enumerated in verse 15. The third one is *tamaḥpradhānaprakṛti* which serves as the material cause for the five elements and therefore of the entire subtle and gross creation.

DISTINCTION OF THREE *PRAKṚTI* ASPECTS

Here we have to bear in our mind the following. *Prakṛti* is made up of three *guṇas*. *Prakṛti* with the pure *sattva* among the three *guṇas* mixed with very insignificant *rajas* and *tamas*, is the *māyā*, the *upādhi* for *Īśvara*.

Prakṛti with *sattva* which is not very pure, but rendered impure by the mixing of *rajas* and *tamas* in a highly influential quantity, is *avidyā*. This is the *upādhi* of *jīva*. As the mixing up of these three *guṇas* occurs in a varied manner, the effects of *avidyā* in terms of the embodiments are also variegated.

When the *tamas* is very predominant, it is *tamaḥpradhānaprakṛti* from which the five elements and the rest of the entire creation is born.

तमःप्रधानप्रकृतेस्तद्भोगायेश्वराज्ञया ।

वियत्पवनतेजोम्बुभुवो भूतानि जज्ञिरे ॥१८॥

*tamaḥpradhānaprakṛteṣṭadbhogāyeśvarājñāyā
viyatpavanatejombubhuvo bhūtāni jajñire - (18)*

तद्भोगाय - for the experience of *prājñas* तमःप्रधानप्रकृतेः - from the part of *prakṛti* in which *tamas* predominates ईश्वराज्ञया - by the volition of *Īśvara* वियत्पवनतेजोम्बुभुवः - space, air, fire, water and earth भूतानि - elements जज्ञिरे - were born. - (18)

18. By the volition of *Īśvara*, the five elements viz. space, air, fire, water and earth were born from that part of *prakṛti* in which *tamas* predominates, for the experience of *prājñas*.

Jīva at the stage of *prājñā* is unable to experience joy and sorrow for want of means. Therefore the creation of means is inevitable.

The word "*bhoga*" means both enjoyment and suffering and therefore it is better if its meaning is taken as experiencing.

CREATION OF FIVE ELEMENTS

From that part of *prakṛti* wherein *tamas* predominates, the five elements are born which serve as the immediate material cause for the rest of both subtle and gross creation.

Prakṛti on its own cannot create. Therefore it is the *ājñā* - the volition, will (*saṅkalpa*) - of *Īśvara* that projects the creation. Though *ājñā* literally means command, here it is used in the sense of *ikṣaṇa* - thinking - as stated in "*sa ikṣata*" - *ātmā* thought (*Aitareya Upaniṣad* 1-1-1), or *icchā* - will - as per "*sokāmayata*" - *ātmā* desired - (*Taittirīya Upaniṣad* 2-6). Thus *Īśvara* is the *nimittakāraṇa* - the efficient cause; and *prakṛti* with predominant *tamas* is the *upādānakāraṇa* - the material cause.

A pertinent doubt can be raised here as to how did *Īśvara* entertain such a volition? We can desire provided *antaḥkaraṇa* is there which is itself made up of five elements. In the case of *Īśvara*, for want of these elements which are still to be created, availability of *antaḥkaraṇa* is not possible. In its absence the volition to create the elements also should not be possible.

The explanation is that *Īśvara*, being omniscient and omnipotent, is independent of all such means. Just in the presence of *Īśvara* all these

take place.

Ācārya Śaṅkara dispels this doubt in the commentary of *Aitareyopanīṣad* by stating - "sarvajñasvābhāvyaṭ" - because of naturalness of omniscience.

Yet, the question remains why at all such a miserable world be created? The omniscient *Īśvara* should have put a stop to it in the very beginning.

The fact is that the *jīvas* give the blueprint of their *karmaphalas* to *Īśvara* and the laws of *karma* take their own course.

THE FIVE SENSE ORGANS

Having mentioned the creation of the five elements, now while describing the creation of their effects, the birth of the five sense organs (organs of perception) is told to begin with.

सत्त्वांशैः पञ्चभिस्तेषां क्रमाद्धीन्द्रियपञ्चकम् ।
श्रोत्रत्वगक्षिरसनघ्राणाख्यमुपजायते ॥१९॥

sattvāṃśaiḥ pañcabhisteṣāṃ kramāddhīndriyapañcakam
śrotratvagakṣirasanaḡhrāṇākhyamupajāyate - (19)

तेषां - theirs पञ्चभिः - by the five सत्त्वांशैः - by the (collective) constituent *sattva* क्रमात् - gradually श्रोत्रत्वगक्षिरसनघ्राणाख्यम् - called ear, sense of touch, eye, sense of taste, and sense of smell धीन्द्रियपञ्चकम् - the group of five sense organs उपजायते - is born. - (19)

19. By the *sattva* constituent of those five elements, gradually the group of five sense organs called ear, sense of touch, eye, sense of taste, and smell is born.

The five elements are born from *prakṛti* consisting of three *guṇas*. Though in this case *tamas* predominates, the other two are also present. *Sattva* and *rajas* of these five elements individually and collectively account for the subtle creation. Their remaining *tamas* after undergoing a grossification process called *pañcīkaraṇam*, gives rise to the gross world. These are being explained one by one in their order.

From each *sattva* constituent of these five elements as the material cause, the sense organs ear, etc. are born respectively.

Kramāt - gradually - indicates that each sense organ is born from one of the five elements. It also suggests the order in which each sense organ is born from respective element. By keeping the order of five elements starting from space to earth and that of sense organs from ear to sense of smell as told in the text, we come to know that ear is born of *sattva* constituent of space etc. respectively. Similar order prevails for the origin of organs of action. This group of *dhīndriyam, jñānendriyam* - the sense organs - represents the actual faculties of perception; whereas the external organs like ear etc. are their loci of abidance. As will be seen later the external gadgets found in our gross body are made from grossified elements. In contrast to them, the sense organs are born from *sattva* portions of these elements in the subtle form before their grossification.

ANTAḤKARAṆA

The collective *sattva* portions of all the five elements produce the *antaḥkaraṇa*.

तैरन्तःकरणं सर्वैर्वृत्तिभेदेन तद्विधा ।

मनो विमर्शरूपं स्याद्बुद्धिः स्यान्निश्चयात्मिका ॥२०॥

tairantaḥkaraṇaṃ sarvairvṛttibhedena taddvidhā

mano vimarśarūpaṃ syādbuddhiḥ syānniścayātmikā - (20)

तैः सर्वैः - by those all (collective *sattva* constituent) अन्तःकरणं - the inner instrument (उपजायते - is born) तत् - that वृत्तिभेदेन - due to difference in the function द्विधा - in two ways (अस्ति - is) विमर्शरूपं - the one whose nature is scrutiny or indecisive (thought) मनः - mind स्यात् - is निश्चयात्मिका - decisive (thought) बुद्धिः - the intellect स्यात् - is. - (20)

20. The inner instrument (*antaḥkaraṇa*) is born by the collective *sattva* constituent of all those five elements. It is of two types due to difference in (its) function. The indecisive thought is the mind, (whereas) the decisive thought is the intellect.

The *karaṇam* - the means of gaining the knowledge - which abides within (*antaḥ*) the gross body is called *antaḥkaraṇam*.

It is of two types, based on the distinction in its *vṛtti* - the function

or modification in terms of thoughts. When the thoughts are in a state of indecisiveness or scrutiny (*vimarśa*) it is called the mind. For example, you are looking at a familiar person coming towards you, but being far you are still not sure of his identity. The thought of the nature of doubt like - "Is he Mr. Gopalan or Mr. Raman?" is an instance of the mind. After such scrutiny you decide - "He is Mr. Gopalan only." Such decisive thought is called intellect.

The mind and intellect signify here the remaining two aspects of *antaḥkaraṇa* viz. *ahaṁkāra* - the "I" notion - and *cittam* - the faculty of recollection. All these four form the *antaḥkaraṇa*. Each aspect differs according to its thought modifications or function.

ORGANS OF ACTION

Next in the order is the enumeration of the effects from each *rajas* part of the five elements.

रजोऽशैः पञ्चभिस्तेषां क्रमात्कर्मेन्द्रियाणि तु ।
वाक्पाणिपादपायूपस्थाभिधानानि जज्ञिरे ॥२१॥

rajoṁśaiḥ pañcabhisteṣāṁ kramātkarmendriyāṇi tu
vākpāṇipādapāyūpasthābhidhānāni jajñire - (21)

तेषां - theirs पञ्चभिः - by the five रजोऽशैः - by the (collective) *rajas* constituent तु - and now, or mere expletive particle क्रमात् - sequentially वाक्पाणिपादपायूपस्थाभिधानानि - named as organ of speech, hand, foot, anus and the organ of generation कर्मेन्द्रियाणि - the organs of action जज्ञिरे - were born. - (21)

21. By the *rajas* constituent of those (five elements), sequentially the organs of action named as organ of speech, hand, foot, anus and the organ of generation were born.

From each *rajas* constituent of space, air, fire, water and earth as the material cause, the organs of action - *vāk* - the organ of speech, *paṇi* - the hand, *pāda* - the organ of locomotion, *pāyu* - the anus, *upastha* - the genitals, respectively were born.

FIVE VITAL AIRS

The collective *rajas* constituent produces the five *prāṇas* - the vital airs.

तैः सर्वैः सहितैः प्राणो वृत्तिभेदात्स पञ्चधा ।
प्राणोऽपानः समानश्चोदानव्यानौ च ते पुनः ॥२२॥

*taiḥ sarvaiḥ sahitaiḥ prāṇo vṛttibhedātsa pañcadhā
prāṇopānaḥ samānaścodānavyānau ca te punaḥ - (22)*

तैः सर्वैः - by all those सहितैः - collectively प्राणः - the vital air (जायते - is born) वृत्तिभेदात् - because of difference in functions सः - it पञ्चधा - in five ways (अस्ति - is) ते - those (divisions) पुनः - further प्राणः - *prāṇa* अपानः - *apāna* समानः च - and *samāna* उदानव्यानौ च - *udāna* and *vyāna* (इति - so) (वाच्याः - to be called). - (22)

22. By the collective rajas constituent of those (five elements) vital air is born. It is of five types based on its fivefold functions. Further, those divisions are called as *prāṇa*, *apāna*, *samāna*, *udāna* and *vyāna*.

Prāṇa is one; yet due to its manifold functions or modifications, it is known to be of five types which correspond to the five physiological functions in the gross body. These faculties are as follows:

Prāṇa - Respiration

Apāna - Evacuation of faeces, urine etc.

Samāna - Digestion

Udāna - Upward thrust, ejection of subtle body from the gross one at the time of death

Vyāna - Circulation.

SUBTLE BODY

The purpose of describing the creation of the five elements, sense organs etc. is shown now.

बुद्धिकर्मेन्द्रियप्राणपञ्चकैर्मनसा धिया ।
शरीरं सप्तदशभिः सूक्ष्मं तल्लिङ्गमुच्यते ॥२३॥

*buddhikarmendriyaprāṇapañcakairmanasā dhiyā
śarīram saptaśabhiḥ sūkṣmaṁ talliṅgamucyate - (23)*

बुद्धिकर्मेन्द्रियप्राणपञ्चकैः - with the groups of five sense organs, five organs of action and five *prāṇas* मनसा - with mind धिया च - (and) with intellect (सह - along with) सप्तदशभिः - with the seventeen (parts) सूक्ष्मं शरीरं - the subtle body (भवति - is born) तत् - that लिङ्गम् - *liṅgam*

उच्यते - is named. - (23)

23. The subtle body is made up of the seventeen parts viz. the groups of five sense organs, five organs of action and five *prāṇas* along with mind and intellect. It is (also) called *liṅgam*.

The organs that produce the perceptual knowledge (*buddhi*) are *buddhindriyas* - the organs of perception. Those who take to action are *karmendriyas* - organs of action. These ten organs including the five vital airs, mind and intellect constitute the subtle body. The mind and intellect signify the entire *antaḥkāraṇa* which includes *ahaṃkāra* and *citta* also. *Liṅgam* is another name for the subtle body in Vedānta. Literally *liṅgam* means a sign or a mark. *Tārkikas* - the logicians - derive its etymology as *liṅgam arthaṃ gamayati iti* - that which makes one cognise an invisible thing. For example smoke is said as *liṅgam* for fire because we can infer the unseen fire from the mark of smoke. The word "invisible" is in the sense of "not cognised in general", and not necessarily "the unseen".

Likewise the subtle body indicates the presence of the all illuminating *cit*, the *ātmā* and so it can be viewed as its *liṅgam*. In fact, the subtle body by itself is inert and hence its part, the *antaḥkāraṇa*, gets directly illumined by *cit*. Therefore, wherever there is subtle body, *cidābhāsa* - the sentiency - and thereby *cit*, *samvit* - the knowledge principle - can never be missed. *Cit* otherwise can never be cognised directly. Just as light can be cognised only by its reflection through a reflecting medium, *cit* can be done only through the medium of a subtle body. This also explains as to why we find the division of inert and sentient in this world in spite of the presence of all pervasive *cit*.

TAIJASA AND HIRANYAGARBHA

प्राज्ञस्तत्राभिमानेन तैजसत्वं प्रपद्यते ।

हिरण्यगर्भतामीशस्तयोर्व्यष्टिसमष्टिता ॥२४॥

prājñastatrābhimānena taijasatvaṃ prapadyate
hiranyagarbhatāmīśastayorvyaṣṭisamaṣṭitā - (24)

तत्र - in the (subtle body) अभिमानेन - by identification प्राज्ञः - *prājña*
तैजसत्वं - the status of *taijasa* प्रपद्यते - attains ईशः - *Īśvara* (च- अत्)
हिरण्यगर्भताम् - the status of *Hiranyagarbha* (प्रपद्यते - attains) तयोः -

between those two (व्यष्टिसमष्टिता - the distinction of) status as microcosm and macrocosm (भवति - is). - (24)

24. *Prājña* by identification with subtle body becomes *taijasa*, and *Īśvara* (by similar identification) becomes *Hiraṇyagarbha*. Between them there is the distinction of becoming microcosm and macrocosm.

Jīva, due to its identification with causal body, is called *prājña* (vide verse 17). The same *prājña* on its identification with subtle body becomes *taijasa*. In other words *cidābhāsa* available in *avidyā* identified with a subtle body becomes *taijasa*. *Antaḥkaraṇa* which is a part of a subtle body is also called *tejas* - a luminous entity - because it is directly illumined by *cit - ātmā*. *Tejas* signifies the subtle body. When *prājña* identifies itself with *tejas*, it becomes *taijasa*.

Īśvara, who is also *cidābhāsa* available in *māyā*, becomes *Hiraṇyagarbha* due to its identification with the subtle body.

The word "*Hiraṇyagarbha*" in fact means the one whose cause is the most luminous *cit - paramātmā*. It is to our advantage to know the derivation of this word, as more often than not it is wrongly translated.

हिरण्यं हेममयाण्डं गर्भः उत्पत्तिस्थानं यस्य सः हिरण्यगर्भः ।

The word "*Hiraṇyam*" or "*hemam*" means gold and so *hemamayam* is golden. But the metal "gold" being out of context it only indicates something that is luminous, like lustrous gold. The most luminous thing is the knowledge principle itself, *cit - paramātmā*, as everything else depends on it. Thus *hiraṇyam* finally means the *paramātmā* who is the very knowledge principle. Again, *aṇḍam* - egg - or *garbhaḥ* - womb/foetus - finally means the basis of birth or the cause. So the one whose cause is *paramātmā* is *Hiraṇyagarbha*. The *purāṇas* describe *Hiraṇyagarbha* as *Brahmā* (not Brahman), one of the trinity, viz. *Brahmā*, *Viṣṇu* and *Maheṣvara*.

Even though both *taijasa* and *Hiraṇyagarbha* are identified with the subtle body, there is a distinction between them, the former being at the level of individuality and the latter at the totality. *Taijasa* is *vyaṣṭi* - microcosm - being conditioned by an individual or an isolated subtle body as *upādhi*. On the contrary, *Hiraṇyagarbha* is *samaṣṭi* - macrocosm - being conditioned by total subtle bodies as *upādhi*. *Īśvara* thus plays the role of *Hiraṇyagarbha* with respect to all the subtle bodies. *Jīva* who is *prājña*, on the other hand, assumes the role of *taijasa* being related only to individual subtle bodies apart from the rest.

WHY MACROCOSM DIFFERS FROM MICROCOSM?

Why the one has individuality and the other the totality is now explained by the author himself in the next verse.

समष्टिरीशः सर्वेषां स्वात्मतादात्म्यवेदनात् ।
तदभावात्ततोऽन्ये तु कथ्यन्ते व्यष्टिसंज्ञया ॥२५॥

*samaṣṭirīśaḥ sarveṣāṃ svātmatādātmyavedanāt
tadabhāvāt tatonye tu kathyante vyaṣṭisamjñayā - (25)*

ईशः - *Hiraṇyagarbha* सर्वेषां - of all *taijāsas* स्वात्मतादात्म्यवेदनात्
- due to knowledge of identity with oneself समष्टि - macrocosm (भवति
- becomes) ततः - from him (ये - those) अन्ये - different (ते - they) तु -
whereas तदभावात् - on account of lack of that (knowledge of identity)
व्यष्टिसंज्ञया - by name microcosm कथ्यन्ते - are called. - (25)

25. *Hiraṇyagarbha* due to knowledge of identity of all *taijāsas* with oneself becomes macrocosm, whereas on account of lack of it, those who are other than *Hiraṇyagarbha* viz. *jīvas* are called by name microcosm.

Īśa in the context here refers to *Hiraṇyagarbha* and not *Īśvara*. By virtue of it being another facet of *Īśvara* at the level of all the subtle bodies, *Hiraṇyagarbha* is also an overlord in his own sphere. He knows that all the *taijāsas* present in the innumerable subtle bodies are identical with himself, in the sense that they have no separate existence apart from him, because the total should necessarily include the individuals contained therein. Therefore, all of them are not different from "me" - *Hiraṇyagarbha* - and "me" is abiding in them all; with that understanding he becomes macrocosm. Here *svātmatādātmya* means the identity of all *taijāsas* with *Hiraṇyagarbha* and not with their real nature, *cit*.

The *jīvas* who consider themselves to be different (*anye*) from *Hiraṇyagarbha* (*tataḥ*) do not have such knowledge of identity with all *taijāsas*. They identify themselves with only their own individual subtle bodies, taking themselves to be totally different from others. Due to absence of knowledge of such identity with all the totality, they are called by name microcosm. The absence and presence of knowledge of such identity produce microcosm and

macrocosm respectively.

Of course, *jīvas* being controlled by *avidyā*, it is ignorance that denies them this knowledge of oneness of all *taijasas*. Otherwise we know that the very same *sattva* and *rajas* constituents of all the five elements go into the making of all the subtle bodies without any exception whatsoever. It is the very same *cit* which presents itself as *cidābhāsa* irrespective of its *upādhi* (*māyā* or *avidyā*). The basic *cit* is thus the same though the *upādhis* differ; and yet if differences are attributed to *cidābhāsa* available in different *upādhis*, it is only an erroneous attribution of features of *upādhis* to it.

Though this inquiry is still to proceed further, even at this level, let us try to find out the basic truth. If *Īśvara*, the *cidābhāsa* in *māyā*, identified with all subtle bodies is *Hiraṇyagarbha*, does he abide in us or not? As each of us has a subtle body, *Hiraṇyagarbha* is verily present in us all.

That is why he is also called *sūtrātmā*. Like the thread in a garland he is the very core of our personality in terms of our subtle bodies. Only because of his presence we are alive and able to think. Our body will otherwise be a dead rotten mass. The presence of *Hiraṇyagarbha* means the very manifestation of *Īśvara*. Later it will be revealed that *Īśvara* in reality is verily "me".

Inquiry in Vedānta should lead to discovery about my real nature overcoming the obstruction caused by ignorance. Unlike in academic studies it is not stuffing the information from *pustakam* into *mastakam* - from book to head. The truth has to be seen then and there in *śravaṇa* - inquiry. Only for this purpose we are now investigating into how *avidyā*-ignorance - has ramified this *saṃsāra* so that we can retrace to "me" in reality by destroying the ignorance.

So far our investigation has reached up to *taijasa* and *Hiraṇyagarbha*. It was also seen earlier that *Īśvara* creates the world as ordered by *jīvas* according to the blueprint of their *karmaphalas*. They need a field of experience to exhaust their *karmaphalas*, but unless a gross body and a gross world are available, such experiences are not possible. Therefore, *Īśvara* further creates the gross body and the gross world. However, such a creation needs specific types of elements which are gross in nature. The five elements so far created are subtle whose *sattva* and *rajas* constituents have produced the sense organs, *antahkaraṇa*, organs of action and *prāṇas*. The remaining constituent *taṃas* of the very same five elements is subjected to a grossification process - called *pañcīkaraṇam* - to produce five gross elements. To explain the process, *pañcīkaraṇam* is introduced first.

PAÑCĪKARANAM

तद्भोगाय पुनर्भोग्यभोगायतनजन्मने ।
पञ्चीकरोति भगवान्प्रत्येकं वियदादिकम् ॥२६॥

*tadbhogāya punarbhogyabhogāyatanajanmane
pañcīkaroti bhagavānpratyekaṁ viyadādikam - (26)*

भगवान् - *Īśvara* पुनः - thereafter तद्भोगाय - for their experience भोग्यभोगायतनजन्मने - for the creation of sense objects and gross embodiments वियदादिकम् - the five elements beginning from space प्रत्येकम् - each of पञ्चीकरोति - grossified by the process of fivefold self division and mutual combination. - (26)

26. *Īśvara* thereafter grossifies each of the five elements beginning from space, to create the sense objects and gross embodiments for the experience of *jīvas*.

Bhagavān is an epithet applied to *Īśvara*, deities and other holy or respectable personages. When used in the sense of *Īśvara*, it is defined as under:

एश्वर्यस्य समग्रस्य धर्मस्य यशसः श्रियः ।
वैराग्यस्याथ मोक्षस्य षण्णां भग इतीरणा ॥

(Viṣṇu Purāṇa - 6-5-74)

"The six (attributes) viz. overlordship, *punya*, fame, wealth, dispassion and liberation, all in absolute measure, are called *bhagaḥ*. The one who possesses these six is called *Bhagavān*."

उत्पत्तिं प्रलयं चैव भूतानामागतिं गतिम् ।
वेत्ति विद्यामविद्यां च स वाच्यो भगवानिति ॥

(Viṣṇu Purāṇa - 6-5-78)

"He who knows the origin and end (of creation), the birth and death of beings, and (also) *vidyā* and *avidyā* is named *Bhagavān*".

Īśvara having first created the *jīvas* in terms of *prājñas* etc. thereafter (*punaḥ*) intended to provide them the sense objects like food, drink etc. (*bhogyā*) and suitable gross embodiments (*bhogāyatanam*) to get their experiences (*bhogas*) according to their *karmaphalas*. A physical body is the place (*āyatanam*) where all experiences of sense objects (*bhogas*) take place. For example, if you do not have the physical body how will you eat and drink or read this book? Thus *jīva* needs both the sense objects and physical body.

To create these, *Īśvara* grossifies each of the elements by the process of *pañcīkaraṇam*. Thereby a given element gets united with the remaining four. How this takes place or what is *pañcīkaraṇam* is the topic of the next verse.

द्विधा विधाय चैकैकं चतुर्धा प्रथमं पुनः ।

स्वस्वेतरद्वितीयांशैर्योजनात्पञ्च पञ्च ते ॥२७॥

*dvidhā vidhāya caikaikaṃ caturdhā prathamam punaḥ
svasvetaradvitīyāṃśairyojanātpañca pañca te - (27)*

एकैकं - each (वियदादिकं - the space etc.) द्विधा - in two parts विधाय - having made पुनः - again च - and प्रथमं - the first (half) चतुर्धा - in four parts (विधाय - having made) स्वस्वेतरद्वितीयांशैः - with the second halves of (elements) other than itself योजनात् - by joining (a quarter of first half) ते - they पञ्च पञ्च - quintuple (भवन्ति - become). - (27)

27. Having split the elements, space etc. each in two parts and again having divided the first half of each in four parts, and by joining each of the four quarters of the first half with the second halves of remaining elements, they become quintuple.

The *tamas* constituent of each of the five elements undergoes the process of *pañcīkaraṇam*. The following steps are involved in it.

1. The *tamas* aspect of each of the subtle elements is divided into two halves.

2. The first half is further divided into four equal parts keeping the second half intact. Thus we have four numbers of one eighth parts and a half in each element.

3. The one eighth portions of the first halves of each of the five elements are joined with the second halves of the remaining elements one each.

4. The resultant gross element is designated by the predominant constituent in the grossified element.

Before the grossification the subtle elements had their exclusive nature, but after the process each is mixed with the remaining four. For example, gross space consists of half of space plus one eighth each of air, fire, water and earth. One may question the propriety of retaining their original names. Here, the norm adopted in naming them is based on the degree of predominance.

We have also the following *Brahmasūtra* (2-4-22) to ascertain this basis.

वैशेष्यात्तु तद्वादस्तद्वादः ।

"But on account of the preponderance (of a particular element) occurs the corresponding designation, occurs the corresponding designation."

The word "tu" - but - in the *sūtra* is to refute the objection raised against such naming. The repetition of the last phrase is only to mark the end of the second chapter in *Brahmasūtra*.

The model of *pañcīkaraṇam* is said to be conceived by Ādi Śaṅkarācārya. There are some who object to it on the ground that it is not found anywhere in the Vedas. This criticism is wrong because it lacks thorough investigation. These hasty critics refer only to the ten *Upaniṣads* which are generally commented upon by great masters like Śaṅkarācārya. In fact as many as three *Upaniṣads* speak of *pañcīkaraṇa*. *Pañgalopaniṣad* belonging to *Śuklayajurveda* completely explains this process in its first chapter. *Kātharudropaniṣad* from *Kṛṣṇayajurveda* narrates the creation of five subtle (*apañcīkṛta*) elements. Thereafter it describes how *Īśvara* created the gross world having subjected these elements to the process of *pañcīkaraṇa*. *Varāhopaniṣad* found in *Kṛṣṇayajurveda*, directly refers to *pañcīkṛtabhūtāni* (the grossified elements) having taken for granted this process. Even among the first ten *Upaniṣads* the model has got its basis in the *trivṛtkaraṇam* process as stated in *Chāndogyopaniṣad* (6-3-3 and 4). What is told there is a similar process of grossification, though only with respect to fire, water and earth. But these three elements in that context signify the remaining two also. To speak of

creation without space and air will be absurd; besides, it will also clash with other *śrutis* like *Taittirīyopaniṣad* wherein the five elements are very clearly stated in the order of their creation.

Validity of *pañcīkaraṇa* can also be proved based on *Praśnopaniṣad* wherein there is a long list of different facets of creation which merge in *Para-akṣara* - in Brahman. This list also includes all the five elements both in gross and subtle forms.

पृथिवी च पृथिवीमात्रा चाऽऽपश्चाऽऽपोमात्रा च तेजश्च
तेजोमात्रा च वायुश्च वायुमात्रा चाऽऽकाशश्चाऽऽकाशमात्राच . .

(*Praśnopaniṣad* 4-8)

"Gross earth and subtle earth, gross water and subtle water, gross fire and subtle fire, gross air and subtle air, gross space and subtle space...."

The word "*mātrā*" with each element represents its nascent form prior to grossification. The mention of both gross and subtle elements itself proves the validity of *pañcīkaraṇam*.

Trisikhibrāhmaṇopaniṣad belonging to *Suklayajurveda* also first narrates the creation of *pañcatanmātrās* from which the *pañcamahābhūtas* are subsequently born.

The elements that we cognise are grossified, whereas the subtle elements are beyond our cognition. The earth that we dwell upon, the water that we drink, the fire that we warm with, the air that we breathe in, the space wherein we are accommodated, are all verily grossified (*pañcīkṛta*) elements.

GROSS CREATION FROM GROSS ELEMENTS

After *pañcīkaraṇam* the creation of gross world including the gross embodiments is shown. Thereafter the statuses of *Hiraṇyagarbha* and *taijasa* each with respect to gross bodies will be described.

तैरण्डस्तत्र भुवनं भोग्यभोगाश्रयोद्भवः ।
हिरण्यगर्भः स्थूलेऽस्मिन्देहे वैश्वानरो भवेत् ।
तैजसा विश्वतां याता देवतिर्यङ्मरादयः ॥२८॥

*tairaṇḍastatra bhuvanaṃ bhogyabhogāśrayodbhavaḥ
hiraṇyagarbhaḥ sthūleśmindehe vaiśvānaro bhavet
taijasā viśvatām yātā devatīryaṇnarādayaḥ - (28)*

तैः - by those (gross elements as the material cause) अण्डः - miniature form of the universe (उत्पद्यते - is born) तत्र - in that भुवनं - fourteen *lokas* (are born) तेषु - in them भोग्यभोगाश्रयोद्भवः - the birth of sense objects and gross embodiments (भवति - takes place) अस्मिन् - in this स्थूले देहे - in the gross body (वर्तमानः - abiding) हिरण्यगर्भः - *Hiraṇyagarbha* वैश्वानरः - *vaiśvānara* भवेत् - becomes (तथा - so also) तैजसाः - *taijasas* विश्वतां - the status of *viśva* याताः (सन्तः) - attaining देवतिर्यङ्नरादयः - deities, animals, human beings etc. (भवन्ति - become). - (28)

28. From those gross elements the *Brahmāṇḍa* - the miniature form of the universe - is born. In the *Brahmāṇḍa* the fourteen *lokas* are born. In them, the sense objects and gross embodiments are born. *Hiraṇyagarbha* abiding in the gross body becomes *vaiśvānara*. Similarly *taijasas* attaining the status of *viśva* become deities, animals, human beings etc.

There is a difference found in the numbering of verses 28 to 30 in different books. The order adopted here seems to be more suited topic-wise.

After *pañcīkaraṇam*, the *Brahmāṇḍa* - the universe presided over by *Hiraṇyagarbha* - is created from the five gross elements. In that the fourteen *lokas* - the fields of experience - are born. These are *bhūḥ* (earth), *bhuvāḥ*, *svaḥ*, *mahaḥ*, *jānaḥ*, *tapāḥ* and *satyaṃ* in the order of one above the other. Beneath the earth are the remaining seven, one below the other, beginning from *atala*, *vitāla*, *sutāla*, *talātāla*, *mahātāla*, *rasātāla* and *pātāla*. Those above the earth are heavenly abodes.

In every *loka*, the sense objects necessary for the *jīvas* and the befitting embodiments suitable for a given *loka* are born. The gross body is called *bhogāśraya* because it is the abode of all the experiences of *jīvas*.

Īśvara and *jīva* were called *Hiraṇyagarbha* and *taijasa* respectively when identified with the corresponding subtle body. The very same *Hiraṇyagarbha* when identified with macrocosmic gross body is

known as *vaiśvānaraḥ*.

The word "*vaiśvānara*" is derived in two ways.

१. विश्वश्च असौ नरश्च विश्वानरः । विश्वानरः एव वैश्वानरः ।

"The one who is *viśvaḥ*, *sarvaḥ* - the entire physical world - and at the same time *naraḥ* - all the *jīvas* abiding in the creation - is *viśvānaraḥ*. *Viśvānaraḥ* himself is called *vaiśvānaraḥ*."

Vaiśvānara is entire gross creation including the *jīvas* abiding therein. The entire physical creation which includes our gross bodies also, serves as his gross body.

२. विश्वेषां नराणां अनेकधा नयनात् वैश्वानरः ।

"Because of his leading all the *jīvas* in innumerable ways (to different embodiments according to their *karmaphalas*) he is called *vaiśvānara*."

This is possible because *Īśvara* himself in a different role is *vaiśvānara*.

This shows that anything and everything in the creation is *Īśvara* alone. That is why the scriptures emphasise, "love all, hate none" or "help ever, hurt never". When we hate or hurt anyone, we create pockets of revulsion in the objects or beings we hate or hurt whereby we cannot discover the truth of *Īśvara* being everything, including ourselves. Therefore all such do's and don'ts are told keeping in view the only one final purpose of appreciating the real nature of ourselves.

The innumerable individual *taijāsas* by identification with their individual bodies gain the status of *viśvaḥ* - waker consciousness. Here, the meaning of this word "*viśvaḥ*" is different from the one seen earlier in the derivation of *vaiśvānaraḥ*. There as a pronoun it meant "all". Here it refers to individual bodies which differ from one another, due to the differences in their physical embodiments. They include deities, animals, human beings etc. It is said that there are eighty-four lakhs of species of these embodiments in the entire creation.

Viśvaḥ is the complete manifestation of a *jīva* who is fully equipped to reap the harvest of one's own *karmaphalas* - both joys and

sorrows.

FALL OF JĪVA IN SAṂSĀRA

How *jīvas* get caught up in *saṁsāra* is explained in the next two verses with an illustration.

ते परादर्शिनः प्रत्यक्तत्त्वबोधविवर्जिताः ।

कुर्वते कर्म भोगाय कर्म कर्तुं च भुञ्जते ॥२९॥

te parāḡdarśinaḥ pratyaktattvabodhavarjitāḥ
kurvate karma bhogāya karma kartum ca bhuñjate - (29)

ते - they परादर्शिनः - extrovert (सन्ति - are) (यतः - because)
प्रत्यक्तत्त्वबोधविवर्जिताः - devoid of knowledge of oneself (भवन्ति - they are) भोगाय - for the sake of enjoyments कर्म - action(s) कुर्वते - they do कर्म - action(s) कर्तुं - to perform च - and भुञ्जते - they reap the result.
- (29)

29. They are engrossed in the external sense objects because they lack the knowledge of oneself. They do actions for the sake of enjoyments and reap the results (only) to perform (further) actions.

A *jīva* who is *cidābhāsa* is the effect of *avidyā* or that aspect of *prakṛti* which has impure *sattva*. While *avidyā* itself serves as the causal body for *jīva*, the subtle and gross bodies are produced from *tamaḥpradhānā prakṛti*. In short all these three bodies are made from the two aspects of *prakṛti*, as mentioned earlier. *Prakṛti* itself is dependent on Brahman - the all pervasive *saṁvit*.

If Brahman and *prakṛti* were two separate entities, the limitless Brahman will no more be so, being limited by the latter. Therefore the only possibility is that Brahman is *satyam* - real - and *prakṛti* is false - *mithyā*. This means the entire *upādhi* of *jīva* from *avidyā* to gross body including the *cidābhāsa* is equally false. What is real, is Brahman, limitless *ānanda*, which itself is the real nature (*pratyaktattva*) of *jīvas*. If this is known there is no problem of *saṁsāra*. But the problem is that they lack this knowledge (*bodha*).

One may argue at this juncture that at least those who work for attaining heavens, necessarily know *ātmanā*, because they know that heavenly embodiments can be gained only after death of the present one and therefore *ātmanā* is certainly different from the body. It is true that unlike *cārvākas* - the materialists - they do not take the

physical body to be *ātma*, but their concept of *ātma* is that of a "doer", "experiencer", departing to and arriving from other *lokas* or in one word, a *saṃsārī*. Therefore, they also do not have the knowledge of the real nature - *pratyaktattva*. Based on this, *jīvas* are described as *pratyaktattvabodhavivarjitāḥ*. Due to this ignorance, *jīvas* are unable to appreciate their own limitless *ānanda* nature. They get engrossed in the external sense objects. Thus they are *parāṅdarśināḥ*.

Kāthopaniṣad mantra also declares this fact.

पराञ्चि खानि व्यतृणत् स्वयम्भूः

(*Kātha* 2-1-1)

"*Īśvara* created the senses extrovert (and thereby) destroyed them."

By their very nature senses pursue the external sense objects. So they are unable to appreciate the real nature of their own selves. This inability is described as destruction in the *Kātha śruti*.

On knowing this you may jubilantly disown any lapses on your part in not knowing "*ātma*". On the contrary you may even justify your incessant sense pursuits. After all, is it not a manufacturing defect? If anyone is to be blamed at all for such defective senses, it is *Īśvara* alone!

Superficially it may appear so. But what for do *jīvas* order their bodies? What for do you take to action?

Here is the answer given by the author himself. Actions are done for the sake of sense enjoyments - *bhogāya karma kurvate*. Whether one gets the joy or not is altogether a different question, but the intention of one and all is invariably so. Further, actions and sense indulgence are never possible without a suitable body, wherein the senses should be capable of interaction with the external world. In other words, the senses are required to be extrovert. If this is so, how can we expect *Īśvara* to create senses which will not cater to the needs of *jīvas*? Therefore it is a job well done by *Īśvara*. *Jīvas* alone have to bear the blame for this mistake.

How long this *bhoga* - the sense indulgence - is to continue? Having got an embodiment, let it be over, once forever, so that *jīva* can be free to know the nature of oneself.

No, the present sense indulgence is only to take to further actions to get further *bhoga*. So it is pointed out in the verse: *karma kartum*

ca bhuñjate - reaps the results of past actions only to act further.

Why so? Why should *jīvas* not put a stop to this vicious circle?

The answer lies in the very cause that prompts them to take to *bhoga*. It is the sense of incompleteness, the want of happiness which goads them to run after the sense objects. This of course is the outcome of their self-ignorance. Therefore, however much they may indulge, at the end they continue to discover themselves to be still lacking, still wanting endless things. As a result thereof, there is no ceiling to the desires that they can entertain. Thus the vicious circle of action and sense indulgence remains never ending.

Then, are we to conclude that for this mistake of extrovertedness, *jīvas* can never hope to get freed from *saṃsāra*?

Certainly not. With moderation in the sense indulgence, the very same senses which can otherwise be calamitous should be regulated and redirected towards the pursuit of the highest goal in life as guided by *śāstras*. They are like the Schedule 'L' (for lethal) drugs in allopathic medicines which are poisonous and yet can cure the disease if administered properly in prescribed dosages. Likewise, with the mastery over the senses and the mind, they can be pressed into action ultimately to gain the knowledge of oneself.

Kāthopaniṣad in this context surely shows such possibility.

कश्चिद्धीरः प्रत्यगात्मानमैक्षदावृत्तचक्षुरमृतत्वमिच्छन् ।

(*Kāṭha* 2-1-1)

"A rare discriminating person, desiring immortality, having withdrawn from the senses, sees (i.e. gains the knowledge of) one's own real nature - *pratyagātmā*."

A mature *mumukṣu*, with all required readiness, by taking to inquiry as guided by an equally capable teacher, can certainly discover "*ātmā*" in its true nature. This will be suggested in verse 32.

Presently the helplessness and pitiable condition of the *jīvas* caught up in the vicious circle of *karma* and *bhoga* called *saṃsāra* is vividly described through an illustration.

नद्यां कीटा इवावर्तादावर्तान्तरमाशु ते ।

ब्रजन्तो जन्मनो जन्म लभन्ते नैव निर्वृतिम् ॥३०॥

*nadyāṃ kīṭā ivāvartādāvartāntaramāsu te
vrajanto janmano janma labhante naiva nirvṛtim - (30)*

नद्यां - in a river आवर्तत् - from (one) whirlpool आवर्तान्तरम् - to another whirlpool आशु - quickly व्रजन्तः - going कीटाः - insects इव - like जन्मनः - from (one) birth जन्म - to (another) birth (व्रजन्तः - going) ते - they निर्वृतिम् - liberation or happiness न एव - not at all लभन्ते - get. - (30)

30. Like the insects (fallen) in a river quickly going from one whirlpool to another, they, going from birth to birth, do not get liberation at all.

Unlike big fish, tiny insects have no capacity either to resist the current of a river or to get out from whirlpools. Being totally exhausted they get tossed into a series of whirlpools. In such a state it is just impossible for them to have any repose or happiness.

The *jīvas* in the form of *viśvas* having different types of embodiments also suffer a similar plight. By the momentum of *karmaphalas* against which they are totally helpless, they get caught up in a continuous series of births. Birth means death is inevitable. Therefore the cycle of birth and death they can never escape. *Kāthopaniṣad* asserts:

मृत्योः स मृत्युमाप्नोति य इह नानेव पश्यति ।

(*Kātha* 2-1-10)

"He who sees as though there is diversity, goes from death to death."

How can this person, subjected to incessant cycle of birth and death ever hope to get any happiness or freedom from it? Death is the most painful event in life. That is why *samsāra* is characterised by death. *Mṛtyurūpaḥ samsārah - samsāra* is of the nature of death. It is not just the case of one death, but an incessant cycle of births and deaths.

Birth also is not a pleasant thing to the born. Though modern gynaecology has not conducted any research in this direction, the condition of the foetus in the mother's womb does remain a very torturous one. We find a detailed account of this fact in the text *Adhyātma Rāmāyaṇa (Kiṣkindhā kāṇḍa, section 8, verses 22 to 39)* which is a part of *Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa*.

It is not that just only the birth and death are painful, but the period in-between also is nothing else but a continuous procession of sorrows, because of which even a little joy here and there gets reduced to nothing. Obviously *jīvas* get no *nirvṛti* - happiness or satisfaction. *Nirvṛti* also means limitless happiness or liberation from *saṃsāra*.

Are we to bear this state mutely and console ourselves, as the saying goes - "what cannot be cured must be endured" - that *saṃsāra* is unavoidable? No.

FREEDOM FROM SAṂSĀRA

There is a hope which will be explained with the help of the very same illustration of insects fallen in a river. So, having described the fall of *jīva* in *saṃsāra*, to recommend the means of getting freedom from it, that illustration is continued.

सत्कर्मपरिपाकात्ते करुणानिधिनोद्धृताः ।

प्राप्य तीरतरुच्छायां विश्राम्यन्ति यथासुखम् ॥३१॥

satkarmaparipākātte karuṇānidhinoddhṛtāḥ

prāpya tīratarucchāyāṃ viśramyanti yathāsukham - (31)

(यथा - just as) सत्कर्मपरिपाकात् - because of fructification of (their) past good deeds करुणानिधिना - by a person who is an ocean of compassion उद्धृताः - lifted up ते - those तीरतरुच्छायां - the shade of a tree on the bank प्राप्य - having reached यथासुखम् - happily विश्राम्यन्ति - rest. - (31)

31. (Just as) those (insects), because of fructification of (their) past good deeds lifted up by a very compassionate person, having reached the shade of a tree on the bank, rest happily (This verse is connected to the next verse).

While those insects were thus in a perilous condition a very compassionate person happens to come near them. Seeing the plight of those insects he takes pity on them and lifts some whom he has noticed and keeps them in the shade under a tree on the bank. Thus rescued from the whirlpool they rest happily there.

Now the question is, what made the person come there and notice them? "Just by a chance", cannot be the answer. There is no effect without a cause. Where we do not know the cause, it may appear

to be accidental, but in fact every thing or event is an incident only. In this case, it has to be attributed to *satkarmaparipāka* - some good deed of those insects in their past lives which have yielded the fruit now. Otherwise there may be still other insects left behind who have gone unnoticed and are still struggling in the whirlpools. *Satkarmaparipāka* is therefore the reason shown for such a rescue.

Mere compassion and eagerness on the part of that person by themselves are not enough. He should be intelligent and also have the ability to help. Or else, in spite of the eagerness to help, if he does not know how to handle them, he may even cause their drowning or make them crippled by a very tight grip while handling.

This illustration has to be applied to the *jīvas* who are in a similar plight in the ocean of *saṃsāra*. Like the insects, they should have *satkarmaparipāka* - their *puṇya* of the past, ready to provide the opportunities to get freed from this life of limitations. This also shows that a life given to *dharma* is indispensable; otherwise Vedānta teaching will not work. Vedānta presupposes a life of *dharma* if it is to be effective.

The compassionate person here is the *guru* - *ācārya* - who helps, prompted by mere compassion and not expecting any gains in return. *Ācārya* Śaṅkara describes such master as *ahetukadayāsindhuḥ* - an ocean of compassion that asks for no reason. That compassion is not motivated by anything other than the urge to destroy the distress of disciples.

Here also *ācārya* besides being compassionate, must be equally competent to help. In the words of Śaṅkarācārya they are "*tīrṇāssvayam . . . anyānapi tārantaḥ*" - having themselves crossed the ocean of *saṃsāra*, they help others also to do so.

Otherwise it is not uncommon to find people who are in search of some place or route being misled unwittingly by readily obliging passers-by who themselves know not the destination or the route. From the standpoint of *mumukṣus* the so called masters of this variety can at best be described as - "*svayaṃ magnāḥ anyānapi majjayanti*" - themselves drowned (in *saṃsāra*) cause others also to drown!

The illustration is now actually applied to the subject matter for which it was given.

उपदेशमवाप्यैवमाचार्यात्तत्त्वदर्शिनः ।

पञ्चकोशविवेकेन लभन्ते निर्वृतिं पराम् ॥३२॥

*upadeśamavāpyaiṣamācāryāṭtattvadarśinaḥ
pañcakōśavivekena labhante nirvṛtiṃ parām - (32)*

एवं - similarly (as told in verse 31) तत्त्वदर्शिनः आचार्यात् - from a teacher who knows the truth उपदेशम् - teaching अवाप्य - having got पञ्चकोशविवेकेन - by discrimination of five sheaths परां निर्वृतिं - liberation/limitless happiness लभन्ते - they (*jīvas*) attain. - (32)

32. Similarly, having got the teaching from a master who knows the truth, they attain liberation by the discrimination of five sheaths.

Just as the insects could get the help of a compassionate person, in the same manner the *mumukṣus* due to their immense *punya*, earned either in the past lives or now, get the guidance and the teaching of a right *ācārya*.

Smṛtis define *ācārya* as follows:

आचिनोति च शास्त्रार्थम् आचारे स्थापयत्यपि ।

स्वयमाचरते यस्तु स आचार्य इति स्मृतः ॥

"The one who (thoroughly) learns the subject matter of *śāstras* (Vedas etc.), also instructs others in the right conduct (according to *śāstras*) and himself practises accordingly, is considered an *ācārya*."

An *ācārya* is a *śrotriyaḥ* - well versed in the sacred learning because of mastery over the subject matter of *śāstras* including its final purpose - besides an *akāmahataḥ* - not smitten with desires - and has an exemplary conduct.

In addition to the above qualifications, the *ācārya* referred to here is also a *tattvadarśi* - the one who has *aparokṣa jñāna* of real nature of *ātmā*. This also includes, in the scriptural parlance, the status of being a *brahmaṇiṣṭhaḥ* - one who abides in the knowledge of Brahman. This means that the *ācārya* in this context is *śrotriyaḥ* and *brahmaṇiṣṭhaḥ* in accordance with *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* (1-2-12).

The life of an *ācārya* must be totally exemplary. In academic teaching the lifestyle of the teacher may not make any difference at all. So long as one has the thorough knowledge of the subject matter

and capacity to teach, one may be recognised as a good teacher.

But in scriptural lore, and more so in Vedānta, the conduct of an *ācārya* plays a prime role. The lack of it means the lifestyle is divorced from what one teaches. In such cases, not only the teaching will not work, but it is going to damage the very image of what is being taught too. There seems to be much truth in the criticism that damage to spirituality is done by verily those who profess it, as their conduct is not in accordance with what they talk.

Can one argue that an *ācārya* who is a *jñāni*, is not bound by the norms of conduct, as *śāstras* themselves declare that this person is above all do's and don'ts?

It is true that a *jñāni* - one who has self-knowledge - is *akartā* - not a doer, and *abhoktā* - not an experiencer, and also has no duties. But the fact that this person has gained self-knowledge presupposes that he or she had lived a life guided by *dharma* either in this life or earlier lives. Otherwise, to have the required disposition to gain knowledge is just next to impossible. And the one who adhered to the conduct of *dharma* even in the state of ignorance, can never be expected to violate it after the discovery that oneself is limitless *ānanda*. The above statement of the scripture is not a licence given to anyone to justify the misconduct. It is only in praise of this knowledge. Unlike an ignorant person, if a *jñāni* does something contrary to *dharma* either inadvertently or under certain peculiar situations, the adverse results can no longer affect him in the absence of his doership.

Actually, by virtue of the status of being an *ācārya*, a *jñāni* though not bound by duty has an added responsibility in terms of *lokasaṅgraha*, being a *śreṣṭhaḥ* - an exalted person. Lord Kṛṣṇa puts it in the phrase - "*lokasaṅgrahamevāpi sampasyan*" - "looking at the welfare or the protection of the world also", (*Gītā* 3-20). By seeing the very demonstration of teaching in *ācārya*'s life, the disciples will also develop an attitude of more trust in the teaching with firm *vairāgya* and *śraddhā*. The conduct of any *ācārya* whether *jñāni* or otherwise is therefore very important.

It is said that if a student is bad, only one person is spoilt. But if a teacher is bad, many are spoilt. There is no exception to this statement.

The *mumukṣu* has to gain the *upadeśa* from such a right *ācārya* who also has to have complete clarity of the final truth.

Upadeśa, in the context, is not some piece of advice or any counsel, but the teaching in the form of an inquiry, called *śravaṇam* to gain the knowledge of identity of *jīva* and *Īśvara*, both being in reality one and the same *saṁvit* - Brahman. This *upadeśa* will be told in verses 43 to 48.

Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad (2-4-5) exhorts - "one should gain the knowledge of *ātmā* for which *śravaṇam*, *mananam* and *nididhyāsanam* should be taken to." *Śravaṇam* is the means to gain *aparokṣajñāna*. By *mananam* - reflection - the vagueness and doubts in the knowledge are removed. In spite of clarity of the knowledge, habitual errors of identification of oneself with one's embodiment or taste for the sense objects can still persist. This problem is overcome by *nididhyāsanam* - contemplation - wherein one has to take to the practice of repeatedly appreciating the real nature of oneself by deliberate efforts.

In keeping with the style of *śruti*, Vidyāraṇya Muni suggests the reflection by means of *pañcakośaviveka* - the discrimination of *ātmā* to be distinct from the five sheaths.

Pañcakośaviveka can also be considered as *śravaṇam* as in *Taittirīyopaniṣad*. However, the author employs here the method of reasoning only, though based on *śruti*. This will be clear from its introduction in verse 37 and the conclusion in the first line of verse 43. Thus having gained the *upadeśa* (*śravaṇam*), reflection is resorted to by the *mumukṣu*.

Finally comes the role of the *nididhyāsanam*. Though it is not expressly mentioned in this verse, it is to be taken for granted that one should take to it as needed.

With these means one is able to abide in *parānirvṛtiḥ* - the limitless *ānanda* - the real nature of oneself. This itself is the liberation from the *saṁsāra*.

THE FIVE SHEATHS

Before conducting the inquiry into the five sheaths to show that *ātmā* is distinct from them, they are described in verses 33 to 36.

अन्नं प्राणो मनो बुद्धिरानन्दश्चेति पञ्च ते ।

कोशास्तैरावृतः स्वात्मा विस्मृत्या संसृतिं ब्रजेत् ॥३३॥

*annam prāṇo mano buddhirānandaśceti pañca te
kośāstairāvṛtaḥ svātmā vismṛtyā saṁsṛtiṁ vrajet - (33)*

अन्नं - food प्राणः - vital air मनः - mind बुद्धिः - intellect आनन्दः - bliss च
- and इति - so ते - those पञ्च - five कोशाः - sheaths (सन्ति - are) तैः - by them
आवृतः - covered स्वात्मा - one's real nature *ātmā* विस्मृत्या - by
forgetfulness संसृतिं - transmigration ब्रजेत् - gets. - (33)

33. The five sheaths are (those of) food, vital air, mind, intellect and bliss. *Ātmā* covered by them, by forgetfulness subjects (oneself) to transmigration.

The five *kośas* are as follows.

1. *Annamaya kośa* - food sheath
2. *Prāṇamaya kośa* - vital air sheath
3. *Manomaya kośa* - mental sheath
4. *Vijnānamaya kośa* - intellectual sheath
5. *Ānandamaya kośa* - bliss sheath.

In all these sheaths the suffix *maya* (i.e. *mayaḥ*) is used in the sense of modification (*vikāra*).

The sheaths will be described in the next two and a half verses. Presently why they are called *kośas* is told. To say that anything can truly cover *ātmā* is more absurd than to claim that space can be covered by a lid.

WHAT IS KOŚA?

Kośa here means a sheath which is used to place or cover a sword. You know that there is a sword inside but you are not able to see it. The sheath obstructs the direct sight of the sword. Thus it is a covering.

Likewise these five sheaths come in the way of the knowledge of our real nature. For practical purposes these five sheaths appear to cover *ātmā* as if like multiple sheaths covering a sword and therefore universally they are mistaken for *ātmā* - "I" - itself. The physical body is taken as "I" by one and all. Similarly the vital airs, mind, intellect and ignorance also are taken to be "me"; therefore they are referred to as *kośas* - sheaths - but literally they are not so.

Actually what is covered is one's own vision - one's intellect. When we say that the vast sun, the centre of our entire solar system is covered by a tiny patch of cloud, it only means that the onlooker's sight is covered by it. It is wrong to consider the sun to be really covered by the cloud. Similarly the statement that "*kośas*" have covered *ātmā* means that self-ignorance denies to us the knowledge of *ātmā*.

Kośa also means a cocoon of a silkworm, spun by itself for its protection. But the silkworm gets distressed due to confinement in the cocoon and generally dies when greedy man kills it to get the silk. Like cocoon (*kośavat*) these sheaths are causes of suffering (*kleśahetuvāt*) and so are called *kośas*. Once these five sheaths are considered to be "I", all the modifications that take place in them also get superimposed on "me". This is the basis of suffering in *samsāra*. Hence the aptness of the name *kośa*.

In fact *kośas* deny us the knowledge of *ātmā* only due to ignorance. If we have the knowledge of our real nature, we would not have mistaken them as "I". What is covered truly, is our intellect and of course the cover is ignorance itself. Thus there is *viśmṛtiḥ*, *vītā smṛtiḥ* - loss of memory or forgetfulness - of *ātmā*. The word "*viśmṛti*" can also be resolved as *viparītā smṛtiḥ* - erroneous thinking (of *ātmā*). This accounts also for the erroneous concepts about oneself. Thus *kośas* deny us the knowledge of our nature and also produce wrong notion, and as a result one is caught up in the non-stop cycle of birth and death called *samsṛtiḥ*.

The nature of these *kośas* is now described one by one.

स्यात्पञ्चीकृतभूतोत्थो देहः स्थूलोऽन्नसंज्ञकः ।

लिङ्गे तु राजसैः प्राणैः प्राणः कर्मेन्द्रियैः सह ॥३४॥

syātpañcīkṛtabhūtottho dehaḥ sthūlonnasamjñakaḥ
liṅge tu rājasaiḥ prāṇaiḥ prāṇaḥ karmendriyaiḥ saha - (34)

पञ्चीकृतभूतोत्थः - born of five gross elements स्थूलः - gross
 देहः - body अन्नसंज्ञकः - the *kośa* called *annamaya* स्यात् - is लिङ्गे - in
 subtle body तु - but (वर्तमानैः - present) राजसैः - by the effects of *rajas*
 प्राणैः - by the vital airs कर्मेन्द्रियैः सह - together with (*saha*) organs of
 action प्राणः - the *prāṇamaya kośa* (स्यात् - occurs). - (34)

34. The gross body, born of five gross elements is called *annamaya kośa*. But, by the effect of *rajas* viz. the vital airs together with the organs of action, present in the subtle body, form the *prāṇamaya kośa*.

FOOD SHEATH

The physical body is made up of five gross elements. It is born of the food assimilated by the parents. Food is indispensable for its survival. After the death it goes back to earth to become food for others. So the one which is essentially the modification of food (*annam*) is called *annamaya kośa*.

VITAL AIR SHEATH

While the *annamaya kośa* is made up of the constituent *tamas* aspect of five elements after grossification, the *prāṇamaya kośa* is the product of the *rajas* aspect of five subtle elements. It consists of the five vital airs and the five organs of action.

The description of *kośas* continues further.

सात्त्विकैर्धीन्द्रियैः साकं विमर्शात्मा मनोमयः ।
 तैरेव साकं विज्ञानमयो धीर्निश्चयात्मिका ॥३५॥

*sāttvikairdhīndriyaiḥ sākam vimarśātmā manomayaḥ
 taireva sākam vijñānamayo dhīrniścayātmikā* - (35)

विमर्शात्मा - the mind सात्त्विकैः - with the effects of *sattva* धीन्द्रियैः -
 with the sense organs साकं - along with मनोमयः - mental sheath (स्यात्
 - is) निश्चयात्मिका - whose nature is decisiveness धीः - intellect तैः - with
 those (sense organs) एव - same साकं - along with विज्ञानमयः -
vijñānamaya kośa (भवति - becomes). - (35)

35. The mind along with the sense organs which are the effects of *sattva* is (called) *manomaya kośa*. The intellect whose nature is

decisiveness, together with the same (sense organs) becomes *vijñānmayā kośa*.

MENTAL SHEATH

That the nature of mind is *vimarśaḥ* - scrutiny or positive and negative thought - was seen in verse 20. It is born from the collective *sattva* of all the five elements, whereas each sense organ is born of respective individual *sattva* constituent of the five elements. The mind along with the sense organs forms the *manomaya kośa*.

INTELLECTUAL SHEATH

The intellect is the decision making faculty. Being a part of *antahkaraṇa*, the intellect is also produced from the collective *sattva* of all the five elements. The intellect together with the same sense organs is known as *vijñānamaya kośa*. Functions of mind and intellect depend on the data furnished by the sense organs. Thus the sense organs become a common component in both these sheaths.

The next verse first describes the bliss sheath, followed by the result of identification of oneself with all the five sheaths.

कारणे सत्त्वमानन्दमयो मोदादिवृत्तिभिः ।

तत्तत्कोशैस्तु तादात्म्यादात्मा तत्तन्मयो भवेत् ॥३६॥

*kāraṇe sattvamānandamayo modādivṛttibhiḥ
tattatkośaistu tādātmyādātmā tattanmayo bhavet - (36)*

कारणे - in causal body (यत् - which) सत्त्वं - *sattva guṇa* (अस्ति - is there) (तत् - that) मोदादिवृत्तिभिः - with its modifications or functions *moda* etc. आनन्दमयः - bliss sheath (स्यात् - is) आत्मा - *ātmā* तु - but तत्तत्कोशैः - with different sheaths तादात्म्यात् - due to identification तत्तन्मयः - one with them भवेत् - becomes. - (36)

36. The *sattva guṇa* that is in the causal body with its modifications viz. *priya*, *moda* and *pramoda*, is (called) bliss sheath. But *ātmā* due to its identification with different sheaths becomes one with them.

BLISS SHEATH

The causal body or *avidyā* is that part of *prakṛti* which is predominated by *malinasattva* - the impure *sattva*. Because of being mixed with *rajas* and *taṃas* in varying proportions, it is said to be impure. The

presence of *sattva* in causal body cannot be denied, though it may be overcome by the other two. This *sattva* with its modifications (*vyttis*) *priya*, *moda* and *pramoda*, is named *ānandamaya kośa* - the bliss sheath.

PRIYA, MODA, PRAMODA

In the commentary of *Taittirīyopaniṣad*, Ācārya Śaṅkara defines these three as follows:

1. *Priyam*: *Iṣṭaputrādīdarśanam priyam* - the pleased disposition or joy on seeing a dear son or other objects and beings. "Seeing" here also signifies hearing good news about them or their memories. Suppose you see your bosom friend after many years or receive a letter from him after a long time. You are pleased by it. Even when you think of him there is some joy, brought about by the revival of impressions about him.

2. *Modaḥ*: *Priyalābhanimitto harṣaḥ* - the delight that is caused by gaining those that are dear to oneself. This joy of acquisition is certainly greater than the one in the first case.

3. *Pramodaḥ*: *Saḥ (modaḥ) eva ca prakṛṣṭo harṣaḥ* - the same delight of *moda* in abundance is *pramoda*. The actual enjoyment of desired thing may produce such measure of joy that it can surpass the earlier two, but not always. One's expectation may also go wrong. Keeping that in view, it has been defined as *moda* in its exalted state.

Suppose someone gives you the news that mangoes of the best variety have arrived in the market, much before the actual season. You like them the most and so you are happy to know of their arrival. This is *priya*. Then you go to the market and find that they appear good in quality and the price is affordable. So you purchase a dozen of them. They are in your bag now. You are happier, which is *moda*. Finally after coming home when you eat one you are still more happy because it is very sweet. This is *pramoda*. On the contrary if it turns out to be sour, you will start making faces. Such a possibility can never be ruled out. It is not true that a desired object will invariably give the expected happiness. So, *pramoda* is not defined as the joy born of sense-indulgence, because our expectations may go wrong.

These three *vyttis*- modifications of *sattva* in the causal body - are very subtle in nature. Whenever we are happy in the waking or in the dream state, irrespective of the cause that makes us happy, the actual manifestation of happiness is due to these very *vyttis*. Deep

sleep is the exclusive state of *ānandamaya kośa*, wherein also these three are present.

WHY ARE KOŚAS CALLED ĀTMĀ?

So far the five sheaths have been described with the purpose of discriminating *ātmā* as separate from them. But in the context of *Taittirīyopaniṣad* a doubt is possible. It is stated therein that different from *annamaya kośa* is the inner *ātmā*, *prāṇamaya kośa*. Distinct from *prāṇamaya kośa* is the inner *ātmā*, *manomaya kośa* etc. (*Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2-2-1 etc.). Thus the very sheaths are referred to as *ātmā*. How is this possible if *ātmā* is different from all the sheaths?

The answer is given in the second line of this verse. *Ātmā*, due to its identification (*tādātmyā*) with the different sheaths (*tattatkośaiḥ*) becomes (*bhavet*) verily one with them (*tattanmayah*). And so in practice ignorant persons take the sheaths to be *ātmā*. It is the predominance of different sheaths in our daily activities that gives the notion that a particular sheath is *ātmā*.

The following statements will explain to us the *kośa* of identification:

STATEMENT	ĀTMĀ IS MISTAKEN AS
1. "I am sitting here"	Food sheath
2. "I am hungry"	Vital air sheath
3. "I am restless"	Mental sheath
4. "I am a lawyer"	Intellectual sheath
5. "Now I am happy"	Bliss sheath

But in reality, *ātmā* is totally different from these five sheaths. The word "tu" - but - in the verse is meant to point out this distinction.

WHY IDENTIFICATION?

Let us now consider why such mistaken identification should take place at all.

From what we know so far, *saṁvit*, *cit* - pure awareness - is *ātmā*. In contrast to this, our physical body is by itself inert as easily verified in a corpse. Yet we feel the sentience in the body due to the *cīdābhāsa* - the reflection of *cit* in the subtle body - which in turn transmits it to our gross body. Everyone knows oneself to be sentient. But ignoring the inertness of the body, the error is committed in taking the body to be "I".

The situation is similar to the one seen in a red hot iron ball, where the fire and the iron ball are separate. But a child takes it as a fireball, being not able to distinguish the metal iron and the fire that has

permeated in and through the iron ball. The problem is due to lack of *viveka* - discrimination - between iron and fire. Likewise for want of discrimination between the physical body (food sheath) and *cit*, we take the former to be "I" - *ātmā*. This also holds true for the other sheaths. Such erroneous identification - *tādātmya* - is never possible unless there is *cidābhāsa* available in our body.

THREE TYPES OF *TĀDĀTMYAS*

There are three types of *tādātmyas*:

1. *Sahaja tādātmya* - inborn or natural unity.
2. *Karmaja tādātmya* - unity born of *karma*.
3. *Bhrāntija tādātmya* - erroneous identification.

From the time of birth, our subtle body abides in our gross body. The subtle body is always accompanied by *cidābhāsa*. It is as natural as the reflection of the sun in a mirror. All that is necessary for the latter is that the mirror should be present in the sunlight. *Ātmā* being all pervasive *cit*, wherever a subtle body is present, *cidābhāsa* is inevitable effortlessly. This is called *sahaja tādātmya*.

That a given subtle body should be present in a particular gross one is determined by the *karmas*. Therefore, it is called *karmaja tādātmya* - unity born of *karma*. Because the subtle body is imbued with the natural *cidābhāsa*, there is an inborn unity of *cidābhāsa* with the gross body also through the subtle body.

MERE *CIDĀBHĀSA* IS NOT A PROBLEM

Availability of *cidābhāsa* in the entire embodiment by itself is not a problem, provided *cit* and the embodiment are known to be distinct. A *jñāni* has *cidābhāsa*. But it is no longer a problem for such a person in view of the knowledge that *ātmā* and the three bodies are as distinct as the fire is from iron, in spite of their coexistence. The presence of *cidābhāsa* itself does not make the physical body, vital airs, mind etc. to be *kośas* which cast afflictions. It is *visṃṛti* - the forgetfulness - (vide verse 33) or, in other words, the ignorance of "I" - *ātmā* - that produces the notion of "I"ness in them and thereby they function as *kośas*. This is *bhrāntija tādātmya* - erroneous identification - as it is born of error about "me". No doubt, it is the inborn unity with *cidābhāsa* that provides the base for such error by taking an embodiment as sentient in its true nature. In the absence of *cidābhāsa* the body is inert, and can never be taken as "I".

This *tādātmya* is complete only at the level of *viśva* - the waker consciousness. In the waking state the *jīva* utilises all

the three bodies and functions as both *kartā* - the doer - and *bhoktā* - the experiencer. In the dream the gross body is not used and therefore no actions are possible. It is only a state of experience - *bhoga*.

Ātmā is opposed neither to ignorance nor to anything else. It is like a crystal that appears to take unto itself the colours in the vicinity. Similarly *ātmā* appears to become totally one with the *kośas* (*tattanmayo bhavet*). *Tanmaya* means full of those (*kośas*) or saturated with them. There lies the *saṃsāra*. This cannot be so in reality, as *ātmā* by its nature is unconnected to anything, like space.

DESIRED THING CAN BE *KOŚA*

It should be clear from the foregoing discussion that the embodiment becomes *kośas* for the ignorant persons. In their case, the concept of *kośas* can even be extended further to things desired by them!

Whenever a person desires anything, there develops an *āśakti* - attachment - for it, which is evidently prompted by a notion that "I depend on it for my joy". In course of time *āśakti* grows into *abhiśvaṅga* - the identification with the desired thing. The person gets afflicted by any ups and downs in the object of identification. Thus this object also behaves like a *kośa*.

DESIRE PRESUPPOSES BODY IDENTIFICATION

Desires also nourish the concept of *kośa* and make it more and more deeply rooted. It is an interesting investigation. Can anyone ever entertain a desire without the identification with one's own body? Of course, the desires referred to are those by fulfilment of which one hopes to be happier. For whom is the desired object, being or event? You will reply, "It is for me". But, which "me" do you mean? Certainly it cannot be the "me" who is *sat, cit, ānanda*. Then it has to be the "me" who is identified with the body. Therefore, any desire presupposes identification with the body. The more the desires are entertained, the stronger is the identification.

NECESSITY OF DISPASSION

You must now understand why Vedānta repeatedly emphasises the need to develop a sense of *vairāgya* - dispassion. Generally dispassion is detested by all who lack maturity. In absence of *vairāgya*, Vedānta does not work. Desire presumes identification with the embodiment consisting of five *kośas*, whereas self-knowledge is the discovery of "me" to be separate from the embodiment. How can both co-exist? They are as opposed to each other as light is to

darkness. Therefore dispassion is indispensable for *pañcakośaviveka* to be effective.

In Hindi the saying goes:

जहाँ राम वहाँ काम नहीं । जहाँ काम, वहाँ राम नहीं ।

"Wherever there is Lord Rāma, there is no desire (*kāma*); wherever there is desire, there is no Rāma."

Both Rāma and *kāma* can never co-exist.

The saying stems forth from an episode in the *Ramāyaṇa*. Rāvaṇa had tried all the means to persuade Sītā to yield to himself, but he failed miserably. He was a past master in all magics too. So someone suggested to him to disguise himself as Lord Rāma and deceive Sītā. But Rāvaṇa who had already tried that trick had to confess pathetically his failure even in that attempt. The moment he disguised himself to be Lord Rāma, the *kāma* - lust - disappeared from him!

DISCRIMINATION OF FIVE SHEATHS FROM ĀTMĀ

If *ātmā* has become *saṃsārī jīva* by the identification with the *kośas* how can it be Brahman who is ever free from all these?

The answer would be clear from our earlier analysis that *ātmā* does not really become *saṃsārī*. The problem arises from an error of mistaking *kośas* as *ātmā*. A well-prepared intellect has to discriminate *ātmā* to be free from *kośas* and therefore from consequent *saṃsāra*. Then alone can one discover the *jīva* in reality to be Brahman. So the author starts the discrimination between five sheaths and *ātmā*.

अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां पञ्चकोशविवेकतः ।

स्वात्मानं तत उद्धृत्य परं ब्रह्म प्रपद्यते ॥३७॥

. *anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ pañcakośavivekataḥ*

svātmānaṃ tata uddhṛtya paraṃ brahma prapadyate - (37)

अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां - with the (ascertaining of) continuance and discontinuance पञ्चकोशविवेकतः - by discriminating the five sheaths (from *ātmā*) स्वात्मानं - the nature of *ātmā* ततः - from the five sheaths उद्धृत्य - having distinguished and ascertained परं - limitless ब्रह्म - Brahman प्रपद्यते - one gains. - (37)

37. By discriminating the five sheaths (from *ātmā*) with the (ascertaining of) continuance and discontinuance (and thereby) having distinguished and ascertained the nature of *ātmā* from the five sheaths, one gains the limitless Brahman.

GENERAL NATURE OF PAÑCAKOŚAVIVEKA

Pañcakośaviveka should not be mistaken as literally stripping of layers of five *kośas* one by one from the so called *ātmā* of the size of a thumb seated in the heart - *aṅguṣṭhamātraḥ puruṣaḥ* (*Kāthopanīṣad* 2-1-12). The intention of *śruti* in *Kāthopanīṣad* is not to attribute any size to *ātmā*. At best, it is a concept for *upāsana* - meditation. As we know, these *kośas* are called so, because of their consequent effect like *kośas*. They are not physical coverings. So

discrimination is not a job of physical separation to be handled by any surgeon. It is a differentiation to be undertaken at the level of intellect. It is the job for the one who wants to be a *paramahansaḥ* - one who is limitless - (*parama*) and the destroyer of ignorance (*hanti iti haṃsaḥ*). The notion that *ātmā* is the *pañcakōśas* which are *anātmā* - not self - has to be discarded.

The association between *ātmā* and *kōśas* is not that of *samsarga* - a connection - between two entirely different things. Nor is it an association of two members of a given species like two flowers, say rose and jasmine. *Ātmā* is not an object like any other object in the world, to get connected with something else. Such associations would mean destruction of *ātmā*, being limited by other objects. Actually the five sheaths are *mithyā* - false - and not real. We can trace back their origin to *prakṛti* which itself is false and depends on *cidānandamayabrahma* (vide verse 15) which alone is *satyam*. Thus *ātmā* - Brahman - alone is real and *kōśas* are false. Between the real and the false, there is a confusion which necessitates discrimination.

ANVAYA VYATIREKA

In this chapter, the author has used the words "*anvaya*" and "*vyatireka*" in the sense of continuance and discontinuance respectively. In the present context these two words are to be understood as follows:

1. *Anvaya*: *Anuvṛttiḥ* - the continuance which is determined by the *pratītiḥ* - cognition of *ātmā* in all the states of experience.
2. *Vyatireka*: *Vyāvṛtti* - discontinuance. This is ascertained by the *apratītiḥ* - non-cognition of the *kōśas* at varied times.

This can be best understood by the following example. Suppose the Prime Minister of our country is on a continuous tour of all the states one by one. To whichever state he may go, he is accompanied by the Chief Minister of that particular state. When he departs for the neighbouring state, the Chief Minister takes leave of him and does not follow him to the next state. Thus the Prime Minister has *anvaya* - continuance - with respect to the entire country, whereas the Chief Ministers have *vyatireka* as regards the other states. This shows the distinction between the Prime Minister and the Chief Ministers.

By these norms of *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, the *nityatva* - everlasting presence - of *ātmā* is shown. It exists independently, irrespective of the presence or absence of the sheaths. In contrast, each sheath

gets negated at one stage or the other. The sheaths being fleeting in nature cannot be *ātmā*. Thus *ātmā* is distinct from them.

It should also be noted that *anvaya* and *vyatireka* are not employed here in the usual method in which the presence and absence of a given thing is determined by the presence or absence of something else, on which it depends. The sun is, so the day is; and the smoke is, so the fire is, are the examples of *anvaya* in this sense. The sun is not, so the day is not; and the fire is not, so the smoke is not, explain *vyatireka* in that pattern.

ONESELF IS BRAHMAN

The continuance (*anvaya*) of *ātmā* and the discontinuance (*vyatireka*) of five sheaths will be described in verses 38, 39 and 41. With this method one has to appreciate one's real nature (*svātmānam*) to be separate from the five sheaths (*tataḥ*). As stated earlier, this is not a physical separation. The false sheaths are superimposed on the real *ātmā* and therefore, the separation is to be done by one's intellect and thereby *ātmā* is to be distinguished from them and its nature - *sat*, *cit*, *ānanda* - is to be ascertained. *Ātmā* - the real nature of oneself - and limitless Brahman are the same. Therefore the one who ascertains *ātmā* as told, discovers oneself to be Brahman.

First, the principles of continuance and discontinuance are used to prove the gross body to be *anātmā* - not self.

अभाने स्थूलदेहस्य स्वप्ने यद्भानमात्मनः ।

सोऽन्वयो व्यतिरेकस्तद्भानेऽन्यानवभासनम् ॥३८॥

*abhāṇe sthūladehasya svapne yadbhānamātmānaḥ
sonvayo vyatirekastadbhānenyānavabhāsanam* - (38)

स्वप्ने - in the dream स्थूलदेहस्य - of the gross body अभाने - when there is non-cognition आत्मनः - of *ātmā* यत् - which भानम् - illumination (अस्ति - is there) सः - that अन्वयः - (is) continuance (of *ātmā*) तद्भाने - when it (*ātmā*) illumines (यत् - which) अन्यानवभासनं - non-cognition of the other (i.e. gross body) (अस्ति - is there) (सः - that) व्यतिरेकः - (is) discontinuance (of the gross body). - (38)

38. In the dream when there is non-cognition of the gross body the illumination of *ātmā* is there, and that is its continuance (therein). When *ātmā* illumines, whatever non-cognition of the gross body is

there, that is its discontinuance (in the dream) of the gross body.

Having introduced the inquiry of *pañcakośaviveka*, the author now changes the terminology, from *kośa* to the body. The food sheath and the bliss sheath correspond to the gross body and the causal body, respectively. The remaining three *kośas* are included in the subtle body, and will be specified in verse 40.

GROSS BODY CANNOT BE *ĀTMĀ*

The gross body is not available for cognition in the dream state. It is absent there. From the waking state one goes to the sleep state first. Thereafter, there is a projection of mind without the help of the senses, and that is the dream state. Directly entering into dream from waking, without the intervention of sleep, is at best day dreaming or building castles in the air! During dream, when the gross body is not cognised, *ātmā* as the *sākṣī* - independent illuminator - still continues to illumine the dreamer, the dreamt world, and all the dream experiences directly. Otherwise we cannot experience the dream. This persistent illumination of *ātmā* even when the gross body is negated, is said to be continuance (*anvaya*) of *ātmā* in the dream.

In the state of dream, where *ātmā* continues to illumine, the gross body is not available. It is not cognised. Such *anavabhāsanam* - non-cognition - of *anya* - the other - viz. the gross body, even when *ātmā* is illuminating, is discontinuance (*vyatireka*) of the gross body in the dream.

Thus in the dream the gross body ceases to exist for the person. So it cannot be the "I" - *ātmā* - which can never be negated. This also proves that *ātmā* is distinct from the gross body.

Perhaps the subtle body can be *ātmā*! No, this possibility is also ruled out, as will be seen now.

लिङ्गाभाने सुषुप्तौ स्यादात्मनो भानमन्वयः ।
व्यतिरेकस्तु तद्भाने लिङ्गस्याभानमुच्यते ॥३९॥

*liṅgābhāne suṣuptau syādātmano bhānamanvayaḥ
vyatirekastu tadbhāne liṅgasyābhānamucyate - (39)*

सुषुप्तौ - in deep sleep लिङ्गाभाने - when the subtle body is not cognised आत्मनः - of *ātmā* भानं - illumination अन्वयः - continuance (of *ātmā*) (स्यात् - is) तद्भाने - when it (i.e. *ātmā*) illumines तु - but लिङ्गस्य -

of the subtle body अभानं - non-cognition व्यतिरेकः - discontinuance (of the subtle body) उच्यते - is called. - (39)

39. When the subtle body is not cognised in the deep sleep, the illumination of *ātmā* persists and that is its continuance (therein). But when *ātmā* illumines, the non-cognition of the subtle body is called its discontinuance (in the deep sleep).

SUBTLE BODY CANNOT BE *ĀTMĀ*

In the deep sleep the *antaḥkaraṇa* is dormant. So the subtle body (*liṅgaśarīra*) is not available for cognition. It is universally known that in the deep sleep, neither the subtle body nor the gross body is available for cognition. That "nothing was known in the sleep" is the recollection of all people. Yet *ātmā* - cit - continues to illumine in the sleep. If it were not so, we will not be able to recollect, after waking up, our deep sleep experience of not knowing anything. This *bhānam* - the independent illumination - of the deep sleep state by *ātmā* as *sākṣī* is the continuation of *ātmā* therein. In that same state of deep sleep, where *ātmā* illumines, the non-cognition of the subtle body is its discontinuance therein.

In both these verses, it is proved that *ātmā* who continues to illumine is the one to whom the continuance (*anvaya*) in that particular state belongs. That which ceases to be there, has got the discontinuance (*vyatireka*) therein.

The discontinuance of the subtle body in the deep sleep indicates that it is *anātmā*. If it were not so, it should be cognised in the deep sleep too, as *ātmā* can never get negated.

Then, may be that the remaining *ānandamaya kośa* or the causal body, is *ātmā*! This will be analysed in verse 41. Prior to it, the discrimination of the subtle body from *ātmā* is shown to be the same as that of the vital air, the mental and the intellectual sheaths, because these three sheaths together constitute the subtle body.

तद्विवेकाद्विविक्ताः स्युः कोशाः प्राणमनोधियः ।

ते हि तत्र गुणावस्थाभेदमात्रात्पृथक्कृताः ॥४०॥

tadvivekādviviktāḥ syuḥ kośāḥ prāṇamanodhiyaḥ
te hi tatra guṇāvasthābheda mātrātpṛthakṛtāḥ - (40)

तद्विवेकात् - by its (of the subtle body) discrimination प्राणमनोधियः

कोशाः - the vital air, mental and intellectual sheaths विविक्ताः स्युः - are discriminated हि - because ते - those (sheaths) तत्र - there (in the subtle body) गुणावस्थाभेदमात्रात् - on account of differences in *guṇas* and their states पृथक्कृताः - are differentiated. - (40)

40. By the discrimination of the subtle body, the vital air, the mental and the intellectual sheaths are (as well) discriminated from *ātmā*, because those (sheaths) (abiding) there (in the subtle body) are differentiated on account of differences in their *guṇas* and the states.

In verse 39, *ātmā* was shown to be distinct from the subtle body which can only be *anātmā*. This also means that *ātmā* is distinct from the three sheaths which constitute the subtle body. So the vital air, the mental and the intellectual sheaths are equally discriminated from *ātmā*.

One may doubt, if all the three sheaths are nothing but the subtle body, why are they taken as three different sheaths? This is done as they differ from one another in their constitution, nature and function. Vital air sheath is made from *rajoguṇa*, and *kriyā* - action - is its function, and contains in itself all the five components. Mental and intellectual sheaths are the products of *sattvagūṇa*. The former is of the nature of scrutiny or positive and negative thoughts, whereas the latter is a faculty of decision making. Due to an error *ātmā* also gets identified with them individually along with their modifications. Therefore they are differentiated (*pṛthakkr̥tāḥ*) from one another.

CAUSAL BODY CANNOT BE *ĀTMĀ*

Now let us see, how the bliss sheath or the causal body is shown to be *anātmā*.

सुषुप्त्यभाने भानं तु समाधावात्मनोऽन्वयः ।
व्यतिरेकस्त्वात्मभाने सुषुप्त्यनवभासनम् ॥४१॥

*suṣṭyabhāne bhānam tu samādhāvātmanonvayaḥ
vyatirekastvātmabhāne suṣṭyanavabhāsanam* - (41)

समाधौ - in *samādhi* सुषुप्त्यभाने - when the causal body is not cognised आत्मनः - of *ātmā* तु - alone (यत् - which) भानं - the illumination (अस्ति - is there) (सः - that) अन्वयः - continuance (of *ātmā* therein) आत्मभाने - when *ātmā* illumines सुषुप्त्यनवभासनम् - non-cognition of the

causal body तु - but व्यतिरेकः - discontinuance of (causal body) (स्यात्- is). - (41)

41. When the causal body is not cognised in *samādhi* the illumination of *ātmā* alone (which is there) is its continuance (therein). But the non-cognition of the causal body, when *ātmā* continues to illumine, is (its) discontinuance (therein).

Samādhi is the absorbed state of our *antaḥkaraṇa* wherein there is neither the dream nor the sleep. Yet the mind is not awake to any object as in the waking. The *antaḥkaraṇa* is totally absorbed in the knowledge of Brahman to the exclusion of all *dṛśya*- the known. We can even say that then the *dhī* - the intellect - is absorbed in the knowledge of *sama* - the one that is ever the same without any change - which can only be Brahman. All other things are always *viśama* - never the same. *Samādhi* will be dealt with further in verses 55 to 60.

The word "*suṣupti*" in the verse signifies the causal body which in turn is a sign of *avidyā*. In the *samādhi* gained after *aparokṣa jñānam*, *avidyā*- ignorance of oneself - is absent, and *ātmā* alone shines, to the total exclusion of the rest. The word "*tu*" in the first line is to ascertain that *ātmā* alone shines in *samādhi*. This is the continuance of *ātmā* in *samādhi*. But in that same state of *samādhi*, the absence of *avidyā* or the causal body even when *ātmā* shines, is its discontinuance therein. The word "*tu*" in the second line is to show the contrast between *ātmā* and *avidyā*. So *ātmā* is distinct from *avidyā* or causal body which is *anātmā* in nature.

Thus *ātmā* is distinct from the three bodies or the five sheaths, because it continues to exist even when they get mutually negated. That which does not get negated even when everything else associated with it gets negated, is certainly distinct from them. For example, take a garland made of different types of flowers. The flowers may wither and drop away or can be removed, but the single thread running in and through them remains unaltered.

This is *pañcakośaviveka* which ascertains *ātmā* to be *nitya* and distinct from the sheaths. In verse 37 it was told that the one who thus discriminates *ātmā* discovers oneself to be Brahman. This statement is now substantiated in the next verse, based on the following *śruti*:

"*Puruṣa*, the real nature of oneself, of the size of a thumb, ever abides in the *antaḥkaraṇa* of all the beings. With due eligibility one

should separate (i.e. distinguish) him from one's body like a stalk from the *muñjā* grass. One should know him to be pure and immortal Brahman" (*Kāthopaniṣad* 2-3-17).

Here again *ātmā* should not be mistaken as having the size of a thumb. As told earlier, it is only for *upāsana*. Otherwise it will oppose all the *śrutis* which describe *ātmā* to be limitless. The *śruti* declares that *ātmā* - the real nature of all the beings - is itself Brahman.

यथा मुञ्जादिषीकैवमात्मा युक्त्या समुद्धृतः ।
शरीरत्रितयाद्धीरैः परं ब्रह्मैव जायते ॥४२॥

yathā muñjādiṣikaivamātmā yuktyā samuddhṛtaḥ
śarīratritayāddhīraiḥ paraṁ brahmaiva jāyate - (42)

यथा - just as मुञ्जात् - from the *muñjā* grass इषीका - its core (is extracted) एवं - similarly धीरैः - by the eligible persons युक्त्या - through reasoning शरीरत्रितयात् - from the three bodies समुद्धृतः - distinguished and ascertained आत्मा - *ātmā* परं ब्रह्म - limitless Brahman एव - really जायते - becomes. - (42)

42. Just as from the *muñjā* grass its core (is extracted), similarly *ātmā*, distinguished and ascertained through reasoning by the eligible persons, really becomes the limitless Brahman.

Muñjā is a kind of grass or rush which has a core (*iṣikā*) within. To get to the core, one has to peel off the thick cluster of grass around with due knack and care.

Likewise *ātmā* has to be separated from the three bodies which are themselves mistaken to be *ātmā*. The knack here is *yukti* - reasoning - consisting of *anvaya* and *vyatireka* as employed in the last few verses. Thereby *ātmā* is differentiated from the three bodies and ascertained (*samuddhṛtaḥ*) as already seen.

Such an inquiry has to be conducted by those who are *dhīrāḥ* - who have a prepared frame of mind as described in the *śāstras*. They have cultivated mastery over the senses and mind through *sādhana* *catuṣṭayasampatti*.

Dhīrāḥ is also a person who makes the best use of the intellect (*dhiyam rāti iti*). The greatest accomplishment that the human intellect can confer is *mokṣa* - abidance in the self-knowledge. Any

accomplishment, short of it, is as good as not making use of the intellect. Therefore those who employ their intellect to inquire and ascertain the nature of *ātmā* are making its optimum use.

ĀTMĀ AND BRAHMAN ARE ONE

The *ātmā* thus ascertained to be free from the three bodies is truly *Param Brahma*, because both are the same *sat, cit, ānanda* principle. Therefore, Brahman unfolded in the *upaniṣads* and the real nature of oneself are one and the same.

The statement in this verse that *ātmā*, so ascertained becomes Brahman, actually means that an eligible person who has so ascertained *ātmā* verily discovers oneself to be Brahman.

TAT TVAM ASI - ASCERTAINMENT OF MEANING

The present chapter was introduced by the author to propound the discrimination for an easy understanding (verse 2) of real nature of oneself (*tattvaviveka*). This has been successfully accomplished by him so far. Therefore, one may feel that now this chapter may be closed as there is no need of any further elaboration. Yet the chapter continues. To remove such doubt, the topic so far analysed and ascertained is summed up and the purpose of the following portion is told.

परापरात्मनोरेवं युक्त्या संभावितैकता ।

तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यैः सा भागत्यागेन लक्ष्यते ॥४३॥

*parāparātmanorevaṃ yuktyā saṃbhāvitaikatā
tattvamasyādivākyaīḥ sā bhāgatyaṅgena lakṣyate - (43)*

एवं - thus परापरात्मनोः - of Brahman and *jīva* एकता - identity युक्त्या - by reasoning संभाविता - was shown सा - that (identity) तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यैः - by the sentences (like) "that thou art" etc. भागत्यागेन - by giving up of (opposed parts) लक्ष्यते - is unfolded through implied sense. - (43)

43. Thus the identity of Brahman and *jīva* was shown by reasoning. The same identity is unfolded through the implied sense by the sentences (like) "that thou art" etc. by giving up of (opposed) aspects (of *tat* and *tvam*).

SUMMARY OF EARLIER ANALYSIS

Parātmā is the limitless Brahman. *Aparātmā* is the *jīva* who is not *parātmā*. But as analysed and established so far the identity of these has been revealed (*saṃbhāvita*) by the method of *yukti* - reasoning.

Earlier, *ātmā* - the real nature of *jīva* - as *saṃvīt* was ascertained only by reasoning. The *pañcakośaviveka* was also conducted making use of mere *yukti*. It was by probing into the continuance of *ātmā* in all the states including *samādhi* and discontinuance of the three bodies in one state or the other. Finally based on the similarity of both *ātmā* and Brahman as *sat*, *cit*, *ānanda*, their identity was shown. Thus reasoning has been mainly employed in the teaching so far.

Yukti - reasoning - cannot be the final *pramāṇa* - the means of knowledge. It operates only in the field of intellect. Based on some perceptible data we analyse, codify and conclude. But *ātmā* is not an object of intellect nor is it available for any form of perception. It is beyond the operation of reasoning, and therefore reasoning is employed only to understand the statements of *śruti* better, but not as a *pramāṇa*. *Śruti* alone is the final *pramāṇa*. Keeping this in view, the truth unfolded so far is corroborated by revealing the meaning of "*tat tvam asi*" as an example of a *mahāvākya*.

MAHĀVĀKYA IN ŚRUTI

A *mahāvākya* is a statement of the *śruti* which declares the identity of *jīva* and *Īśvara*. There are many of them in the *śruti*. The one that is going to be analysed here is from the sixth chapter of *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*. Uddālaka the father teaches his own dear son Śvetaketu - "you (*tvam*) are (*asi*) that (*tat*) - the *sat* or Brahman which is the cause of the universe." He unfolds this nine times, with the help of different examples.

By an agreement the word "*tat*" in Vedānta, represents *Īśvara* - Brahman, conditioned by the *upādhi* of *māyā*. *Tvam* denotes *jīva*. As our experience shows, both *Īśvara* and *jīva* differ in their characteristics. Therefore both cannot be one and the same if the literal meanings of the words in the *mahāvākya* are accepted. Yet *śruti* being the valid means of knowledge, cannot be wrong. When the source of a statement is valid, and the literal meaning of a statement is not making sense, some particular methods are employed to ascertain its exact meaning. Here the method employed is called *lakṣaṇāvṛtti* - implied sense.

The word "*lakṣyate*" means indicated or taught by means of implied sense. Even in this method there are three varieties which will be seen shortly. The one that is applicable here involves *bhāgyāga* - giving up of the mutually opposed aspects of certain words contained in the sentence.

To show that the identity of *ātmā* and Brahman proven by reasoning is no speculation, the author reveals the purpose of the following portion. The same identity (*sā*) is now taught therefore by ascertaining the meaning of "*tattvamasi*" *mahāvākya*.

VṚTTI

To ascertain the meaning of the *mahāvākya*, a thorough understanding here of the method employed to know the implied

sense is indispensable. When a sentence is used as a *pramāṇa*, its operation is effective, provided the meaning of the words therein and the sentence as a whole are properly understood.

The meaning of a given word or a sentence can be literal, indicative, or implied and figurative depending on how it is employed. Words have an inherent capacity to yield appropriate meaning as per the context, which is called *vṛtti*. It indicates the relation (*sambandha*) between the word (*pada*) and its meaning (*padārtha*), resulting in an understanding of the word (*śābdabodha*). *Vṛtti* can also be defined as the power or the force of a word by which it expresses, indicates or suggests the meaning of the given word.

Vṛttis are of three types:

a) *Abhidhā vṛtti*: It gives the literal meaning (*vācārtha* or *śaktyārtha*) of a word. It is also called *mukhya vṛtti*. For example, when you say "this is a book", the direct meaning of the word "book" is immediately understood by us. Here, the *abhidhā vṛtti* operates.

b) *Lakṣaṇā vṛtti*: When the literal meaning of a word or a sentence is incongruous, either the meaning must be wrong or something else is indicated or implied thereby. If the sentence is not wrong, there may be a possibility of conveying some meaning other than the direct one. This is called *lakṣaṇā vṛtti* or *śakya sambandha*. It gives the *lakṣyārtha* - implied meaning. In this case some aspects of the word or words may have to be deleted, retained or added, depending on the context. The three sub-divisions of this *vṛtti* will be seen subsequently.

In the case of *tattvamasi mahāvākya*, this type of *vṛtti* is employed, as the direct meaning does not make sense.

c) *Vyañjanā vṛtti*: This gives the figurative meaning. When the first two types of *vṛttis* fail to convey suitably, one has to go in for this.

The three sub-divisions of *lakṣaṇā vṛtti* are as follows.

1. JAHALLAKṢAṆĀ VṚTTI

Jahallakṣaṇā vṛtti is the *lakṣaṇā vṛtti* which discards (*jahāti*) some aspect. Here the primary sense of a word is given up, yielding a different sense which is connected to the primary one in some way.

A familiar instance is, *gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ* - "a hamlet on the Ganges". A hamlet on a river is not possible. We therefore interpret the word "Ganges" as "Ganges bank". That there is a hamlet on the Ganges bank, is the implied meaning.

Mañcāḥ krośanti- cots cry. But cots cannot cry; therefore it means the patients on the cots are crying.

Somewhat akin to *jahallakṣaṇā vṛtti* is the figure of speech "metonymy", where a thing is referred to by the name of some other thing closely connected with it.

"From cradle to the grave" is used for "from infancy to death".

"We read Shakespeare" means "we read the works of Shakespeare".

2. AJAHALLAKṢAṆĀ VṚTTI

In *ajahallakṣaṇā vṛtti* the original sense of a word used elliptically is not given up but it is supplemented by a relevant word.

Śoṇo dhāvati - "red runs". The red colour by itself cannot run; therefore, it means "a red horse runs".

Similarly "guns march" means "soldiers carrying the guns march".

The figure of speech "synecdoche" is somewhat similar to this type of implied sense. Often called as "whole and part figure of speech", it indicates a whole thing by one of its constituent parts.

Consider "the parental roof". The "roof" here indicates the house. In the sentence "all must earn their daily bread" the word "bread" implies food.

3. BHĀGATYĀGALAKṢAṆĀ VṚTTI

In *bhāgatyāgalakṣaṇā vṛtti* or *jahadajahallakṣaṇā vṛtti*, words convey the implied sense by discarding the mutually contradictory aspects. "*Soyam devadattaḥ*" - "This is that Mr.Devadatta" is an oft quoted example, cited here also in verse 47 to illustrate this.

Let us say, you were going to your office. On the way you met your friend who was talking to a smart gentleman in posh clothes. While you were still struggling to recall who the person was, the friend introduced him to you by saying "this is that Mr.Devadatta". Immediately you identified him to be the same petty shopkeeper with whom both of you had got acquainted about ten years ago in Delhi. Later he came to Bombay and became a successful businessman in due course of time, about which you were not aware of.

In this sentence "that" represents the place Delhi, the time ten years ago and the person a petty shopkeeper. "This" means the place Bombay, the present time and a businessman. Both these

groups of characteristics do qualify the same person, Mr. Devadatta. Yet they differ from each other and cannot be the same. To understand this statement mutually opposite aspects are given up (*bhāgatyāga*) and only the locus, the individual Mr. Devadatta is retained. If simply said "this Mr. Devadatta", it may mean that this person is an entirely new one. But if told "that Mr. Devadatta", you may be inquisitive about that person without recognising him to be the very same person in front of you. Thus, this is an effective means of communication, provided the context is known. Otherwise it does not work. There is no parallel to this methodology, available in the figures of speech in the English language. This *lakṣaṇā vṛtti* is applicable to *tattvamasi mahāvākya*, the details of which will be seen in verse 46.

One may ask, why in Vedānta the *lakṣaṇā vṛtti* or teaching through implication is employed? Why not use *mukhya vṛtti* or words directly?

It is the nature of *ātmā* or Brahman which defies its description by the direct meaning of any word or a sentence. *Ātmā* is free from all the five sense objects. Such an entity cannot be directly an object of perception or the words, as they can describe only those things which can fit into the categories of species (*jāti*), attribute (*guṇa*), action (*kriyā*) and relation (*sambandha*). The all pervasive Brahman is free from all these categories. Therefore *śruti* has declared Brahman as the one from which words along with the mind return without being able to objectify it (*Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, 2-9-1).

It is a common experience that only an object vividly perceived can be well described. It is difficult to express even the emotions and feelings. Taking into account such inability of the words, it is but natural that they cannot directly describe Brahman. In spite of this, *śruti* has no option but to use these very frail words by adopting such special methods of communication. To gain the knowledge through these methods, we should know the context of *śruti*. If we are not aware of it, the statements in *śruti* do not mean anything or at times may sound absurd. The illustration, "this is that Mr. Devadatta", out of its context bears testimony to this. Most of the criticisms cast at Vedānta are by those who either are ignorant of the total context or do not care to know it fully.

This is the reason why one has to learn Vedānta from a competent master who is able to unfold these statements. *Śruti* also emphasises the need of a right *guru*. *Ācārya* Śaṅkara while commenting on such an instruction given in *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* (1-2-12) advises that even a scholarly person should not independently inquire into the nature of

Brahman.

To understand the meaning of 'tat tvam asi' or any similar sentence, one should first know the literal meanings of its words. The implied sense has to be discovered only when the literal meaning is not intelligible. Otherwise, to apply the implied meaning without studying the literal sense, amounts to speculation. Therefore let us see the literal meaning of the word "tat".

जगतो यदुपादानं मायामादाय तामसीम् ।

निमित्तं शुद्धसत्त्वां तामुच्यते ब्रह्म तद्विरा ॥४४॥

jagato yadupādānaṃ māyāmādāya tāmasīm

nimittaṃ śuddhasattvāṃ tāmucyate brahma tadvirā - (44)

यद् - which ब्रह्म - Brahman तामसी - the one with predominant *tamas*
माया - *prakṛti* आदाय - having taken जगतः - of the creation उपादानं -
material cause भवति - becomes (च - and) ताम् - that शुद्धसत्त्वां - *māyā*
(आदाय - having taken) निमित्तं - efficient cause (भवति - becomes) (तत्
- that) तद्विरा - by the word "tad" उच्यते - is denoted. - (44)

44. The Brahman which, having taken *prakṛti* with predominant *tamas* (as the *upādhi*) becomes the material cause of the creation and which (having taken) *māyā* (as the *upādhi*) becomes the efficient cause, (that Brahman) is denoted by the word "tad" (in *tat tvam asi*).

TAT

Tat - that - is a pronoun, and so can mean any noun in place of which it is used. Therefore we should know what exactly *śruti* means by *tat* in the *mahāvakyā*. It is used for Brahman having a particular status called *Īśvara*. This status is conferred on Brahman because it is both the material cause and the efficient cause of the entire creation.

Prakṛti, as seen already, consists of three aspects. That which is predominant with pure *sattva* is called *māyā*. If impure *sattva* predominates it is called *avidyā* (verse 16). The third is the one wherein *tamas* predominates (verse 18). This aspect of *prakṛti* is termed as *tāmasī māyā* in this verse. Though *māyā* is one of the three aspects of *prakṛti*, here it means the *prakṛti* itself. Such usages wherein a part signifies the whole is a common practice in Vedānta. In such cases, the meaning has to be ascertained, based on the context.

The *tamaḥpradhānāprakṛti* - *prakṛti* with predominant *tamas* - goes into the formation of five elements and thereby the entire subtle and gross creation. Any embodiment is also a part of this creation. Thus this provides the material for the entire creation. Brahman, having taken or accepted (*ādāya*) this aspect of *prakṛti*, called here *tamasī māyā*, as *upādhi*, gains the status of material cause (*upādānam*).

The same Brahman, having assumed *śuddhasattvā prakṛti*, called *māyā*, as *upādhi*, becomes the efficient cause of the creation. Thus Brahman is called *Īśvara* with reference to creation, because it is both the material cause and the efficient cause. Based on this, *Īśvara* gets the appellation of *abhinnanimitta upādānakāraṇa* - the non-differentiated (*abhinna*) efficient and material cause. It is called *abhinna* because the creation is not different from Brahman, in the sense that its cause, *prakṛti*, has no existence apart from Brahman. Of course, Brahman is real and *prakṛti* with its effect as *jagat* is false.

The Brahman which thus plays the role of *Īśvara* is referred to by the word "tat" (*tadgīrā*) in *tattvamasī mahāvākya*.

TVAM

The literal meaning of the word "tvam" is explained now.

यदा मलिनसत्त्वां तां कामकर्मादिदूषिताम् ।
आदत्ते तत्परं ब्रह्म त्वंपदेन तदोच्यते ॥४५॥

yadā malinasattvāṃ tāṃ kāmakarmādidūṣitām
ādatte tatparaṃ brahma tvampadena tadocyate - (45)

तत्परं ब्रह्म - the same limitless Brahman यदा - when तां - that कामकर्मादिदूषिताम् - contaminated by desire, action etc. मलिनसत्त्वां - *prakṛti* predominated by impure *sattva* आदत्ते - takes (as *upādhi*) तदा - then 'त्वं' पदेन - by the word "tvam" उच्यते - denoted. - (45)

45. When the same limitless Brahman takes *prakṛti* predominated by impure *sattva*, contaminated by desire, action etc. (as *upādhi*), then (it) is denoted by the word "tvam" (in *tat tvam asi*).

The *malinasattvā prakṛti* is *avidyā* (verse 16). Obstructing the knowledge of one's real nature, *avidyā* prompts *jīva* to entertain desires. Thereafter actions, their results and *bhoga* follow naturally. That is to say, *jīva* gets caught up in *samsāra* (verse 29). That is why *malinasattvā prakṛti* is called *dūṣita* - contaminated by *kāma*, *karma* etc.

The very same Brahman which assumes the role of *Īśvara* becomes *jīva*, the sorrowful *saṃsārī*, when it takes (*ādatte*) *avidyā* as its *upādhi*. This *jīva* is referred to by the word "*tvam*" in this *mahāvākya*.

Thus, Brahman appears different as *Īśvara* and *jīva* due to difference in *upādhis*. *Īśvara* controls *māyā*, whereas *jīva* is ruled by *avidyā*.

MEANING OF TATTVAMASI MAHĀVĀKYA

After explaining the words "*tat*" and "*tvam*", here follows the meaning of the entire sentence as envisaged by *śruti*.

त्रितयीमपि तां मुक्त्वा परस्परविरोधिनीम् ।
अखण्डं सच्चिदानन्दं महावाक्येन लक्ष्यते ॥४६॥

*tritayīmapi tām muktvā parasparavirodhinīm
akhaṇḍam saccidānandam mahāvākyaena lakṣyate* - (46)

त्रितयीम् - of three types अपि - besides परस्परविरोधिनीम् - mutually opposing तां - that (*prakṛti*) मुक्त्वा - having discarded अखण्डं - non-dual सच्चिदानन्दं - *sat cit ānanda* (Brahman) महावाक्येन - by the *mahāvākya* लक्ष्यते - is unfolded through implied sense. - (46)

46. Having discarded *prakṛti* which is of three types besides mutually opposing, the non-dual *sat cit ānanda* Brahman is unfolded by the *mahāvākya* through implied sense.

Literally the *mahāvākya* means that *jīva* is *Īśvara*. According to the Vedas *Īśvara* is free from *saṃsāra*, and is omniscient, omnipotent and omnipresent. We know *jīva* very well to be *saṃsārī* having limited knowledge and capacity with all other limitations. The experience of everyone shows that both can never be the same. Yet we cannot discard the statement considering it as wrong, because it is so declared by *śruti*. Thus we have to go in for the implied sense of the sentence. First of all it is necessary to find out which of the three types of *lakṣaṇā vṛtti* is applicable here.

Consider the application of *jahallakṣaṇā vṛtti*. Then either *tat* or *tvam* is required to be given up completely and something connected to it has to be applied to the other like discarding the river Ganges and taking its bank, as cited in the illustration given earlier. If *Īśvara* represented by *tat* is given up, his accompanying omniscience, omnipotence and state of being free from *saṃsāra* will not fit into *jīva*. On the contrary if *tvam* - the *jīva* - is given up, its status as *saṃsārī*,

limited knowledge and power can never be applied to *Īśvara*. Thus this method fails to arrive at any sensible meaning.

Let us try the *ajahallakṣaṇā vṛtti*. In this case both *tat* and *tvam* are retained as they are with the addition of some relevant thing. Irrespective of what is added, the opposing aspects of *Īśvara* and *jīva* continue to be there. As a result, the identity between the two has to be ruled out. Thus *ajahallakṣaṇā vṛtti* also does not give a sensible meaning.

Now the only alternative left out is *bhāgatyaḡgalakṣaṇā vṛtti*. Here the mutually opposing aspects are discarded to retain the common factor in both of them. The three aspects of *prakṛti* (*tritayī*) due to the predominance of pure *sattva*, impure *sattva* and *tamas* are mutually opposed to one another (*parasparavirodhinī*). That is why they make Brahman appear differently as *jīva* and *Īśvara* with their features poles apart.

Having discarded (*muktvā*) the mutually opposing aspects of *prakṛti*, what remains in both *tat* and *tvam* is the common principle (Brahman) whose nature is non-dual (*akhaṇḍam*) *sat cit ānanda*. This is implied by this *mahāvākya*. Brahman is said to be *akhaṇḍam* because it is free from all *khaṇḍa - bheda* - the divisions. *Bheda* can be the difference either between *jīva* and *Īśvara*, or *sajātīya bheda* - the differences obtaining in the different members of a given species, *vijātīya bheda* - differences in different species, and *svagata bheda* - those abiding in a given member of a given species. It can also be considered as the division of knower, known and knowledge. All these divisions are absent in Brahman.

The identity between *tat* and *tvam* can be better understood by the following equations.

$$tat = \text{Īśvara} = \text{Brahman} + \text{tāmasī māyā} + \text{māyā} - (1), \text{ and}$$

$$tvam = \text{jīva} = \text{Brahman} + \text{avidyā} - (2).$$

As per the *mahāvākya* equations 1 and 2 are identical. Thus we get a new equation as follows:

$$\text{Brahman} + \text{tāmasī māyā} + \text{māyā} = \text{Brahman} + \text{avidyā} - (3).$$

Obviously the third equation cannot hold good unless the opposing aspects of the false *upādhis* on either side are discarded. This is the job of *bhāgatyaḡgalakṣaṇā vṛtti*. When they are dropped the equation remains:

Brahman = Brahman - (4).

Thus the same Brahman is the real nature of both *jīva* and *Īśvara*. This is how both are one and the same in reality, which is implied in the *māhāvākya*, though the words employed cannot directly reveal it.

ILLUSTRATION FOR *BHĀGATYĀGALAKṢAṆĀ VṚTTI*

Here one may like to have an illustration of the application of *bhāgatyāgalakṣaṇā vṛtti*. Though we have discussed it thoroughly while dealing with verse 43, the author furnishes one here, as the context warrants it.

सोऽयमित्यदिवाक्येषु विरोधात्तदिदन्तयोः ।

त्यागेन भागयोरेक आश्रयो लक्ष्यते यथा ॥४७॥

soyamityādivākyeṣu virodhāttadidantayoḥ
tyāgena bhāgayoreka āśrayo lakṣyate yathā - (47)

सः अयं - this (is) that (Mr.Devadatta) इत्यादिवाक्येषु - in such statements तदिदन्तयोः - of that and this विरोधात् - due to contradiction भागयोः - of the (opposed) parts त्यागेन - by discarding एकः - the same आश्रयः - locus यथा - for instance लक्ष्यते - is indicated. - (47)

47. For instance, in the statements like "this (is) that (Mr.Devadatta)", due to contradiction of that and this, by discarding the (opposed) parts, the same locus (the individual) is indicated.

Tad and *idam* in the illustration refer to all the mutually opposing attributes of the past and the present place, time and features. As all of them are opposed to one another the identity revealed by the statement is not possible by direct meaning. Therefore the discarding of the parts (*bhāgayoḥ*) applies only to mutually opposed aspects (*paraspara viruddhāṁśa*) and not to any other thing. For example, you cannot give up Mr. Devadatta. *Āśrayaḥ* means the common locus which is the individual independent of mutually opposing aspects. Therefore, such indications are available when the direct meaning is incongruous.

THE ILLUSTRATED (BRAHMAN) IS INDICATED

Having cited an illustration, it is now applied to the subject matter for which it was given.

मायाविद्ये विहायैवमुपाधी परजीवयोः ।

अखण्डं सच्चिदानन्दं परं ब्रम्हैव लक्ष्यते ॥४८॥

māyāvidye vihāyaivamupādhi parajīvayoh

akhaṇḍam saccidānandaṁ paraṁ brahmaiva lakṣyate - (48)

एवं - similarly परजीवयोः - of *Īśvara* and *jīva* उपाधी - *upādhis* मायाविद्ये - *māyā* and *avidyā* विहाय - having discarded अखण्डं - non-dual सच्चिदानन्दं - *sat cit ānanda* परं - the limitless ब्रह्म - Brahman एव - alone लक्ष्यते - is indicated. - (48)

48. Similarly, having discarded *māyā* and *avidyā*, the *upādhis* of *Īśvara* and *jīva* (respectively), the limitless non-dual *sat cit ānanda* Brahman alone is indicated.

Just as in the illustration of "this is that Mr.Devadatta", the mutually opposing aspects were discarded, likewise it is to be done here. *Paraḥ* in the first line of this verse means *Īśvara*. The *upādhis* of *Īśvara* and *jīva* are *māyā* and *avidyā* as told earlier. Here *māyā* includes *tāmasī māyā* too. These *upādhis* which make Brahman appear as *Īśvara* and *jīva* are opposed to each other. When they are discarded what remains is one and the same principle, Brahman to the total exclusion of any *upādhis* and their effects seen as creation. Brahman is *paraṁ* because it is free from all the limitations of space, time and objects. *Akhaṇḍam* is free from all the divisions as seen earlier and so it is non-dual.

As in the case of the illustration, in the case of the illustrated also the *mahāvākya* indicates the common principle, Brahman, to be the real nature of *Īśvara* and *jīva* when they are freed from all the *upādhis*. In other words, *jīva* in reality is verily Brahman.

This discussion of *lakṣaṇā vṛtti* with the help of an illustration, shows that the identity of *jīva* and Brahman proved earlier on the basis of reasoning is strictly in accordance with *śruti*.

IMPLIED MEANING OF THE MAHĀVĀKYA - AN OBJECTION AND ITS ANSWER

The identity between *jīva* and *Īśvara* as declared by *tattvamasī mahāvākya* was unfolded so far by the application of *bhāgatyāgalakṣaṇā vṛtti*. This method was adopted as the direct meaning of the *mahāvākya* was not intelligible.

By the by, this verse is literally borrowed from *Adhyātmopaniṣad* (mantra 32) belonging to *Śuklayajurveda*.

AN OBJECTION

Here an objection is raised against the very application of *lakṣaṇā vṛtti* to ascertain its meaning. In all the three types of *lakṣaṇā vṛtti*s discarding, retaining and/or addition of certain things are involved. Any thing should necessarily have attributes. So it is contended that any secondary or indirect meaning (*lakṣyārtha*) is known only by the attributes which determine the implied or the indicated thing. That means the *lakṣyārtha* is applicable to only those things which have attributes. Those which are not qualified by attributes cannot be the subject matter of *lakṣaṇā vṛtti*. Though this does hold good in general, it is not always true.

The question arises whether Brahman indicated by the *mahāvākya* is *savikalpam* - with attributes - or *nirvikalpam* - without attributes. In either case the defects are shown by the objector.

सविकल्पस्य लक्ष्यत्वे लक्ष्यस्य स्यादवस्तुता ।

निर्विकल्पस्य लक्ष्यत्वं न दृष्टं न च संभवि ॥४९॥

savikalpasya lakṣyatve lakṣyasya syādavastutā

nirvikalpasya lakṣyatvaṃ na dṛṣṭaṃ na ca sambhavi - (49)

सविकल्पस्य - the one which has attributes लक्ष्यत्वे - if indicated (by a sentence) लक्ष्यस्य - of that indicated (thing) अवस्तुता - the status of being false स्यात् - (there) should be निर्विकल्पस्य - of an attributeless (thing) लक्ष्यत्वं - status of being indicated (by a sentence) न दृष्टं - not

seen न च संभवि - and not possible. - (49)

49. If the one which has attributes is indicated (by a sentence), it should be false. An attributeless thing being indicated (by a sentence) is neither seen, nor possible also.

Vikalpa generally means a division, attribute or characteristic. It also means a doubt or an option, which is not the meaning in this context.

Savikalpa should be taken here as that which abides (*varate*) with (*saha*) contrarily projected (*viparītatvena kalpītena*) attributes like name, form, species etc. (*nāma rūpādī dharmēṇa*). Any division that you can think of is a projection contrary to what the truth is.

If the Brahman which is *savikalpa* or has attributes is indicated as the subject matter of *mahāvākya* (*lakṣyatve*), it will be *avastu* - not Brahman - because anything that has attributes, becomes limited in nature and hence destructible. And a destructible thing cannot be Brahman. *Upaniṣads* also declare that Brahman is devoid of all attributes. For a *lakṣaṇā vṛtti* to operate, the *lakṣya* - the indicated thing - must be with attribute (*savikalpa*). If Vedānta accepts this proposition to be valid, the *lakṣya* of the *mahāvākya* ceases to be Brahman. According to the objector this is the first flaw.

To get rid of this flaw, if it is insisted that Brahman is always *nirvikalpa* - attributeless, it cannot be the *lakṣya* of the *mahāvākya*, because a thing without attributes (*nirvikalpa*) can never be indicated by the implied sense of a sentence.

This is not possible (*asambhavi*) logically too. When one claims that a given thing is indicated by a sentence in a secondary or implied sense, the thing should necessarily have attributes. To declare such a thing to be attributeless is an obvious contradiction. Yet, in verse 48 it is stated that the limitless Brahman which means *nirvikalpaṁ* Brahman, is indicated by the *mahāvākya*. This is the second flaw. Thus the application of *lakṣaṇā vṛtti* to *tattvamasi mahāvākya* is questionable.

THE ANSWER VARIES WITH THE QUESTIONER'S INTENT

Generally an answer is directed more towards the questioner rather than the question itself. The purpose of the questioner in asking it determines to a great extent the nature of the answer to be given. Therefore it is better to know the motive of the person who has raised the objection or question under consideration. There can

be three types of persons as given below who could have put forth this question.

1. The first type is the one who has already concluded that the dualistic world is real and the non-dual principle cannot be the reality. Though a seeker, the person does not have an open mind and so is not available for learning. The question itself is an outburst of the intolerance to the conclusion arrived at in the earlier verse that the limitless non-dual Brahman is indicated by the *mahāvākya*.

2. The question may be even from a person who is neither a *mumukṣu* nor interested in the ascertainment of the nature of Brahman. Having seen how *nirvikalpa* Brahman has been ascertained from the *mahāvākya*, the question is posed only to show one-upmanship. In the language of *tarka* - reasoning - such retort is called *jātiḥ*. It is defined as *asaduttaram jātiḥ* - an irrelevant or futile (*asad*) rejoinder. Otherwise the word "*jāti*" means a species.

3. Possibly the questioner is a sincere *mumukṣu* and it is a genuine doubt because the actual import of *tat tvam asi* is not understood.

The first two varieties of persons are answered in verses 50 and 51. They are silenced by showing that they have no basis to ask the question and hence the question itself cannot arise. The author follows the maxim *uṣṭra laguḍa nyāyaḥ* - the camel and the stick. When wood is being transported on the back of camels, the owner beats the unruly camel by picking up a stick from its own back. Its equivalent in English is "hoist with his own petard" as put by Shakespeare in Hamlet. A petard is a bomb used in olden days to break the gate, door or wall. It means, getting trapped by the very snare meant to be used for others. The stick or the petard used here in the answer is the word "*vikalpa*", which will be clear later.

The answer belongs to the category of discussion called *vitandā kathā* - a wrangle. This will be clear from the following elaboration on various types of discussions.

THREE TYPES OF DISCUSSIONS

i) *Vāda* - A healthy discussion conducted to know the truth of a given thing or a subject matter, is *vāda*. *Tattva bubhutsoḥ kathā vādaḥ* - the discussion of the one who is desirous to know the truth regarding a particular thing. Participants have no desire to win over one another. They are interested in the correct knowledge of the subject matter.

ii) *Jaipah* - This is a discussion between two parties wherein each

is desirous of winning over the other, having equipped themselves with the means to do so (*ubhaya sādhanavatī vijigīṣu kathā*). When the stand taken by the other party is refuted, the one taken to by one's own side is proved to be correct. Here each is only interested in establishing one's own stand.

iii) *Vitaṇḍā Kathā*- The *jalpa* type of discussion itself, where one is without one's own stand to be established, is *vitaṇḍā*. Here, the interest is confined only to refuting the other person's stand.

ANSWER SUGGESTS THAT CREATION IS FALSE

In fact, the author has to digress from the usual course of his teaching, in verses 50 and 51. However, it is not totally a futile discussion. If the first two types of questioners are not answered, they will think that Vedānta is wrong. Or in future someone may contend on the same grounds. Therefore the answer has to be furnished. Besides this, the discussion also hints that the creation consisting of *vikalpas* - divisions (*bhedas*) - like name, form etc. should necessarily be false, as there is no possibility for any real division in the non-dual Brahman.

The third type of questioner who has not understood the exact import of the *mahāvākya* is made to understand in verse 52 how *nirvikalpa* Brahman can be indicated by an implied sense.

THE ANSWER

How the objection hurled in the earlier verse is baseless is proved in the next verse.

विकल्पो निर्विकल्पस्य सविकल्पस्य वा भवेत् ।
आद्ये व्याहतिरन्यत्रानवस्थात्माश्रयादयः ॥५०॥

*vikalpo nirvikalpasya savikalpasya vā bhavet
ādye vyāhatiranyatrānavasthātmāśrayādayaḥ* - (50)

(यः- the one त्वत्कृतः- made by you) विकल्पः- the division (सः- that one) निर्विकल्पस्य - of *nirvikalpa* सविकल्पस्य - of *savikalpa* वा - or भवेत् - is आद्ये - in the first case व्याहतिः - (there is) contradiction अन्यत्र - in the other अनवस्थात्माश्रयादयः - (there are logical defects like) regress ad infinitum, self dependence etc. - (50)

50. Does the division (*vikalpa*) (made by you) pertain to *nirvikalpa*

or *savikalpa*? In the first case there is a contradiction. In the other, (logical defects like) regress ad infinitum, self dependence etc. are there.

The discussion now is full of logic. The reader may find it difficult to follow it. Though not very difficult in content, it certainly demands a close application of the mind. In fact even if verses 49 to 51 are skipped, the trend of thought in the main teaching is not disturbed.

First of all let us be very clear about the meaning of the word "*vikalpa*" as used here. It means *bheda* - the division - in terms of name, form, characteristics, actions etc. which are considered to be real by the objector. In the earlier verse, when the questioner argued by using the words "*savikalpa*" and "*nirvikalpa*" in the context of indicatory meaning of *mahāvākya*, the person himself has got in his mind, some *vikalpa*, *bheda* - division. Without such a *vikalpa*, the words "*savikalpa*" - the one with *vikalpa* - and "*nirvikalpa*" - the one without *vikalpa* - cannot be used. So the question is, what is the *āśraya* - locus - of this *vikalpa*? Or where do the *vikalpas* abide? Any *vikalpa* should have a locus; it cannot come from nowhere. For example when one speaks of *vikalpas* like name, form and attributes, the following questions can be asked: Whose name are you talking about? Whose form are you describing? Whose attributes are you mentioning? Without locus or origin they cannot exist. The objector has to decide the *vikalpa* and fix it in its locus.

The questions which can be asked are framed in the first line of this verse.

- a) Does the *vikalpa* that you are talking about, belong to *nirvikalpa*?
- b) Or does it belong to *savikalpa*?

In either case the *vikalpa* cannot be fixed. Whether the *vikalpa* is placed in *nirvikalpa* or in *savikalpa*, serious flaws arise. Therefore the *vikalpa* cannot abide in either. Once the *vikalpa* itself cannot be placed in its locus, the talk of *savikalpa* or *nirvikalpa* is baseless, leave alone the question whether they can be the subject matter implied by the *mahāvākya*.

How it is baseless is pointed out by the flaws mentioned in the second line of this verse.

VIKALPA CANNOT BE IN NIRVIKALPA

If the answer to (a) above is in the affirmative, it means *nirvikalpasya vikalpaḥ* - the *vikalpa* of that which is totally free from *vikalpa*. The

contradiction (*vyāhatih*) is obvious. In fact this contradiction was shown by the very opponent in the earlier verse when it was stated that *nirvikalpa* being indicated by a *mahāvākya* is not possible (*na ca saṁbhavi*). A *nirvikalpa* has no connection whatsoever with *vikalpa*. To say that *vikalpa* abides in or belongs to *nirvikalpa* is a palpable contradiction like a person shouting at the top of one's voice "I am dumb."

VIKALPA CANNOT BELONG TO SAVIKALPA

If the answer to (b) is "yes", then it will be "*savikalpasya vikalpaḥ*" - the *vikalpa* of *savikalpa* (that which is with *vikalpa*).

In the above statement the word "*vikalpa*" occurs twice. Let us number them also for an easy understanding. The first one is in the word "*savikalpa*" which is resolved as *vikalpena saha vartate* - that which exists with *vikalpa*. The word "*vikalpa*" here is in the instrumental case. Let it be called "*vikalpa* - one" (V-1). Let the "*vikalpa*" in the nominative case be called "*vikalpa* - two" (V-2). *Vikalpa* - one in instrumental case is taken as the first because the other word "*vikalpaḥ*" (*vikalpa* - two) which is in the nominative case belongs to it. *Vikalpa* - one in the instrumental case is the cause of *vikalpa* - two in the nominative case. To repeat, the word "*vikalpa*" in *savikalpasya* is V-1 and the other "*vikalpaḥ*" is V-2.

As we have seen V-2 has its origin or locus in V-1. So, V-2 depends on V-1. Now, the opponent has to fix the locus of V-1 because of which *savikalpa* was possible. To ascertain it is just impossible. Whatever way one may try, four logical fallacies are going to follow which are pointed out in the verse. For the sake of future analysis, they are mentioned in the following order.

FOUR LOGICAL FALLACIES

- i) *Ātmāśraya doṣaḥ* - The defect of self dependence.
- ii) *Anyonyāśraya doṣaḥ* - The defect of mutual dependence.
- iii) *Cakraka doṣaḥ* - The defect of arguing or dependence in a circle.
- iv) *Anavasthā doṣaḥ* - The defect of regress ad infinitum.

How these defects arise can be seen from the following analysis.

The investigation is to find the locus of V-1. The first possibility is whether *nirvikalpa* can be its locus. We have already seen that *nirvikalpa* can never be the locus of any *vikalpa* due to contradiction (*vyāhati*). We have to bear in mind this fact hereafter also.

Perhaps something other than *nirvikalpa* can be its locus. Such a thing necessarily has a *vikalpa*. For example, here is a tree which has got tree-ness. The origin of tree-ness can be only from some tree or tree-ness. It cannot be from some pot-ness or cloth-ness. Similarly for V-1, some *vikalpa* alone has to be searched for as the locus. The following two possibilities (P) can be considered.

P-1: V-1 is the same as V-2.

P-2: Or V-1 is different from V-2. In this case V-1 being a *vikalpa*, must have another locus.

Nirvikalpa being the locus of any *vikalpa* is ruled out long back. So possibly a third *vikalpa*, say V-3 can be taken as the locus of V-1.

DEFECT OF SELF DEPENDENCE

In the case of the first possibility (P-1), V-1 is the same as V-2. But we already know that V-2 has its locus in V-1 and so V-2 is dependent on V-1. Hence you are required to ascertain the existence of V-1. How will you do it? You cannot ascertain the existence of something without knowing it. Therefore you are required to know V-1. But to know V-1 you should know its origin which is V-2 because V-1 and V-2 are the same. To know V-2, you should necessarily know V-1, as V-2 depends on V-1. It is like this: The knowledge of a given thing depends on the knowledge of another thing. But the object of the knowledge of the other thing is the very same first given thing. As a result you can neither ascertain the thing nor know its existence. This is called *ātmāśraya doṣaḥ* - the defect of self-dependence.

This defect is defined as

स्वज्ञानसापेक्षज्ञानविषयत्वम् आत्माश्रयः ।

which is resolved as

स्वस्य ज्ञानस्य सापेक्षज्ञानस्य विषयत्वम् आत्माश्रयः ।

"A given thing itself becoming the very object of the expected knowledge which is required to gain the knowledge of itself, is the defect of self-dependence."

Here, to gain the knowledge of a given thing, its own knowledge is expected.

Let us say you do not know what a given object 'A' is. You can

know it only by knowing another object 'A-1'. So you try to gain the knowledge of 'A-1'. But the object of the knowledge of 'A-1' is the very same original 'A', only to know which you are required to know 'A-1'. The following concrete example will make it clear. Suppose you do not know what a cow is. It has been defined to you as follows. "A cow is that which belongs to a species of cow-ness, which is not found in any other species than that of the cow." If the cow-ness is known, you can certainly recognise a cow. But to know the cow-ness, you have to find a cow which is still unknown to you. How are you going to proceed now? To know the cow, you should know the cow-ness, and to know the cow-ness, you should know the cow. That means you cannot know what a cow is. This is the defect of self-dependence - *ātmāśraya*. This defect has been defined here with respect to the acquisition of knowledge because it is easy to illustrate. The same style is adopted while defining the other three defects. But these definitions also hold good in the other cases of cause, effect, attribute etc. wherein the same defects arise.

Now consider the second possibility (P-2). We are required to probe the nature of V-3 which is the locus of V-1. Here the following two possibilities arise further:

P-3: V-3 is the same as V-2.

P-4: Or V-3 is entirely different from V-2 and V-1, in which case it should have its locus in some other *vikalpa*, say V-4.

DEFECT OF MUTUAL DEPENDENCE

In the case of P-3, V-3 is the locus of V-1. And because V-3 is the same as V-2, V-1 should automatically depend on V-2, though they are different from each other as seen in P-2.

Therefore, to ascertain the existence of V-1, you should know V-3. Further, to know V-3, V-2 has to be known because V-3 is the same as V-2. Again it is a fact that V-2 has its locus in V-1. So to know the existence of V-1, you should know V-2 and vice versa. This is a defect of mutual dependence - *anyonyāśraya*.

It is defined as -

स्वज्ञानसापेक्षज्ञानसापेक्षज्ञानविषयत्वम् अन्योन्याश्रयः ।

It is further resolved as -

स्वस्य ज्ञानस्य सापेक्षज्ञानस्य सापेक्षज्ञानस्य विषयत्वम् अन्योन्याश्रयः ।

"A given thing itself becoming the very object of the expected knowledge, which is the cause of the (other) expected knowledge that is required to know itself, is the defect of mutual dependence."

In other words, in gaining the knowledge of a given thing, there is a requirement of having some other knowledge. And in order to have this required knowledge one needs to have the knowledge of the very same thing which is to be known.

To explain this further, the knowledge of 'A' depends on the knowledge of 'A-1', and the knowledge of 'A-1' depends on the knowledge of 'A-2', but the object of the knowledge of 'A-2' is verily 'A'. So, 'A-2' is not different from 'A'. That means the knowledge of 'A-1' depends on the knowledge of 'A', though 'A' and 'A-1' are different from each other.

The following example can be taken to understand the nature of this defect. You want to know a cow you know not so far. Someone gives you the feature of a cow as, "cow-ness is different from buffalo-ness and buffalo-ness is different from cow-ness". To know the cow you are required to know cow-ness. But cow-ness can be known, provided you distinguish it from buffalo-ness. Unfortunately you do not know buffalo-ness, the knowledge of which is necessary to know cow-ness. The buffalo-ness can be known, provided you know the cow-ness and how to distinguish between the two. That means, to know the cow you should know the buffalo, and to know the buffalo you must know the cow. This defect of mutual dependence arises when V-3 is the same as V-2.

In the case of P-4, V-3 is different from V-2 and V-1. It has its locus in V-4. Now the locus of V-4 will have to be ascertained. As in the previous cases, the following further possibilities are there.

P-5: V-4 is the same as V-2.

P-6: Or V-4 is totally different from V-2, V-1 and V-3. Then it should have its locus in say, V-5.

DEFECT OF DEPENDENCE IN CIRCLE

Consider the possibility P-5. If V-4 is the same as V-2, the outcome is that V-2, V-1 and V-3 depend on one another though each of them is distinct.

How is it so?

To explain it in detail: V-2 depends on V-1. V-1 depends on V-3. V-3 has its locus in V-4. So it depends on V-4. But V-4 is the same as V-2. Therefore V-3 depends on V-2. In other words V-1, V-2 and V-3 have mutual dependence.

The above mutual dependence of V-1, V-2 and V-3 is another defect called *cakraka* - dependence or arguing in circle. It is like a merry-go-round! Where more than two effects mutually depend on each other, there crops up the *cakraka* defect. Or it can be defined as -

स्वज्ञानसापेक्षज्ञानसापेक्षज्ञानसापेक्षज्ञानविषयत्वम् चक्रकम् ।

"A given thing itself becoming the very object of the expected knowledge, which is the cause of the (other) expected knowledge which (again in turn) is the cause of (still another) expected knowledge, required to know itself - is the *cakraka* defect."

Here, the original thing becomes the object of the expected knowledge in a circuitous way.

The earlier illustration of knowing a cow can be seen in an extended way. To a person who wants to know the cow, it is defined as an animal which belongs to the species having cow-ness. In turn cow-ness is defined as that which is absent in those having no *sāsnā*, but invariably found in those animals having four legs and *sāsnā*. Yet the person cannot identify a cow for want of knowledge of *sāsnā* which in turn is described as a fold of loose skin hanging down from the neck of a cow or a bull, called dewlap. It is prominently seen in bulls. Now to make out the *sāsnā*, a cow has to be identified. Thus to gain the knowledge of a cow, the knowledge of cow-ness, the knowledge of *sāsnā* and finally that of cow itself, are indispensable. Thus it is impossible to know the cow this way. In view of *cakraka* defect, P-5 cannot help to fix the *vikalpa*.

REGRESS AD INFINITUM

According to P-6, V-4 must have its locus in some other *vikalpa*, V-5. Here also if V-5 is the same as V-2, *cakraka* defect will crop up. If V-5 is different like the previous *vikalpas*, it should have its locus in V-6 and so on, and it will lead to infinity without any finality. This is called *anavasthā doṣaḥ* or regress ad infinitum. For further *vikalpas* the *cakraka* defect also is going to continue if that subsequent *vikalpa* is the same as V-2.

BASIS OF VIKALPA AND THE LIKE CANNOT BE FIXED

Thus due to these four defects the real *vikalpa* in the *savikalpa* cannot be established by the opponent. Consequently there cannot be even any talk of either *savikalpa* or *nirvikalpa*, leave alone asking any question or objecting as done in the earlier verse. Therefore, the question by the first two types of questioners is dismissed and will not warrant any reply.

This analysis has proved that real *vikalpa* can never exist either in *nirvikalpa* or *savikalpa*. It is extended to the other things in the next verse.

इदं गुणक्रियाजातिद्रव्यसंबन्धवस्तुषु ।

समं तेन स्वरूपस्य सर्वमेतदितिष्यताम् ॥५१॥

idam guṇakriyājātidravyasambandhavastuṣu

samaṁ tena svarūpasya sarvameta ditiṣyatām - (51)

इदं - this (i.e. these defects) गुणक्रियाजातिद्रव्यसंबन्धवस्तुषु - in the categories (like) attribute, action, species, substance and relation समं - similar (अस्ति - is) तेन - thereby एतत् सर्वं - all these (attributes etc.) स्वरूपस्य - of the things इति - so इष्यताम् - be accepted. - (51)

51. These defects are similar in the categories (like) attribute, action, species, substance and relation. Thereby all these (attributes etc.) be accepted as belonging to the things.

Idam - this - refers to all the four defects seen in the earlier verse. Actually the categories (*vastu*) like attributes etc. mentioned here pertain to the six existent *padārthas* (objects of knowledge) out of the seven categories recognised by *Vaiśeṣika* philosophy. They are - *dravya* - substance, *guṇa* - attribute, *karma* - action, *sāmānya* - generality, *viśeṣa* - particularity, and *samavāya* - relation of inherence. The seventh is *abhāva* - the non-existence of the things, which is also an object (*padārtha*) according to them. The four logical fallacies mentioned earlier are applicable in toto to all these *padārthas* too.

Let us consider a *guṇa* - an attribute. Here is a tree which has got the treeness. The treeness is an attribute (*guṇa*) different from the microphone, watch and such others. The tree is endowed with *guṇa*. Therefore it is *guṇavān* or *saguṇa* - the one which exists with *guṇa*. Based on this we can say - *saguṇasya guṇaḥ* - the attribute of the one

that exists with an attribute. In this statement, the *guṇa* in the nominative case has its basis in the one contained in the word "*saguṇa*" having the instrumental case (*guṇena saha*). Now, one has to investigate the origin of the *guṇa* abiding in the *saguṇa* if it is real. It cannot be in anything that is *nirguṇa* - the one that is totally free from attributes. It is also not possible for the *guṇa* to abide in any other *saguṇa* thing, because the same four fallacies will shoot forth. Thus the original locus of *guṇa* cannot be traced.

What is true for a *guṇa* is equally applicable to every created thing that is there in the creation.

VIKALPA BELONGS TO THE WORLD

This discovery raises another question. Even if one accepts that the origin of any *vikalpa* - division etc. - cannot be traced, *vikalpa* is experienced by all. We know the tree is tall or short. We know that it is different from cow. Like this everything can be experienced as separate and distinct. If they cannot be fixed anywhere in terms of their original locus, how come we experience them?

The answer is given in the second line of this verse from *tena* onwards. Yes, it is true that these are experienced. But, as discussed before, the defects arise if one wants to fix their origin, and therefore, we should accept all these *vikalpas* as they are, belonging to the created things with names and forms. It is not desirable to separate the *vikalpas* - *guṇas*, action etc. - from where they abide. Accept all the created things as they are with specific characteristics. In this context the word "*svarūpa*" in the verse should be understood as anything with name and form with which we can interact. It does not mean the absolute nature of a thing. If there is a *savikalpa* thing, accept it to have *vikalpa* by nature. If there is something *saguṇa*, know it to be capable of having *guṇa*. Do not probe further. If questioned any more the same four defects mentioned earlier will spring up. The opponent therefore should be asked to accept every thing in the transactional world as it is, and not to split hair by raising impertinent doubts as done in verse 49.

If the intention of the objector is to ascertain the absolute nature of the creation including oneself, then the inquiry has to be conducted as had been done from the beginning of the chapter, ending with the *mahāvākya*, *tat tvam asi*.

THE WORLD IS FALSE

The answer given so far also implies that the entire creation is

false. As the creation is a *vikalpa*, it cannot be traced to *nirvikalpa* Brahman. It cannot have its origin in any *savikalpa* thing also. Yet the experiential world is available, and that means it should be necessarily false. The problems arise only if the *vikalpas* are taken to be real. Though, in the transactional world, we can certainly deal with false *vikalpas* as well as *savikalpa* and *nirvikalpa*, each at its own level, the creation is false and Brahman is the only truth. This is the declaration of *vācārambhaṇa śruti* too as detailed in the sixth chapter of *Chāndogyopaniṣad*.

Having thus answered by *vitandā* to the earlier two types of questioners, the true reply is given in the next verse to the genuine *mumukṣu* who has not understood the import of *tat tvam asi*.

विकल्पतदभावाभ्यामसंस्पृष्टात्मवस्तुनि ।

विकल्पितत्वलक्ष्यत्वसंबन्धाद्यास्तु कल्पिताः ॥५२॥

vikalpatadabhāvābhyāmasaṃsprṣṭātmavastuni
vikalpitatvalakṣyatvasambandhādyāstu kalpitāḥ - (52)

विकल्पतदभावाभ्याम् - by the *vikalpa* and its absence असंस्पृष्टात्मवस्तुनि - in the Brahman untouched विकल्पितत्वलक्ष्यत्वसंबन्धाद्याः - (its) status of being the object of doubts, *lakṣaṇā vṛtti* (and) the relations etc. तु - indeed कल्पिताः - are falsely superimposed. - (52)

52. In Brahman untouched by *vikalpa* and its absence, (its) status of being the object of doubts, *lakṣaṇā vṛtti* (and) the relations etc., indeed are falsely superimposed.

BRAHMAN IS FREE FROM VIKALPA

The *ātmavastu* mentioned here refers to the *paramātmā* which itself is Brahman. It has no connection (*asaṃsprṣṭa*) whatsoever with any *vikalpas* - divisions or duality - and also *nirvikalpa* - their absence. *Paramātmā* is non-dual. There is no room for the existence of anything other than it. All that is experienced as different from *Paramātmā* is verily false. What is *satyam* - real in its nature - cannot have any connection with the false, in spite of contrary experiences of the ignorant. How *Paramātmā* is unrelated to *nirvikalpa* will be seen later.

The phrase "*vikalpa-tadabhāva*" can also have the following meaning: The opponent had doubted whether Brahman indicated by the *mahāvākya* is *savikalpa* or *nirvikalpa*. It is shown here that Brahman

cannot be an object of such an inquiry at all. Because the nature of Brahman is non-dual, the question whether it is *savikalpa* or *nirvikalpa* has no relevance or connection to it.

Let us see how Brahman is not connected to *nirvikalpa* also. Though Vedānta often speaks of Brahman to be *nirvikalpa*, its meaning should be understood properly. *Nirvikalpa* refers to the one wherein duality is absent. When Brahman is said to be so, it means duality exists in reality, but it is absent in Brahman. Such existent independent duality will limit Brahman and it will cease to be non-dual.

Then why is the word "*nirvikalpa*" used at all as an adjective for Brahman? This is done to facilitate the understanding of Brahman. Presently in the state of self-ignorance we are all familiar only with the world full of *vikalpas*, which appears to be real to us. This mistaken concept has to be eliminated by pointing out the truth that in reality there are no *vikalpas* in Brahman including those of *jīva* and *jagat*, or *jīva* and *Īśvara*. After all, the Brahman unknown to us has to be revealed with the help of experienced *savikalpa jagat*. It does not mean that Brahman is *nirvikalpa* by itself. Just as the *vikalpas* are false, so is the status attributed to Brahman with reference to them as *nirvikalpa*, equally false. To a person who has mistaken a rope as a snake we may point out that there is no snake. There is only a rope. The rope is free from the snake. And the rope has no connection with either the presence or even the absence of the snake, because at no time is there really a snake in the rope.

For teaching purpose, use of the words from the experienced relative world has to be made. The word "*advaya*" - non-dual - should be understood also in a similar way. In fact no word can ever be used for Brahman including the very word "Brahman"! The word "Brahman" literally means the big, which is meaningful in comparison to the small. Therefore the "big" has a limitation cast by the "small". A thing with limitation cannot be the limitless Brahman. Yet we have no option but to use the relative words from the empirical world alone.

BRAHMAN IS THE BASIS OF THE FALSE WORLD

On this *ātmavastu* or Brahman, all the following features are falsely superimposed (*kalpitāḥ*).

Vikalpitatvam: This is a status of Brahman as an object of inquiry whether it is *savikalpa* or *nirvikalpa*. This was earlier asked by the opponent.

Lakṣyatvam: Brahman was indicated by the implied sense of *tat tvam asi*. This attributes to Brahman the status of becoming an object of *mahāvākya* through its implied sense.

Saṃbandhādi: Brahman is the very basis for the creation. So it is viewed as *abhinnanimittopādāna kāraṇa* of *jagat*. From the standpoint of *jagat*, it appears as though Brahman and *jagat* have a relation of cause and effect just as rope is said to be the cause of the delusive snake. Or the word "*saṃbandhādi*" - the relations etc. - can refer to the other categories envisaged by *Vaiśeṣikas*, which include the entire creation along with the effects and experiences therein. As a matter of fact, these cannot have any real existence of their own independently because in reality, nothing other than Brahman ever exists. None of them can be part and parcel of Brahman which itself is free from parts and all modifications or attributes. Yet if we do experience them separately, the only possibility is that all of them are *kalpitāḥ* - falsely superimposed - on Brahman. The certainty of this possibility when other ways are impossible is expressed by the particle "*tu*" in the sense of emphasis.

WORLD SERVES AS A *TAṬASTHA LAKṢAṆA*

Anything that is falsely superimposed can at best have only empirical reality like the non-existing snake seen in the place of a rope. Though available for interaction, the object cannot be absolutely real.

An unknown thing, even if it is not available for direct perception can be known with the help of something known. Brahman, the final truth, is unknown to the *mumukṣus* to begin with, whereas the *savikalpa* world is verily known. The known world has its basis in Brahman. The world serves as a *taṭastha lakṣaṇa* to know Brahman. A *taṭastha lakṣaṇa* is defined as a distinctly known feature which, despite being different from a thing to be known, helps to know that thing. Suppose you happened to go to a village to meet an old friend. Unfortunately you forgot the exact location of his house. All houses were looking more or less similar. So you requested a passer-by for guidance. He pointed to a house on the roof of which a crow was sitting.

Mind you, the crow is different from the house. Yet it helped you to identify the house. Here, the crow is said to be a *taṭastha lakṣaṇa* of the house. Similarly Brahman does not have the creation as its nature. It is like the rope that has nothing to do with the delusive snake. We say the snake is superimposed on the rope. So is the creation on Brahman. But if properly inquired into, the creation can

help us in discovering Brahman. Thus it serves as a *taṭastha lakṣaṇa*.

When the entire creation is a *vikalpa*, falsely superimposed on Brahman, the *upādhis* of *Īśvara* and *jīva* also fall in the same false category. Nay, these two forms assumed by Brahman also are equally false. They are meaningful only with respect to the false creation. That is the reason why the mutually opposite features of *tat* and *tvam* in the *mahāvākya* are discarded to ascertain the real nature of both. Otherwise there are no parts in Brahman, leave aside the mutually opposing ones. The falsely superimposed creation provides enough false features to handle the equally false *mahāvākya* to ascertain the real Brahman. That is the reason why they are called *kalpitāḥ*. That a false thing can help to discover a real one can be appreciated from the following illustration.

In your dream suppose a tiger is chasing you and you are running away for your life. By the time it is approaching you nearer and nearer, unfortunately you have reached the edge of a cliff. You can neither recede nor proceed. The dream tiger is just behind you. By mere momentum of your running and with the confusion born of fright, you lose your balance and fall down with a splash in the cool Ganges that was flowing in the valley. The icy touch of the dream Ganges woke you up only to discover that you are very safe in your bed!

Now let us know if the tiger in the dream was real. If not why did you run? You could have said "Hello tiger! I know you are false. Come on, shake hands with me." Did you say so? No. In the dream it appeared to be real as the world appears to be real in the waking state to us. Even the cold touch of Ganges was not real. Yet it helped you to wake up and discover that you are free from the problem experienced in the dream.

ĪŚVARA IS USEFUL

In this context a question of practical importance can crop up. If the creation is false, the relative status of Brahman as *Īśvara* with respect to the false creation is equally false. Then why should one invoke *Īśvara* or pray to Him? Yes, prayers to *Īśvara* are not needed if one has the clarity of vision that *nirvikalpa* Brahman alone is the only reality and the mind remains steadfast in it. If that is the case, there is no *jīva* to begin with; then there is no *jagat* and so automatically, *Īśvara* ceases to be. What is real is only Brahman and Brahman alone. On the contrary, if one does not have this knowledge and thereby the transactional world is taken to be real, *Īśvara* also will be as much real as the *jagat*. And to deny *Īśvara* at such a level of understanding is

either a sign of sheer ignorance or hypocrisy. Until we discover ourselves to be Brahman, not different from the real nature of *Īśvara*, we have to make use of Him to our own advantage. Till then prayers, worship, *japa* etc. are all useful.

IS BONDAGE REAL?

One more topic of vital importance can also be discussed in this context. All *vikalpas* are falsely superimposed on Brahman, free from all of them including the *jagat*. If so, is bondage also a *vikalpa*? Is it real or false in nature like other *vikalpas*?

Let us first see what the bondage is. Is bondage something like a ghost sitting on your head, if at all it exists? Or is it like tying your hands and legs with chains or ropes? What exactly is meant by "I am bound"? Is the bondage on any part of your body? "I am bound" is only a notion. It is a *vṛtti* - a thought in nature. When a statement, "I am bound" is made, the whole problem is centred on what is taken as "I". Due to *ahaṃkāra* - notional I - which is born of error, one identifies oneself with either gross body or subtle body or causal body, each being taken as "I" with their modifications. Really the locus of "I" is *saṃvit* which is *parānanda*. If this is known, there is no question of bondage, and ignorance of this fact results in the notion of oneself being bound. This *vṛtti* - the notion - is produced by *antaḥkaraṇa*. *Antaḥkaraṇa* being made up of five elements is a *vikalpa*. So the notion of bondage arising there is also a *vikalpa*. From what we have discovered, Brahman cannot accommodate any real *vikalpa*. Brahman itself is *ātmā* (*saṃvit*) - the real "I" - in contrast to the notional one, *ahaṃkāra*. Therefore, in reality, there can never be any real *vikalpa* of bondage in "me". If it appears to be present, it should necessarily be false in nature like all other *vikalpas*. Therefore I am truly not bound, but ever free. I am *nityamuktaḥ* - always free from bondage.

This can be seen also from another angle. All *vṛttis* including the notion of bondage are the modifications of *antaḥkaraṇa* which is inert. So are the *vṛttis*; thereby they need to be illumined by *saṃvit* if they are to be cognised. Otherwise one cannot know them. The notion of bondage which too is a *vṛtti* is equally cognised, because it is illumined by "me" - *saṃvit* (*ātmā*). Any known *vṛtti* is invariably distinct from the illuminator, "me", the pure awareness - *saṃvit*. It is a fact that the illuminator is never affected by the illumined. Therefore the notion of bondage, being an illumined *vṛtti*, can never bind "me" - *ātmā* - the illuminator. Then who is bound? The following will make it clear.

Consider a person standing on an open ground and looking at the sun. A big cloud is approaching the sun. The person will notice that the sun starts getting covered by the cloud, then gets totally covered and after some time, on going away of the cloud, gets finally uncovered. Now, imagine yourself to be placed on the sun instead, of course without any damage to you! What will be your description of the same phenomenon? You report, "I saw that the cloud had come within a range which obstructed the person's vision of the sun. Now it has passed away. However, all along the sun was illumining the cloud, and continues to do so without being covered by the cloud at any time." Then why did the person say that the sun is covered? Obviously, when it was his sight that was covered by the cloud, by an error he superimposed the obstruction on the sun. In fact the self-luminous sun can never be covered.

Similarly, when you say "I am bound", it is the intellect that has such a notion, a *vr̥tti* which gets illumined by *ātmā*. What is covered is the intellect by ignorance of our real nature. But *ātmā* is always the same illumining knowledge principle which is ever present irrespective of the presence or absence of such wrong notion, or for that matter any other *vr̥tti*. Even "I am free from bondage" is also a *vr̥tti* in intellect born of *aparokṣa jñāna*. *Ātmā* illumines this *vr̥tti* too. This discussion also should reveal that I - "*saṃvit*" - am ever free.

Hastāmālakācārya, the youngest among the four leading disciples of Ādi Śaṅkarācārya, has put this fact in a small *stotra* - a poetic composition - as under:

"Just as the person, who totally lacks discrimination and whose sight is covered by the clouds, considers the sun covered by them to be dim; similarly the one who appears to those of erroneous vision to be bound, that ever illumining knowledge principle is my real nature."

If the truth is that both bondage and liberation are the *vr̥ttis* of *antaḥkāraṇa* which is false in nature and if I am ever free, then why take to Vedānta? Yes, it is not required, provided one has discovered for oneself this fact and the mind does not lose sight of this truth. Then the job of Vedānta is over. But so long as one takes oneself to be bound, the teaching of Vedānta becomes indispensable. Mere verbal repetition, "I am ever free, I am above the norms of do's and don't's", without the firsthand discovery of the real nature of oneself will not help. Such Vedānta only in talk can at times even be

dangerous. Here one may recall the story of "RED CHILLIES", narrated earlier.

This discussion also emphasises that Vedānta is not a collection of dogmas or any set of commandments. It is an unfoldment of the positive truth accompanied by the specification of required precise means and mode of inquiry. It is to our advantage that we inquire with an open and prepared mind, along the guidelines given by Vedānta and discover the truth.

ŚRAVAṆAM, MANANAM, NIDIDHYĀSANAM

The identity of *jīva* and Brahman was revealed through the *tattvamasi mahāvākya* till verse 48. Thereafter, there was a digression to clarify the doubt about the interpretation of the *mahāvākya*. Having done so the topic is now continued further. What has been discussed so far in the text is properly assigned to the different steps of *sādhana* - the means - so that the further steps to be taken can be described.

इत्थं वाक्यैस्तदर्थानुसंधानं श्रवणं भवेत् ।

युक्त्या संभावितत्वानुसंधानं मननं तु तत् ॥५३॥

*itthaṃ vākyaistadarthānusandhānaṃ śravaṇaṃ bhavet
yuktyā saṃbhāvitatvānusandhānaṃ mananaṃ tu tat - (53)*

इत्थं - thus वाक्यैः - by the means of *mahāvākyas* तदर्थानुसंधानं - discovery of their meaning (viz. identity of *jīva* and Brahman) श्रवणं - inquiry (*śravaṇam*) भवेत् - is युक्त्या - by reasoning तु - on the other hand संभावितत्वानुसंधानं - understanding of such identity to be possible तत् - that मननं - reflection (भवेत् - is).- (53)

53. Thus, by the means of *mahāvākyas* the discovery of their meaning (viz. the identity of *jīva* and Brahman) is called inquiry. On the other hand, the understanding of the possibility of such identity by reasoning, is reflection.

Verses 53 to 62 (except 57 and 58) are taken verbatim from mantras 33 to 40 of *Adhyātmopaniṣad* belonging to *Śuklayajurveda*. This is an additional proof that the author is strictly abiding by the teaching methodology of the *Upaniṣads* and does not put anything according to his own reasoning or speculation that is not in consonance with *śruti*.

ŚRAVAṆAM

Śravaṇam is an inquiry to ascertain and discover the exact import of statements in the *śruti*. It consists of exposure to the teaching by a competent master, wherein the real nature of oneself is unfolded as per the *śruti*. It is not just listening, but doing so with

a spirit of investigation and ascertainment leading to the discovery (*anusandhānam*) of oneself. The author has already shown us a mode of inquiry in verses 44 to 48, with respect to the "*tattvamasi*" *mahāvākya*. First the direct meanings of the words "*tat*" and "*tvam*" were probed into. But it was found that with the direct meaning, the sentence as a whole does not make sensible meaning. So the *bhāgatyaḡgalakṣanā vṛtti* was employed and identity (*tadārtha*) of *tat* and *tvam* was established. This mode of inquiry is a sample that is mentioned by *ittham* - thus - and it is also applicable in ascertaining the import of any other *mahāvākyas*. Thus the phrase "*tadārthānusandhānam*" means the discovery of the meaning (*artha*) or the import of the *mahāvākyas*, which is the identity of *jīva* and Brahman.

For *śravaṇam* to be effective, the person should first acquire *sādhana* *catuṣṭayasamṗatti* and the purity of mind accompanied by withdrawal from its hectic preoccupations. The subject matter is not objective and so it is difficult, making repeated *śravaṇam* indispensable until the clarity of knowledge is gained. Even Lord Kṛṣṇa repeats the topic in *Bhagavadgītā* at several places.

MANANAM

After *śravaṇam* the next stage is the proper understanding of the rationality of such discovery. There are enough reasons to entertain doubts about the teachings from *śruti*. Our perceptions convince us about the reality of the world, whereas *Vedānta* emphasises without any compromise, that *nirvikalpa* Brahman alone exists and that there is no room for the existence of any real thing other than Brahman. *Jīva* and *Īśvara* also appear to be totally different. How do we reconcile these contradictions between our immediate experiences and the declarations in the *śruti*? Therefore it is imperative that these teachings are tested on the touchstones of reasoning (*yukti*) to clear the doubts. This reasoning process is called *mananam*. With the help of reasoning, the clear understanding (*anusandhānam*) that the ascertained meaning of *śruti* (*tattva*) is possible (*samṃbhavi*), is *mananam* or reflection. The entire analysis beginning from verse 3 and ending with verse 43 contained in the text is an example of *mananam*.

If *mananam* is meant to clear the doubts regarding the knowledge gained from *śruti*, how is it that *Vidyāranya* Muni first took to *mananam* and then *śravaṇam*? This is an instance of freedom enjoyed by an author of a *prakaraṇagrantha* wherein he can rearrange

a topic. It is only to suit the method of unfoldment chosen by him. He establishes the truth based on reasoning and then corroborates it with *śruti* to establish that it is not mere speculation. This also reveals that the final *pramāṇa*- the means of knowledge - is *śruti* alone. The reasoning is done in accordance with *śruti* and is helpful in understanding it in a better perspective. A proper teaching takes care of *mananam* along with *śravaṇam* itself. In spite of it, if some doubts persist, they can be resolved either by reflection on one's own, or by discussion with co-seekers or with the teacher.

DEFECTS OF MIND

The knowledge of oneself has to take place in *śravaṇam* alone which is meant to destroy ignorance. In fact the knowledge of a given thing is gained by the appropriate *pramāṇa* - the means of knowledge - and not otherwise. Vedānta in the form of words is the *pramāṇa* in knowing oneself, and it is operated in *śravaṇam*. If the teaching is correct, and yet knowledge does not take place despite repeated *śravaṇam*, one should neither hastily conclude that Vedānta is ineffective nor condemn oneself as incapable. The situation warrants an investigation into one's own mind that operates the *pramāṇa*, Vedānta. Probably some adjustments are necessary in the constitution of one's mind. Therefore the right course is to detect the flaws and set them right to overcome the obstruction to acquiring the knowledge. Thereafter the very same Vedānta *pramāṇa* has to be used.

To give a simile, the sense organ eye when directed towards the objects should see the forms. The instrument called eye, when backed up by mind operates as the *pramāṇa* to perceive the forms. However, in spite of directing the eyes towards the objects to be seen, if they are not seen, then the possibility is that the eyes are defective. May be they need spectacles. Even the problem of cataract or debility of optic nerves is possible. One should correct the defect and then see the forms with the eyes only. For a change, ears can never be used for seeing.

The defects of mind are *mala*, *vikṣepa* and *āvaraṇa*. They can be set right by the following means, respectively.

i) *Mala*: The results of *adhārmic*- unrighteous - actions carried out in the earlier lives produce adverse effects which obstruct one's pursuit of seeking self-knowledge. The *karma* portion of Vedas prescribes various daily actions to be done according to one's status. When these are performed, with the right attitude of *karmayoga*, they

help to overcome the obstruction resulting in a calm and composed mind.

ii) *Vikṣepa*: Lack of steadiness of mind is another major drawback. The different *upāsanās* specified in the *upāsanā* portion of Vedas are the means to accomplish the steadiness of mind (*cittanaiścala*).

iii) *Āvaraṇa*: Even after the above two defects are overcome the knowledge of one's real nature cannot be gained just like that. This is due to the ignorance which serves as a veiling (*āvaraṇa*) of real "I". By self-knowledge alone the ignorance has to be destroyed, for which *śravaṇam* is the means, as seen earlier. Once this ignorance is destroyed, the real nature "I" which is self-evident knowledge principle (*saṃvit*), reveals by itself.

NIDIDHYĀSANAM

Still one more problem of a different nature lingers, even after the successful accomplishment of *śravaṇa* and *manana*. It is true that one has got *aparokṣa* knowledge and discovered "oneself" to be *sat cit ānanda*. But hitherto one was taking oneself to be this embodiment at the gross, subtle and causal levels, and therefore in spite of having the knowledge, the earlier habit of erroneous identification with the body (*dehatādātmya*) persists. Basically, this habit is not picked up only in this particular life. It is a habit entrenched firmly from countless past births, with *jīva*, being a product of beginningless *avidyā*. The embodiments treated by a *jīva* as "I" in the past births are also endless. Due to ignorance, one keeps on identifying oneself with those bodies all along till the knowledge dawns. But habits die hard, and hence the mistake is committed repeatedly. They cannot disappear overnight as such. One is unable to enjoy the fruits of self-knowledge which is *parānanda*. This habitual mistaken identification is annihilated by *nididhyāsanam* - contemplation - done repeatedly.

In *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* (2-4-5 and 4-5-6) we find the basis for these three means.

"O dear Maitreyī, *ātmā* should be known (*draṣṭavyaḥ*), should be inquired into (*śrotavyaḥ*), reflected on (*mantavyaḥ*) and contemplated upon (*nididhyāsitavyaḥ*)."

What is *nididhyāsana* is now described.

ताभ्यां निर्विचिकित्सेऽर्थे चेतसः स्थापितस्य यत् ।
एकतानत्वमेतद्धि निदिध्यासनमुच्यते ॥५४॥

*tābhyāṃ nirvicikitserthe cetasaḥ sthāpitasya yat
ekatānatvametaaddhi nididhyāsanamucyate - (54)*

ताभ्यां - by those two निर्विचिकित्से अर्थे - in the thing (*arthe* i.e. in Brahman) about which the doubts are dispelled स्थापितस्य चेतसः - of the mind that is made to remain यत् - which एकतानत्वम् - the steady abidance (अस्ति - is there) एतत् - this हि - indeed निदिध्यासनम् - *nididhyāsana*/contemplation उच्यते - is called. - (54)

54. The steady abidance of the mind that is fixed in the thing (i.e. Brahman) about which the doubts are dispelled by those two (*śravaṇa* and *manana*) indeed is called *nididhyāsana*.

Generally in Vedānta we come across two words, "*nididhyāsana*" and "*dhyāna*", almost used as synonyms. However, at times they do differ from each other in their meaning according to the context. Both essentially consist of fixing of the mind in a chosen particular pre-occupation called *dhyeya*, as advised by the scriptures, to the total exclusion of all other dissimilar thoughts. The *dhyeya* can differ. It can be either *Īśvara* or some deity etc. with form, or the formless *nirguṇa* Brahman. In the case of the word "*dhyāna*", the *dhyeya* can be either of the two. But when the word "*nididhyāsana*" is used, the *dhyeya* can only be *nirguṇa* Brahman. These two Sanskrit words are translated in English as meditation or contemplation interchangeably. In order to be precise, we have to determine the exact meaning depending on the context.

Śravaṇa ascertains the real nature of *jīva* being not different from Brahman. This knowledge of identity of the two is further clarified by eliminating all doubts by *manana*. By these two means (*tābhyāṃ*) one can very clearly appreciate the nature of Brahman to be one with "me" in reality. "*Artha*" in the verse means Brahman, the doubts (*vicikitsā*) about which are dispelled as denoted by the prefix "*nir*".

The mind is fixed in the appreciation of Brahman to the exclusion of all other dissimilar thoughts, to enable it to get absorbed in it. This is to be accomplished by training the mind to take to the one and

the only one preoccupation of entertaining a *ṛtti* that appreciates Brahman. The knowledge of any given thing is gained by a *ṛtti*- thought - corresponding to the form (*ākāra*) of the thing under consideration. But when it comes to Brahman, it being free from any form or any other types of limitation, the *ṛtti* that appreciates Brahman also necessarily has to be free from any *khaṇḍa*- break or limitation. Such a *ṛtti* is therefore called *akhaṇḍākāra ṛtti*. It is unlike any other thoughts. Yet, it is called a *ṛtti* only, because it is a modification of *antaḥkaraṇa*, having the capacity to destroy the ignorance about oneself. It is not any form of speculation, but is the outcome of thorough *śravaṇa* and *manana* resulting in clear knowledge of the nature of oneself without any doubts or vagueness.

The mind so fixed in the knowledge of Brahman steadily abides in it to the exclusion of all other dissimilar thoughts, after sufficient practice. This is called *ekatānatvam* - a continuous flow of the same type of *ṛtti*. Such a steady abidance of the mind in the appreciation of Brahman which is really oneself, is called *nididhyāsana*. *Hi* denotes the renown of *ekatānatā* as *dhyāna* in accordance with yoga *sāstra*.

Even the etymology of the word "*nididhyāsanam*" throws light on its meaning and practice. It is derived from the verb "*dhyai*" - to meditate or contemplate. First it takes its desiderative form (implying desire) to become *didhyās* - desire to meditate or contemplate. To it a prefix "*ni*" is added in the sense of profound, repeated, constant or full. Finally an abstract noun is formed by two additional suffixes giving rise to two synonyms, "*nididhyāsaḥ*" and "*nididhyāsanam*". So the "*ni*" prefix shows that such a contemplation is not to be done in fits and starts. It is a continuous repetitive pursuit.

The mind when left on its own, occupies itself with hundreds of different preoccupations by force of habit, if not for any specific purpose. It does not find any leisure to appreciate one's real nature. That is the reason for the common complaint of one's inability to contemplate. Volitionally or habitually we pursue various things whereby the mind remains constantly preoccupied with everything else but *nididhyāsana*. Basically the nature of mind is unruly.

Even Arjuna, the mighty archer having single pointed concentration complained to Lord Kṛṣṇa that it is very difficult to keep the mind under control, and had aptly described the mind as *cancalam* - fickle, *pramāthi* - turbulent, *balavat* - very strong, and *dṛḍham* - the one which is very difficult to handle. But there is a definite remedy. Mind can be tamed by *abhyāsa*-repeated practice-and *vairāgya*-dispassion.

Lord Kṛṣṇa himself has prescribed these means to overpower the unruly mind. Understanding of the nature of sense objects in the right perspective without attaching any undue value to them is a very essential step. Further, repeated practice is equally indispensable. One without the other, done singly will not be adequate. The prefix "ni" is employed to emphasise this requirement too. Moreover, for a person who has gained the self-knowledge and thereby has discovered oneself to be the limitless *ānanda*, there cannot be any other interest of greater importance. If there is, the very knowledge the person seems to have gained, will have to be questioned.

Nididhyāsana is assiduously repeated redwelling on the knowledge of our real nature which is already gained through *śravaṇa* and *manana*. There is no thinking involved in *nididhyāsana*. All the thinking and following up of inquiry is carried out in the earlier two stages. It is neither *japa* - repetition of some *mantras* - nor *upāsana* - meditation on *Īśvara* with form. One can take help of some word or words as a prop, which had helped to gain the knowledge in *śravaṇa*. Any *dṛṣya*-known- can also be employed to arrive at one's real nature, as the entire *jagat* is illumined by *saṃvit* - me.

Nididhyāsana is necessary until the erroneous identification with body is totally destroyed. All continue to have identification with the body habitually even after gaining the self-knowledge, exception being very rare in the entire creation. Let us not imagine ourselves to be one of them. The knowledge that I am *parānanda* must become as natural for ourselves as the gross body is "I" for an ignorant person. The question "how long should I contemplate" is not pertinent at all. No one complains, "how long should I be happy?" Contemplation being the appreciation of my true nature that is limitless *ānanda*, there is no room for any complaint.

SAMĀDHI AND ITS RESULT

In *nididhyāsana*, interruptions are present, requiring consistent and deliberate efforts for its pursuit. When it fructifies, it culminates into the mind totally getting absorbed in one's real nature. Such a state of mind is called *samādhī*.

Samādhī is a much misunderstood word. It is wrongly applied very often. Different kinds of emotional upsurges, attacks of hysteria, nervous breakdowns or neurotic fits are now extolled and exalted as *samādhī*! This is a sad mistake. *Samādhī* as per Vedānta, calls for *nididhyāsana* for a sufficiently long period of time in the case of majority of the seekers. Its regular, repeated practice gathers a momentum whereby the mind gets absorbed in the appreciation of Brahman effortlessly. Thus *nididhyāsana* leads to *samādhī*. In verses 55 to 62, *samādhī* and topics relevant to it are elaborated.

ध्यातृध्याने परित्यज्य क्रमाद्धयेयैकगोचरम् ।

निवातदीपवच्चित्तं समाधिरभिधीयते ॥५५॥

*dhyātṛdhyāne parityajya kramāddhyeyaika-gocaram
nivātadīpavaccittam samādhirabhidhiyate - (55)*

(यदा-when) चित्तं-mind ध्यातृध्याने – contemplator and contemplation
क्रमात् – gradually परित्यज्य - having discarded निवातदीपवत् – like a
lamp in a calm place ध्येयैकगोचरं – absorbed in dhyeya (Brahman)
(भवति – becomes) (तदा – then) समाधिः – *samādhī* अभिधीयते –
is called. - (55)

55. Having gradually discarded the contemplator (*dhyātā*) and contemplation (*dhyāna*), the mind (steadily) absorbed in the *dhyeya* (Brahman), like a lamp in a calm place, is called *samādhī*.

Samādhī is a state of mind. In *nididhyāsana* efforts are necessary, and the notions that me the contemplator (*dhyātā*) is taking to contemplation (*dhyāna*) by making my mind abide in the contemplated (*dhyeya*), continue to linger. As the intensity of contemplation progressively increases by repeated practice, the notions of contemplator and the contemplation are gradually (*kramāt*) given up. Then the mind becomes *dhyeyaika-gocaram* - the one

whose only object (*gocara*) or preoccupation is *dhyeya* which is Brahman in this context. The *dhyeya* can also be something else in the case of others. There are no more thoughts of even the presence of contemplator and contemplation. This state of absorption of the mind in Brahman is called *nirvikalpa samādhi*.

There is no practice involved in *nirvikalpa samādhi*. Only for *nididhyāsanā* practice is required. With intense practice of *nididhyāsanā* the mind glides as it were, in *samādhi*. When the notion of *dhyātā* - contemplator - still persists but otherwise the mind is absorbed in *dhyeya*, it is called *savikalpa samādhi*. It is possible to put in efforts up to this point. This itself also has to fructify finally in *nirvikalpa samādhi*.

The illustration of *nivāṭadīpa* - a lamp kept in a place that is not windy - is cited to explain the state of *samādhi*. When even the breeze is not there, the flame of a lamp becomes very steady. Similarly in *samādhi*, there is no wavering of the mind due to any other distracting thoughts. The mind remains steady, continuously absorbed in the *dhyeya*.

VṚTTIS ARE PRESENT IN SAMĀDHI

As already seen, *samādhi* consists of steady flow of *dhyeya vṛtti* alone. The mind gets totally absorbed in *dhyeya*. Without such *vṛtti*, *samādhi* is not possible. A doubt may be raised that *nirvikalpa samādhi* should be free from any *vṛtti* as no *vṛttis* are cognised there. Then how can it be said that there is only one *vṛtti* of *dhyeya* alone? Another question may be that in sleep also there are no *vikalpas*. So what is the difference between sleep and *samādhi*? This is answered in the following verse by citing an evidence to prove the presence of *dhyeya vṛtti* in *samādhi*.

वृत्तयस्तु तदानीमज्ञाता अप्यात्मगोचराः ।

स्मरणादनुमीयन्ते व्युत्थितस्य समुत्थितात् ॥५६॥

vṛttayastu tadānīmajñātā apyātmagocarāḥ

smaraṇādanumīyante vyutthitasya samutthitāt - (56)

आत्मगोचराः वृत्तयः - the *vṛttis* that appreciate *ātmā* तु - in contrast, or certainly तदानीं - then अज्ञाताः - are unknown अपि - even if व्युत्थितस्य - of the one who has come out (of *samādhi*) समुत्थितात् - born स्मरणात् - from the recollection अनुमीयन्ते - are inferred. - (56)

56. Even if unknown then (in *samādhi*), the *ṛttis* that appreciate *ātmā* are certainly inferred from the recollection of the one who has come out of *samādhi*.

It is true that at the time of *samādhi* itself the *dhyeya ṛttis* are not cognised (*ajñātāḥ*) directly. The reason for this is not their absence, but it is the absence of *dhyātā* - the contemplator - himself. Whether in *samādhi* or otherwise all *ṛttis* depend on *ahaṅkāra*, *ahaṅ ṛtti* - the "I" notion as the knower. Even Ramaṇa Maharṣi has stated in *Upadeśasāraṃ* "*ṛttayastu ahaṅ ṛttim āśritāḥ*" - all *ṛttis* depend on *ahaṅkāra*. The contemplator also is none other than the *ahaṅkāra* who contemplates on *dhyeya*. The particle "tu" can be connected either to *ajñātāḥ* or to *anumīyante*. In the former case it means, "in contrast". The contrast is drawn between *nididhyāsana* and *samādhi*. In *nididhyāsana* the *dhyeya ṛttis* are entertained by the deliberate efforts on the part of contemplator and so are known by him, whereas in *samādhi* in the absence of contemplator they are not known. "Tu" in the latter case means "certainly".

The *dhyeya ṛttis* here are described as *ātmagocarāḥ*, because their object (*gocara*) of knowledge is *ātmā* or Brahman. Any knowledge is acquired by the origin of a *ṛtti* corresponding to the form of the known object. But Brahman is without any form and yet no knowledge can take place without the formation of a *ṛtti*. So by courtesy it is called *akhaṇḍākāra ṛtti* - the *ṛtti* which is formless and limitless - which is referred to here by the word "*ātmagocarāḥ*".

If *ṛttis* are absent in *samādhi*, there cannot be any appreciation of Brahman and so, the absorption of the mind in it is impossible. Because here *samādhi* refers to the absorption of mind in Brahman, the corresponding *ṛttis* should necessarily be present. This can certainly be inferred. The person who has come out (*vyutthīta*) of *samādhi*, recalls, "Oh! I was absorbed in *samādhi* for a certain period of time". This is a memory (*smaraṇa*). As seen in verse 5, it is not possible without an earlier experience which presupposes the *ṛttis*. Thus they are inferred (*anumīyante*) to be present in *samādhi*.

In this context, it is desirable that we know the function of *ātmagocara* or *akhaṇḍākāra ṛtti*. It is true that Vedānta is an accepted *pramāṇa* in gaining the knowledge of *ātmā* - Brahman, but basically Brahman is *aprameya* - not known as an object of any *pramāṇa* including Vedānta. Even the *ṛttis* referred to here cannot objectify Brahman. They can only remove the ignorance about Brahman and the wrong notions born out of it. Thereafter, Brahman which is verily *svaprakāśa* - the self-evident, knowledge principle - reveals of its own.

Though self-evident, earlier due to ignorance its knowledge was denied. Once the ignorance is destroyed, Brahman is not dependent on anything else to illumine it.

Śaṅkarācārya in a *prakaraṇa* text gives the illustration of *kataka* nut powder to explain this phenomenon.

अज्ञानकलुषं जीवं ज्ञानाभ्यासाद्विनिर्मलम् ।

कृत्वा ज्ञानं स्वयं नश्येज्जलं कतकरेणुवत् ॥

(*Ātmabodha* - 5)

"Like the *kataka* nut powder purifying the water, the *jñāna vṛtti* by its repeated practice, having purified *jīva* who is distorted by ignorance, gets itself destroyed."

Like alum, *kataka* nut powder is sprinkled on the muddy water and is allowed to settle. The powder forms a thin layer. In course of time all the mud sediments combining with the nut powder gradually settle down at the bottom, leaving behind the clear water. If even the powder remains suspended in it, water cannot be considered to be pure. A *saṃsārī jīva*, the product of *avidyā*, is compared to the muddy water. Repeated *nididhyāsana* or what is called *jñānābhyaśa*, wherein *dhyeya vṛttis* are of the nature described earlier, is like the *kataka* nut powder. Finally like pure water what remains is our own real nature which is self-evident. *Ātmā* - Brahman - is free from even these *dhyeya vṛttis*. The *vṛttis* do help the mind to get absorbed in appreciation of *ātmā* - Brahman - by taking away the ignorance and erroneous concepts about ourselves. Though their presence in *samādhi* can certainly be inferred, our real nature is free from them too.

This verse also brings out the distinction between sleep and *samādhi*. In the former ignorance is dormant. In the latter ignorance has been annihilated and the *jñāna vṛttis* are present, though they are not known directly at the time of *samādhi* itself.

That the *dhyeya vṛttis* are present in *samādhi* is clear from the inference made. Irrespective of its nature a *vṛtti* is the result of the efforts put forth by the individual. Many may find it difficult to accept this statement. People generally consider that thinking is natural, and not to think demands efforts. This is because we are so habituated to keep on thinking that not to do so necessitates special efforts. However, the fact is just the opposite. Do we think in sleep?

Certainly not. No efforts are involved in that. So efforts are required only to entertain *ṛttis*.

In *samādhi* the *dhyātā* - contemplator - who puts forth the efforts being absent, the expected flow of *ātmagocara ṛttis* should also be absent. Then how is it possible to have their presence in *samādhi*? Yes, the question is valid. The reply is that some other factors generate a momentum that keeps the flow of the same *ṛtti* continued, in absence of active efforts by the individual as a *dhyātā*.

वृत्तीनामनुवृत्तिस्तु प्रयत्नात्प्रथमादपि ।

अदृष्टासकृदभ्याससंस्कारसचिवाद्भवेत् ॥५७॥

*ṛttināmanuvṛttistu prayatnātpṛathamādapi
adr̥ṣṭāsakṛdabhyāsaṁskārasacivādbhavet - (57)*

वृत्तीनां - of *ṛttis* अनुवृत्तिः - continuity तु - but प्रथमात् प्रयत्नात् - by initial efforts अपि - besides अदृष्टासकृदभ्याससंस्कारसचिवात् - by the aid of unsullied *punya* together with the impressions born of repeated practice भवेत् - takes place. - (57)

57. The continuity of *ṛttis* takes place by the initial efforts besides the aid of unsullied *punya* with the impressions born of repeated practice.

The *dhyeya ṛttis* continue as a flow. The initial efforts here consist of readiness of mind with all the preliminary requisites and the repeated *nididhyāsana* before culminating in *samādhi*. All these factors generate the momentum to keep the flow of *ṛttis* continued. The momentum is further boosted by the following two supplementary factors (*saciva*):

a) *Adṛṣṭam*: Here it means *punya* unsullied by *pāpa*. *Punya* is earned as a result of good actions done whereby one is given to enjoy in the creation here or hereafter the different sense pleasures. The one who aspires for this should also settle the account for *pāpa* - the result of one's bad actions which produce sorrows. A person who has a high degree of dispassion does not hanker for sense pleasures. The person being a *mumukṣu* invokes *Īśvara* with total dedication. The accrued *punya* of these actions will get utilised for getting a competent *guru*, opportunities for *śravaṇa*, *manana*, *nididhyāsana*, right environment and freedom from obstructions.

According to *Pātañjalayogasūtras* (4-7) the results of all the actions are divided into four categories.

i) *Kṛṣṇaṁ karma*: This comprises results of forbidden actions. Generally wicked persons indulge in such deeds.

ii) *Śuklaṁ karma*: This mainly pertains to results of actions done at mental level without depending on external means or inflicting injury to others. Ascetic practices, study of scriptures and meditation fall in this category. At times the *kāmya karma* - actions enjoined by Vedas - are also taken as *śuklaṁ*.

iii) *Śuklakṛṣṇaṁ karma*: This is a mixture of the first two. It may also be the result of giving afflictions to others (*para pīḍā*), knowingly or unknowingly, and at the same time doing good to some others.

iv) *Aśuklakṛṣṇaṁ karma*: This belongs to those persons whose only preoccupation is the pursuit of the means which leads to *mokṣa*. These people already have purity of mind, discrimination etc. *Sannyāsīs* who are committed to gain self-knowledge come under this category. Whatever *puṇya* that accrues to these individuals is offered to *Īśvara*. This is not *kāmya* - meant to fulfil the desires for sense pleasures. So it is neither *śuklaṁ* nor *kṛṣṇaṁ*.

The *adrṣṭa* referred to here means only *puṇya* of the last category.

b) *Abhyāsa-saṁskāra*: The impressions created in the mind by the repeated pursuit and abidance in *samādhi* also help the *dhyeya vṛttis* to continue without effort.

What has been said about *samādhi* is not something speculated or originally contributed by the author, but has been accepted by earlier great masters. None other than Lord Kṛṣṇa himself has described it in *Bhagavadgītā*.

यथा दीपो निवातस्थ इत्यादिभिरनेकधा ।

भगवानिममेवार्थमर्जुनाय न्यरूपयत् ॥५८॥

yathā dīpo nivātaśtha ityādibhiranekadhā

bhagavānimamevārthamarjunāya nyarūpayat - (58)

यथा - like दीपः - a lamp निवातस्थः - staying in a calm place
इत्यादिभिः by such (verses) भगवान् - Lord Kṛṣṇa - इमं - this एव - very
अर्थं topic अर्जुनाय - to Arjuna अनेकधा - in various ways न्यरूपयत् -
taught. - (58)

58. Lord Kṛṣṇa by verses such as "like a lamp staying in a calm place (does not flicker)", taught to Arjuna this very topic in various ways.

In verses 11 to 29 of the Sixth Chapter of the *Gītā*, Lord Kṛṣṇa has dealt with in detail the state of mind absorbed in the appreciation of *ātmā* and also the need to attain it. It may be objected that the word "*samādhi*" is not used in the *Gītā*. Yes, it is true that this particular word is not used by the Lord. Yet the illustration, along with other description employed to describe the state of mind of the meditator which is absorbed in *ātmā*, reveals it to be nothing but *samādhi* only.

Take for instance, verse 19 from the same chapter of the *Gītā* which is referred to here in this verse. The Lord says:

"Just as a lamp, placed in a calm place, does not flicker, for describing what is the absorbed mind of the meditator who practises contemplation of the self, this illustration is cited."

The comparison of the steady flame of a lamp with the absorbed state of mind of the meditator speaks for itself that it refers to the state of *samādhi*. If the mind were to have any *vṛtti* other than that of the *dhyeya ātmā*, the illustration cited here will not be applicable. Lord Kṛṣṇa has also explicitly pointed out in those verses that the *dhyeya* is *ātmā* - Brahman - only. It is mentioned further that the person who has such absorption of mind in *ātmā* appreciates it abiding in all beings and all beings in *ātmā* (*Gītā* 6-29).

Now the secondary result of *samādhi* is being told in praise of it.

अनादाविह संसारे संचिताः कर्मकोटयः
अनेन विलयं यान्ति शुद्धो धर्मो विवर्धते ॥५९॥

*anādāviha saṁsāre sañcitāḥ karmakoṭayaḥ
anena vilayaṁ yānti śuddho dharmo vivardhate - (59)*

इह - in this अनादै - in beginningless संसारे - in *saṁsāra* संचिताः - the earned कर्मकोटयः - countless results of action अनेन - by this (*samādhi*) विलयं यान्ति - get destroyed शुद्धः - pure धर्मः *punya* (च - and) विवर्धते - grows. - (59)

59. By this *samādhi*, the countless results of actions earned in this beginningless *saṁsāra* get destroyed and the pure *punya* grows.

The main purpose of *nididhyāsana* culminating in *samādhi*, as we

have seen is to eradicate the habitual errors which come in the way of the appreciation of our real nature in spite of having gained the self-knowledge. This verse also speaks of destruction of all *karmaphalas* - the results of actions - pertaining to the individual. Further, *samādhi* itself is a blessing producing pure *puṇya*.

The beginningless *avidyā* gives rise to the beginningless *jīva*, who perpetually acts in endless births through which it migrates and earns countless *karmaphalas* of both the types. The word "*koṭayaḥ*" - crores - is to be taken as countless and not literally. All the *pāpas* and the *puṇyas* standing to the credit of *jīva* who has attained *samādhi* get destroyed.

Here a doubt can be raised. The *Gītā* (4-37) declares "fire of knowledge reduces all action to ashes". So is also the statement of *Muṇḍaka śruti* (2-2-8) - "when the knowledge of Brahman is gained one's all actions get destroyed". Thus it is *aparokṣa jñāna* - self-knowledge - that destroys the *karmaphalas* and not *samādhi*. Then why is it said here that *samādhi* destroys them? Yes, it is true that self-knowledge alone can destroy entire *karmaphalas*. However the *samādhi* that is discussed here is nothing but the total absorption of mind in the very same knowledge to the exclusion of all other *vṛttis*. Hence it is but natural to say that *samādhi* destroys all of them.

The *karmaphalas* can basically belong neither to *ātmā* nor to the inert embodiment. They belong to the impostor, viz. *ahaṁkāra* - the "I" notion. In the wake of the knowledge, this notional "I" does not persist and there is no one to whom all *karmaphalas* can be attached. Thus a *jñāni* becomes totally free from all these, as his or her "I" is now centred in *ātmā* only, in contrast to the earlier notion of the ignorant state. Yet, because a *jñāni* seems to undergo various types of experiences which should have an accountable cause, so to satisfy the cause hunting mind which is unable to appreciate the state of a *jñāni*, *śruti* accepts *prārabdha karma* for such a person.

Samādhi also produces pure *puṇya* (*śuddha dharma*). This statement may appear to be contradictory to what has been told earlier in this verse. If *samādhi* wipes out one's all *karmaphalas*, how can it generate any more *puṇya*? The answer is centred around the adjective "*śuddha*" - pure - which qualifies *puṇya*. It is not the binding *puṇya* earned by *ahaṁkāra*, but the very sacredness that Brahman or its appreciation represents. In fact it is a blessing that others can earn if they know how to tap it from a *jñāni*. That is why *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* (3-1-10) recommends that the one, desirous of prosperity should adore *ātmajñāna* - a knower of self. Even the *samādhi* without self-

knowledge does generate such *punya*.

CONTRAST WITH *PĀTAÑJALA YOGA SAMĀDHI*

Vidyāranya Muni in his another *prakaraṇa* treatise called *Jīvanmuktiviveka*, draws the contrast between *samādhi* according to *Pātañjalayogasūtras* and the *samādhi* following *nididhyāsana* which can be practised only after self-knowledge. In *yogaśāstras*, *samādhi* is defined as - "*yogastu cittavṛttinirodhaḥ*" - *samādhi* (*yoga*) is the absorption or cessation of *vṛttis* in the *antaḥkaraṇa* (*yogasūtra* 1-2). In the entire *yogasūtras*, nowhere the self-knowledge is explicitly told. It only deals with the techniques that can treat one's mind and make it just absorbed free from *vṛttis*. This being so, the author remarks that though the one who has gained *samādhi* as per *yogaśāstra* can appreciate the *tvam pada* - you - as free from all *vṛttis*, to discover the identity of *tvam* and *tat* - Brahman - one should only resort to *mahāvākyas* unfolded in the *upaniṣads*. He also points out that just to appreciate the *tvam pada*, *yogasamādhi* cannot be claimed as the only means; even the *ātmanātmaviveka* as detailed in Vedānta is quite effective. This should be clear from the inquiry conducted in this chapter. The *yogasamādhi* of its own lacks the knowledge of identity of *jīva* and Brahman. That is why *yogasamādhi* is called *andha* (blind) or *jada* (inert) *samādhi* in nature. Of course the persons who can accomplish this *samādhi* certainly have a ready frame of mind. If only they take to inquiry into *mahāvākyas* with an open mind and right attitude, it should be easy for them to discover one's real nature to be identical with Brahman. Otherwise, self-ignorance still being present, *mokṣa* is not possible, in spite of accomplishing a covetable state of absorption of mind.

The praise of *samādhi* is continued in the next verse.

धर्ममेघमिमं प्राहुः समाधिं योगवित्तमाः ।

वर्षत्येष यतो धर्मामृतधाराः सहस्रशः ॥६०॥

dharmameghamimaṃ prāhuḥ samādhim yogavittamāḥ
varṣatyēṣa yato dharmāmṛtadhārāḥ sahasraśaḥ - (60)

यतः - because एषः - this (*samādhi*) धर्मामृतधाराः - showers of nectar in the form of *punya* सहस्रशः - by thousands वर्षति - pours forth (ततः - therefore) योगवित्तमाः - the experts in *yoga* इमं - this (*samādhi*) धर्ममेघं - a cloud of *punya* प्राहुः - call. - (60)

60. The experts in *yoga* call this *samādhi* a cloud of *puṇya* because it pours forth countless showers of nectar in the form of *puṇya*.

Yogavittamāḥ are those who know *yoga* thoroughly or have accomplished its final purpose. Thus it refers to *jñānis* who have discovered the identity between *jīva* and Brahman. The abidance of the mind in the self-knowledge, even for a moment produces enormous *puṇya* and so to equate such *samādhi* to a cloud of *puṇya* is quite appropriate.

The following two passages can give us an idea of the immense *puṇya* that accrues from *samādhi*:

“He whose mind has been fixed even for a moment in reflection of Brahman, has bathed in the holy waters of all sacred rivers; has gifted the entire earth; has performed thousands of sacrifices; has worshipped all the deities; his ancestors have been lifted from *saṃsāra*; and he himself deserves the worship by the three worlds”.

“The one whose mind is absorbed in the limitless ocean of *saccidānanda* Brahman, his lineage is sanctified, his mother has attained her fulfilment and the earth becomes meritorious by him”. (*Sūtasamhitā* 2-20-45).

The specific purpose envisaged by *samādhi* is mentioned in the next two verses.

अमुना वासनाजाले निःशेषं प्रविलापिते ।
समूलोन्मूलिते पुण्यपापाख्ये कर्मसंचये ॥६१॥

वाक्यमप्रतिबद्धं सत्प्राक्परोक्षावभासिते ।
करामलकवद्बोधमपरोक्षं प्रसूयते ॥६२॥

amunā vāsanājāle niṣṣeṣaṃ pravilāpīte
samūlonmūlīte puṇyapāpākhye karmasaṅcaye - (61)

vākyamapratibaddhaṃ satprākparokṣāvabhāsīte
karāmalakavadbodhamaparoṣaṃ prasūyate - (62)

अमुना - by this (*samādhi*) वासनाजाले - the web of *vāsanās* निःशेषं - without remainder प्रविलापिते (सति) - when destroyed पुण्यपापाख्ये - called *puṇya* and *pāpa* कर्मसंचये - the accumulations of results of

actions समुलोन्मूलिते (सति) - when destroyed with their roots. - (61)

वाक्यं - the *mahāvākya* अप्रतिबद्धम् सत् - being unobstructed प्राक् - previously परोक्षावभासिते (तत्त्वे) - in the place of the principle indirectly revealed करामलकवत् - like the fruit of the Embblue myrobalan placed on the palm अपरोक्षं - direct बोधं - knowledge प्रसूयते - produces. - (62)

61-62. When the web of *vāsanās* is totally destroyed (and) when the accumulated results of action, called *puṇya* and *pāpa* are annihilated with their roots, the *mahāvākya* unobstructed, produces direct knowledge like the fruit of the Emblic myrobalan placed on the palm, instead of the previous indirect cognition of the principle.

As mentioned earlier in the context of verse 53, these two verses and some more are verbatim incorporated by the author from *Adhyātmopaniṣad* belonging to *Śuklayajurveda*. This shows that he has quoted the *śruti* and he has not added anything from his own speculation or understanding. Verses 53 to 62 (except 57 and 58), also closely resemble in content the fourth and fifth mantras of the third chapter from *Pañgalopaniṣad* belonging to the same *Śuklayajurveda*. This *upaniṣad* contains the teaching by the celebrated sage Yājñavalkya to Pañgala. Immediately after the above cited portion in *Adhyātmopaniṣad* (which is reproduced here in Pañcadaśī), the narration of the ultimate limit of *vairāgya* (dispassion), *bodha* (self-knowledge) and *uparati* (absorption of mind) is given. It is followed by a detailed description of a *jīvanmukta* - one who is liberated from bondage of *saṃsāra* even during life. *Pañgalopaniṣad* also speaks of *jīvanmukti* - liberation even while living - for the one who has accomplished what is specified in verses 61 and 62. Bearing this in mind, for understanding the exact import of these two verses a thorough investigation with an open mind into the following facets, is indispensable lest we should come to wrong conclusions.

SEVEN QUERIES TO ANALYSE VERSES 61 AND 62

The pertinent queries needing proper clarification are -

- (1) What is the distinction between *parokṣa* and *aparokṣa jñāna*?
What is the status of experience vs. knowledge?
- (2) What is the different *prakriyā*- the mode and recommendation of these means - and where is its origin?
- (3) What are *vāsanās*?

- (4) What is meant by their *kṣaya* - destruction?
- (5) What is *manonāśa* - destruction of mind?
- (6) What is *jīvanmukti* and who is a *jīvanmukta* as described in the various *upaniṣads*?
- (7) What is the contrast between *jīvanmukti* and *videhamukti* - bodiless liberation?

ANSWERS

The clarifications are:

1. DISTINCTION BETWEEN *PAROKṢA* AND *APAROKṢA JÑĀNA*

In Vedānta *parokṣa jñāna* refers to indirect knowledge regarding the real nature of oneself as related to Brahman. A *mumukṣu* being endowed with *śraddhā*, may have some information or understanding about *ātmā*, Brahman and their oneness based on the *upaniṣads* and the teaching. But it lacks direct personal discovery that Brahman is verily, "my real nature". The correct appreciation of *ātmā* and Brahman without any doubts or vagueness, is called *aparokṣa jñāna*. It invariably needs a mind that is *suddha* - pure - and *niṣcala* - steady. Otherwise the knowledge remains only *parokṣa* and not *aparokṣa*. For this very reason even at the risk of repetition Vedānta emphasises the indispensability of a ready mind. The very nature of Brahman or *ātmā* calls for a prepared mind for gaining direct knowledge.

The nature of human mind in contrast to that of Brahman is such that this preliminary becomes a must. In the state of ignorance of oneself, one identifies oneself with the embodiment at gross, subtle or causal level. Prompted by desires and the consequent preoccupations in actions, the mind of such a person always remains full of continuous stream of different *vṛttis* of *dṛśyas* - known - both gross and subtle. On the other hand, our real nature - Brahman - as revealed by *śruti*, is totally free from all *dṛśyas* - gross, subtle or causal. For instance *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad* (*mantra* - 7) ascertains the nature of *turiya ātmā* as *prapañcōpaśama* - totally free from entire *dṛśya jagat* - by negating both the *sthānas* - the three states (waking, dream and sleep) of experiences - and the *sthānis* - waker, dreamer and sleeper - along with all their *dharma*s - characteristics. Thus *avidyā* - ignorance - and its entire *kārya* - effect, the *jagat* - are negated. In other words Brahman is also *prapañcōpaśama* totally free from *dṛśyas*. A person who has *suddha antaḥkaraṇa* with steadiness can certainly command a mind that is free from *dṛśyas*, and thereby be in a position to appreciate Brahman in its true nature, which is totally free from

prapañca. Because of this possibility, the word "*prapañcopaśamam*" in the *Māṇḍūkya śruti* should be taken only in its direct meaning, and not secondarily.

We can also consider the word "*akalaḥ*" - the one who is free from *kalās* (*drśyas*) - appearing in *Praśnopaniṣad* (6-3). That word describes a person who has discovered oneself to be *Puruṣa* (Brahman). *Praśnopaniṣad* also presents *Puruṣa* as the one wherein all *kalās* are dissolved, giving up their names and forms totally, just as the rivers merge in ocean giving up their names and forms but what remains is their real nature (water) called ocean only. Many other *śruti* quotations can be cited to this effect. To appreciate Brahman in *aparokṣa* (as verily me) sense based on the *pramāṇa* of *upaniṣad*, the mind should necessarily free itself from entire *drśyas*. If this is not done, the mind will ascribe its vagaries related to *drśyas*, to Brahman. That kind of knowledge cannot be true to the nature of Brahman.

As stated earlier, a *śuddha antaḥkaraṇa* - pure mind - with *naiścalya* - steadiness - alone can enjoy that disposition which is free from *drśyas*. The *akhaṇḍākāra vṛtti* which reveals Brahman, necessarily presupposes, for the reason already seen, *drśyavilaya* - cessation of *drśya* - except the particular *vṛtti* itself in the beginning. After repeated *nididhyāsana* or *jñānābhyāsa* for a sufficiently long period of time, even this *vṛtti* gets eliminated as seen previously in the illustration of *kataka* nut powder in the context of verse 56. From the foregoing analysis it should be clear that the mind which is not pure and hence not ready, cannot gain *aparokṣa jñāna* and stops at *parokṣa jñāna* which does not give a clear appreciation of the true nature of Brahman.

Here one may object to the very necessity of *drśyavilaya* in *aparokṣa jñāna* on the grounds that *drśyavilaya* is not liberation, and that all *drśyas*, being false (*mithyā*), cannot alter the real nature of *ātmā*. Then why be afraid of these *drśyas* and strive to eliminate them?

The arguer should be asked the following questions:

- i) Do you say that *drśyavilaya* itself cannot be liberation, or do you deny the role of *drśyavilaya* in developing a ready mind which is indispensable for *aparokṣa jñāna*?
- ii) If mind is unable to dismiss the *drśyas*, how can it directly appreciate *ātmā* in its true nature as *prapañcopaśama* or free from all *drśyas*? In the absence of such *aparokṣa jñāna*, on what basis do you ascertain the false nature (*mithyātva*) of *drśyas*?

It is true that mere *drśyavilaya* for any length of time, without the

destruction of ignorance cannot confer liberation. Otherwise sleep wherein *drśyas* are not experienced should be able to liberate one and all! Sureśvarācārya in *Bṛhadāraṇyaka vārtika* (1-4-10-1536, 37) asks - "During the dissolution of entire creation, there was total extinction of *drśyas*. If that were not enough to give *mukti*, how can that, practised for some days, suffice for liberation?" Thus in the absence of destruction of ignorance, it is impossible to gain liberation just by *drśyavilaya*. But this fact cannot be a valid reason to deny its role in developing the readiness of mind in gaining *aparokṣa jñāna*.

The mind which is unable to command a disposition free from *drśyas* will not be able to discover *ātmā* to be *prapañcopaśama* - free from *saṃsāra* presented in the form of *drśyas* - because *ātmā* as free from *drśyas*, is never available for our appreciation, otherwise. In sleep, though the *drśyas* are absent, one is not even conscious of one's existence at that time, and so where is the question of the cognition that *ātmā* is free from *drśyas*? But the cause of *drśyas*, viz. ignorance, persists in sleep, and hence *ātmā* as distinct from ignorance cannot be appreciated in that state. Therefore the recollection that *drśyas* were absent in sleep cannot help us directly in this regard. Ācārya Śaṅkara in his commentary on *Praśnopaniṣad* (6-2), brings to our notice that the sixteen *kalās*, i.e. the entire manifest *drśyas*, are always cognised to be inseparable from *caitanya* - *ātmā* - when they are born and during their existence as well as destruction. He also points out that this is the cause which has given rise to different notions about the nature of *ātmā*. Because of all these reasons, only the ready mind as described above, where ignorance and the consequent wrong notions about *ātmā* have been destroyed by inquiry through the *pramāṇa* of *śruti*, can hope to gain *aparokṣa jñāna*. Otherwise, it is not possible to ascertain the real nature of *ātmā*. Without direct appreciation of *ātmā* in its true nature, mere acceptance that *ātmā* is free from *drśyas* or *saṃsāra* because *śruti* says so, is at best *parokṣa jñāna*, but never *aparokṣa jñāna*.

The false nature of *drśyas* can be ascertained, provided its basis is known beyond any trace of doubt, just as, in the case of a superimposed snake, it is known to be false only when its basis, the rope, is very clearly appreciated. Negation of false is impossible without ascertainment of its real basis. Brahman is the basis for the entire falsely projected creation as *drśyas*, and so naturally, the basis is free from all that is superimposed on it. Without the *aparokṣa jñāna*, i.e. appreciation of Brahman - *ātmā* - the basis, in its true nature, - to label the *drśyas* as false is similar to taking the superimposed snake to be false without discovering the rope as its basis. In the absence of a

ready mind, being unable to gain *aparokṣa jñāna*, one cannot ascertain the false nature of *dṛśyas*. Whatever *śruti* may claim or however much the *ācārya* may repeat the teaching that *dṛśyas* are false, the notion that they are real cannot be eliminated. The problem is in mistaking the *dṛśyas* real though they do not affect *ātmā*. The fear on account of *mithyā dṛśyas* can end only in the appreciation of *satyam*, the *ātmā*. There is no other way to remain unaffected by them forever. To summarise, the *dṛśyavilaya* is accepted as a means to the end of gaining self-knowledge, and not an end in itself without self-knowledge.

EXPERIENCE vs. KNOWLEDGE

This also explains the cause of the general complaint by many, after some exposure to Vedānta, that they know *ātmā*, but still lack its experience. Such problems stem forth from the lack of proper understanding of the nature of the words "knowledge" and "experience" in general and "*parokṣa*" and "*aparokṣa jñāna*" in particular.

Yathārthajñāna - knowledge true to the nature of a given thing - should be in total conformity with its object because it is determined by the thing. Otherwise it cannot be called so, though some content of information about the object may be there. Or it can be even an erroneous one. The same norm applies to experience too. *Yathārthānubhava* - experience true to the nature of a given thing - positively must be in total conformity with the true nature of the thing without wanting anything or any distortion. Thus *yathārthajñāna* must necessarily be *yathārthānubhava* and vice versa. But, an experience which is not *yathārtha* - true to its object - cannot be knowledge in the true sense. Similarly any knowledge which is not *yathārtha* cannot be the experience true to the nature of its object. Generally the words "knowledge" and "experience" are used only in the sense of *yathārtha* - true to the nature of their objects. Yet, at times these words may not be so true due to some deficiencies. There is no definite rule that the word "knowledge" is used invariably in the sense of *yathārtha*, whereas the word "experience" is used only when it is not true to its object, or the other way round. What is important is to stress the necessity of both being *yathārtha*, rather than obstinately sticking to one of these two words at the cost of tabooing the other either without thorough investigation or with some prejudices.

To clarify, the following are the usages of the words "knowledge" and "experience" in the context of Vedānta, by none other than Lord

Kṛṣṇa and *Bhāṣyakāra Ācārya Śaṅkara*, which should prove the validity of what is said so far.

(1) Because the word "*jñāna*" - knowledge - can also mean *parokṣa jñāna* or mere scholarship gained through the study of *śāstras* - scriptures - Lord Kṛṣṇa supplements it with "*viññāna*". On that *Ācārya Śaṅkara* comments that "*jñāna*" is the complete understanding of what is told in the *śāstra*, whereas *viññāna* is what is known through *śāstras* being subjected to one's own experience - *svānubhavakaraṇam* (*Bhagavadgītā*, 6-8).

(2) "*Yogi*" - the one whose mind is absorbed in one's own real nature - is superior to *jñāni* - a person of wisdom (*Bhagavadgītā*, 6-46). Here "*jñāna*" according to the commentary means *śāstrārthapāṇḍityam* - scriptural scholarship. Therefore the word "*jñānam*" is used in the sense that it is short of *aparokṣa jñānam*.

(3) In *Bhagavadgītā* (7-2), the words "*jñānam*" and "*savijñānam*" - with *viññānam* - are used together, for the same reason explained in points (1) and (2). *Ācārya Śaṅkara* explains these two words as scriptural knowledge endowed with one's own experience (*svānubhavaśanyuktam*).

(4) *Śaṅkarācārya* freely uses the word "*anubhava*" on a par with knowledge verily in the *yathārtha* sense, while commenting on the *Brahmasūtra* (4-1-2), in the phrases like *Brahmātmavamanubhavitum* - to experience *ātmā* as Brahman; *ātmānubhavaḥ* - experience of *ātmā*, etc.

The above discussion should explain clearly why *aparokṣa jñāna* and *aparokṣānubhava* or *anubhūti* are identical. *Ātmā* is certainly *anubhavasvarūpa* - the one whose nature itself is experience - and so is self-evident. Yet, in the state of ignorance due to superimposition of *anātmā* on *ātmā*, it appears as if one is a *samsārī*, because what is experienced as "I am", is not true to one's own real nature. For the same reason, viz. that *ātmā* is *anubhavasvarūpa*, *aparokṣa jñāna* of *ātmā* must necessarily be *aparokṣānubhava* - experience true to one's own real nature. If it is not so when the knowledge takes place, we can certainly conclude that the so claimed *jñāna* is still *parokṣa* in its nature.

In light of this it should be clear that those who complain of having knowledge, but no experience of *ātmā*, actually mean that they have no *aparokṣa jñāna* in spite of their having *parokṣa jñāna* to some extent. Here the ready frame of mind necessary for *aparokṣa jñāna* is obviously lacking in them. So the remedy is to undertake measures for accomplishing such mind. Having accomplished it, the further

exposure to Vedānta must necessarily result in *aparokṣa jñāna*. Statements like "to gain a ready mind is very difficult", should not be accepted as an excuse for not gaining *aparokṣa jñāna*. Though difficult, it is not impossible. The mind can certainly be disciplined by *abhyāsa* - repetition of required means, *vicāra* - proper inquiry, and *vairāgya* - dispassion. Not knowing this, many engage themselves in irrelevant pursuits. Not accepting their own deficiencies, they finally even accuse Vedānta for their own failure. Hence in Vedānta it is imperative that one should know what, when, how and why of the means involved.

2. A DIFFERENT *PRAKRIYĀ* IN PREPARATION OF MIND, AND ITS ORIGIN

In gaining liberation (*mukti*), considering the indispensability of a pure and steady mind (*śuddha* and *niścala antahkaraṇa*), the *śruti* does provide the means of accomplishing it. This was discussed previously under the roles of *karma*, *upāsana* and self-knowledge in destroying respectively the three defects - *mala*, *vikṣepa* and *āvaraṇa* - belonging to mind. Our scriptures also elaborate another *prakriyā*, using altogether different terminologies, to get rid of the first two defects, viz. *mala* and *vikṣepa*, the result being the same. Thus we find the readiness of mind to be accomplished through the means of *vāsanākṣaya* and *manonāśa* to gain *bodha* (self-knowledge) which alone confers liberation. While the role of *bodha* is always the same, the means of *vāsanākṣaya* and *manonāśa* are to prepare the mind prior to the acquisition of self-knowledge and thereafter as an aid to effective *nididhyāsana* leading to *jīvanmukti* as envisaged by *śruti*.

Generally the *prakriyā* of *vāsanākṣaya* and *manonāśa* is believed to have its origin in the voluminous text *Yogavāsiṣṭha* which contains the teaching of sage Vasiṣṭha to Lord Rāma. This may appear to be so due to the ready availability of this text in the past days when others were unavailable in the absence of printing technology, and because of its popularity during a particular period. Actually this *prakriyā* is found in various *upaniṣads* from where many excerpts have been incorporated into the body of the teaching of *Yogavāsiṣṭha*. These *upaniṣads* are: *Adhyātma*, *Paingala* and *Muktika Upaniṣads*, from *Śuklayajurveda*; *Varāhopaniṣad* from *Kṛṣṇayajurveda*; *Annapūrṇopaniṣad* from *Atharvaṇaveda*; *Mahopaniṣad* and *Sannyāsopaniṣad* from *Sāmaveda*; and *Nādabindūpaniṣad* from *Rgveda*.

3. *VĀSANĀ*

It is necessary to understand the nature of *vāsanā* first. From

different standpoints it is defined variously as given below.

1) दृढभावनया त्यक्तपूर्वापरविचारणम् यदादानं पदार्थस्य वासना सा प्रकीर्तिता ।

"That acceptance or taking hold (*ādānam*) of a thing without investigation into (its) prior and subsequent nature, by the conviction (that all sense objects are real), is said to be *vāsanā*." (*Annapūrṇopaniṣad* 4-46 and *Muktikopaniṣad* 2-57)

The investigation referred to here is about the seeming existence of the objects during the realm of self-ignorance, and their existence getting falsified in the wake of knowledge when everything is discovered to be Brahman alone.

2) "Sages know it to be *vāsanā* which gets manifested in the form of notion that objects really exist according to their different forms and which results as volition in the mind either to procure or abandon them." (*Muktikopaniṣad* 2-24)

3) "*Vāsanāḥ dharmādharṃarūpāḥ jīvagatasamskārāḥ - vāsanā*s are latent impressions in the mind belonging to *jīva* which are the features of *puṇya* and *pāpa*." (*Jīvanmuktiviveka*, chapter 1).

4) "*Vāsanā* is the latent impression in the mind which is the cause of anger, fear, desire etc. that are born suddenly with force without any preceding and following consideration." (*Jīvanmuktiviveka*, chapter 1).

*Vāsanā*s are of two types, one of them having further sub-divisions. The following passages describe them clearly:

"*Vāsanā*s are said to be of two types, *suddha*- pure - and *malina* - impure. The impure *vāsanā* is the cause of rebirth whereas the pure one destroys the transmigration. It is said by the wise people that *malina vāsanā* is of the form of total ignorance, covering the distinction between *ātmā* and the body, endowed with impenetrable *ahamkāra* giving rise to series of wrong notions and is the cause of rebirth. Having given up the sprout of rebirth, the *suddha vāsanā* remains like a roasted seed." (*Muktikopaniṣad* 2-61 to 63).

"The pure *vāsanā* is endowed with self-knowledge. Just as impure *vāsanā*s like *ahamkāra*, mineness, desire, anger etc. are born without the advice of anyone due to intent preoccupation in

them in many past lives, so also in the case of a person who has now discovered self-knowledge by one's own efforts and has repeatedly taken to *nididhyāsana* with due success, the knowledge of ultimate reality gets spontaneously revealed. The activities endowed with the inherence of such knowledge form pure *vāsanā* which is useful for sustaining *jñāni*'s body." (*Jīvanmuktiviveka*, chapter 2).

Malina vāsanā which obstructs the acquisition of *aparokṣa jñāna* is of three types.

"Due to *lokavāsanā*, *śāstravāsanā* and *dehavāsanā* of human beings, the knowledge conformable to truth does not take place." (*Muktikopaniṣad* 2-2).

i) *Lokavāsanā*.

The perseverance by a person that he would always conduct himself in such a way that not only do all people not censure him, but on the contrary praise him, is called *lokavāsanā*. This is just impossible to attain and so is called impure. If even Lord Rāma and Mother Sītā who were the very embodiments of *dharma* could not escape slander of others, what to speak of others?

ii) *Śāstravāsanā*.

This again consists of three divisions. It is impure because it can induce vanity in the individual besides the defects that will be detailed below in each case.

a) *Pāṭhavyasanam* - mania for reciting the Vedas:

Sage Bharadvāja is cited as an example in this regard, who fully dedicated his three lives to the recitation and study of Vedas and being unable to complete, ventured to continue it in the fourth life also. Finally Indra having convinced him of the futility of such an attempt as an end in itself initiated the sage into *saguṇa upāsana*. *Pāṭhavyasanam* is impure because it is impossible to accomplish completely.

b) *Śāstravyasanam* - mania for study of scriptures other than Vedānta:

Sage Durvāsa is described as the one who had such a habit. Carrying a huge load of books, once he went to Lord Śiva to offer salutations. Sage Nārada compared him to a donkey carrying the load. Enraged by such derisive remark, Durvāsa threw the books in the ocean. Lord Śiva took pity on him and imparted self-knowledge. This

craze is impure because it cannot confer the highest *puruṣārtha*.

c) *Anuṣṭhānavyasanam* - mania for performance of rituals:

We find the example in *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* of a person Nidāgha by name, who did not give up his blind adherence to ritual for a long time in spite of his *guru's* advice to the contrary. The instance of another person by name Dāsūra is also cited who could not find a pure place on earth for the performance of rituals due to blind *śradhā*. *Anuṣṭhānavyasanam* is also impure as it is the cause of rebirth.

Though recitation and study of Vedas, study of scriptures and performance of rituals have an indirect role in gaining self-knowledge, they become positive obstructions, the moment they by themselves assume the dimension of a goal.

iii) *Dehavāsanā*.

This is of three types:

a) *Ātmatvabhrāntiḥ* - wrong notion that physical body which appears to be sentient is "me":

This notion is said to be impure because it is totally false, being opposed to valid means of knowledge, and is also the cause of all our sorrows.

b) *Guṇādhānabhrāntiḥ* - delusion of infusing merits into oneself:

It can be *laukika* - worldly, like acquiring good voice, beautification etc. - or *śāstrīya* - scriptural, like dip in the holy waters, going to pilgrimage etc. *Laukika guṇādhāna* is impossible to accomplish totally, whereas a given *śāstrīya guṇādhāna* gets overruled by another stronger mandate of scripture; and so there is no end to these if they by themselves constitute the goal. Thus they become *malina* - impure.

c) *Doṣāpanayanabhrāntiḥ* - delusion of eliminating the defects:

This also can be *laukika* like subjecting the body to various therapies even for insignificant deficiencies, and *śāstrīya* like repeated baths and *ācāmanam* - sipping water before religious ceremonies - without any sense of proportion. This *vāsanā* is also impure because the body is a storehouse of varieties of filth and disease and to make it totally free from all the defects is an impossible task.

At times these three types of *vāsanās* are also called *mānasavāsanās*. These also include demoniac qualities like *damḃha* - religious hypocrisy, *darpa* - haughtiness - etc. called *viṣayavāsanās*. Besides these, the

latent impressions that are born in the mind while entertaining the desires for sense objects, and indulgence in them are also called *mānasavāsanā* and *viśayavāsanā* respectively. Even these are put in the category of *malina vāsanā*. A discriminative person should give up all these because they are opposed to both the acquisition of self-knowledge by *mumukṣus*, and in the case of *jñānis*, firm abidance in it.

4. VĀSANĀKṢAYA

The means of destroying *malina vāsanās* is to develop *vāsanā* opposite to them called *daivavāsanā*, through *sādhana* *catuṣṭaya sampat*, *daivī sampat* and *amānitvam* etc. - the twenty values as described in the thirteenth chapter of *Bhagavadgītā* - which are essential to gain self-knowledge. Vidyāranya Muni in his *Jīvanmuktiviveka* (Chapter 2) points out that passages like "*Śānto dānta uparataḥ.....*" from *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* (4-4-23) reveal *daivavāsanā* as the means to gain self-knowledge. In other words, mastery over the senses and mind, withdrawal from actions with due maturity of understanding the final goal in life, and means to attain it, etc. which in fact constitute the *sādhana* *catuṣṭaya sampat*, are the means to develop *vāsanās* opposed to the *malina* variety.

Consider the following description for a better understanding of *vāsanākṣaya*:

"The impure *vāsanā* is said to be destroyed when in the presence of even external favourable conditions, it is impotent in manifesting its adverse results like anger, desire, greed etc., due to well rooted opposite *vāsanā* like *śānti*, *dānti* born of discrimination." (*Jīvanmuktiviveka*, chapter 2).

Vāsanākṣaya and *manonāśa* are mutually dependent and both of them become thorough only in *bodha*. For example, *Varāhopaniṣad* (2-70) declares that *vāsanās* get extinct in the wake of the knowledge of non-dual principle.

5. MANONĀŚA

Manonāśa - destruction of mind - is a state of mind wherein it is made to withdraw by deliberate conscious efforts, from all its usual mentations, enabling the mind to apply itself in the pursuit of gaining self-knowledge and firm abidance in it. It is neither stupefaction nor stupor caused by drugs, alcohol etc. The one who has accomplished *manonāśa* is able to command that state of mind which is totally peaceful and can apply it to a chosen preoccupation with single

pointedness recommended by the *śāstras*. Though successful *vāsanākṣaya* invariably leads to *manonāśa*, its independent practice is advised because it preserves *vāsanākṣaya* in turn. *Aṣṭāṅga yoga* is considered as the main means for *manonāśa* independently. It can also be accomplished by *upāsanās* and by intense devotion to *Īśvara*. *Dr̥ṣyavilaya* is synonymous to *manonāśa*. It can be thorough only with the help of *bodha* and *vāsanākṣaya*.

MUTUAL DEPENDENCE OF *VĀSANĀKṢAYA*, *MANONĀŚA* AND *BODHA*

These three are mutually dependent on one another. While *vāsanākṣaya* and *manonāśa* serve as the means to acquire *bodha*, the latter validates the former two. The role and interdependence of all these three become clear from the following *śruti* statements:

"So long as the mind is not extinct the destruction of *vāsanās* is not possible. So long as *vāsanās* are not destroyed, the mind does not become calm. So long as self-knowledge is not gained, how is it possible to have the tranquility of mind? So long as pacification of mind is not there, self-knowledge cannot take place. So long as *vāsanās* are not destroyed, how can self-knowledge take place? So long as self-knowledge is not gained, destruction of *vāsanās* is not possible. Thus self-knowledge, destruction of mind and *vāsanās*, having become the mutual cause of others, are difficult to accomplish. Therefore having given up the desire for sense indulgence from far, take to these three." (*Annappūrnopaniṣad*, 4-78 to 82).

"Oh, intelligent one, *vāsanākṣaya*, self-knowledge (*vijñāna*) and *manonāśa* simultaneously taken to for a long period of time are considered to yield the result". (*Muktikopaniṣad*, 2-10, *Annappūrnopaniṣad*, 4-83).

"So long as these three are not taken to simultaneously, the attainment of liberation is not possible even after hundreds of years. Even if these three are taken to individually for a long time independent of the other two, they do not yield the results." (*Muktikopaniṣad*, 2-11 and 12).

In this case, the knowledge individually taken, obviously refers to *parokṣa jñāna*.

"By these three which are taken to repeatedly for a long period of time, the deeply rooted knots of heart (i.e. *avidyā*, *kāma*, *karma*) get snapped totally like the ropes by cutting their fibres."

(*Annapūrṇopaniṣad*, 4-84, *Muktikopaniṣad*, 2-13).

The reason as to why does the *śruti* advise that these three means should be taken to simultaneously and not individually, should be clearly understood. Even if a *mumukṣu* accomplishes *vāsanākṣaya* and *manonāśa*, due to the persistence of ignorance of oneself, liberation cannot be gained, which is conferred only by self-knowledge, being opposite to ignorance, the root cause of *saṃsāra*. For example an *upāsaka* of *saguṇa Brahma* accomplishes the *vāsanākṣaya* and *manonāśa* to a high degree and yet cannot gain liberation because the ignorance and its product, the locus of subtle body with *karmaphalas*, are intact to produce future births.

One may then think that self-knowledge without the accomplishment of *vāsanākṣaya* and *manonāśa* should be able to liberate us. Though self-knowledge certainly liberates, in this case, because of the absence of *vāsanākṣaya* and *manonāśa*, the individual lacks a ready frame of mind without which the knowledge that is gained can at best be only *parokṣa* and not *aparokṣa*, as already reasoned out earlier. *Śruti* is never ambiguous while declaring that *mokṣa* is next to impossible without *aparokṣa jñāna*. Any number of quotations can be cited to substantiate it. Quoted below is a passage from one of the *upaniṣads* which speak of this *prakriyā* of *vāsanākṣaya* etc.

"It is said that the *kaivalyamukti* - bodiless liberation (also called *videhamukti*) - of all, is gained by self-knowledge alone and not by action (*karma*), mere inquiry without knowledge (*sāṅkhya*), *yoga*, *upāsana* etc., thus ends (the first chapter of) *upaniṣad*". (*Muktikopaniṣad*, 1-7).

An objection may be raised by pointing out a few *śruti* statements which mention that *vāsanākṣaya* alone is *mokṣa* or *manonāśa* alone is *mokṣa*. It is true that there are such statements in some *upaniṣads* which speak of this *prakriyā*. But these statements are not to be taken literally, because they are totally opposed to what is said otherwise in the very same *upaniṣads*. Such statements are contradictory to the unequivocal declarations of all *upaniṣads* that knowledge alone can confer liberation, because bondage is nothing but the effect of ignorance. *Vāsanākṣaya* or *manonāśa* by themselves cannot be even perfected without self-knowledge, leave alone their being able to achieve destruction of ignorance, which is indispensable for *mokṣa*. Further, *śruti* at many places speaks of self-knowledge as the cause of *vāsanākṣaya* and *manonāśa* also. For example consider the following statements which are cited by Vidyāraṇya in

Jīvanmuktiviveka (Chapter 2) to reveal the destruction of *vāsanās* by self-knowledge:

"Having ascertained *ātmā*, all fetters (*pāśas*) get destroyed." (*Śvetāśvataropaniṣad*, 1-1-11).

"Having known *ātmā* by *adhyātmayoga*, the discriminative person abandons joy and sorrow." (*Kaṭhopaniṣad*, 1-1-12).

"*Ātmajñāni* crosses over the sorrow." (*Chāndogyopaniṣad*, 7-1-3).

"When self-knowledge is gained or in *ātmā*, what delusion or sorrow is there for the one who appreciates all beings to be one and the same *ātmā*?" (*Īśāvāsyopaniṣad* - 7).

Having discovered *ātmā*, one gets freed from all fetters." (*Śvetāśvataropaniṣad*, 1-1-8).

Solong as one is in the firm grip of *vāsanās* the destruction of fetters and sorrows is not possible and so we can understand the statement that self-knowledge destroys *vāsanās*.

As for self-knowledge as the cause of *manonāśa*, here is a quotation from *śruti*:

"When to the knower of Brahman, in self-knowledge, everything has become the self, what can one smell and through what, what can one see and through what, etc." (*Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, 2-4-14).

It is well known that so long as mind is there, depending on its state, the particular knowledge of names and forms is present due to ignorance either in manifest form or unmanifest condition of mind. The above mantra shows that when ignorance is destroyed by knowledge of Brahman, there is nothing left other than *ātmā*. *Ācārya Śaṅkara* explains in his commentary that there is absence of anything other than *ātmā* when *avidyā* is destroyed by *Brahmavidyā*, because all names and forms are dissolved (*praviḷāpitam*) in *ātmā*. In this state of knowledge, there is no perception or action in the absence of senses and the perceiver or doer. That means the mind is not projecting the *jagat* of names and forms. This shows that there is *manonāśa* or *dṛśyavilaya* in the wake of *aparokṣa jñāna* of *ātmā*. The above *śruti* passage is not a direct instance of the description of *bādhā* - sublation - of names and forms, though the one who has gained this knowledge can certainly ascertain the falsehood of *jagat*.

The context of the above mantra also signifies that *bādhā* is not the

topic. Yājñavalkya had taught to his wife Maitreyī that Brahman is *vijñānaghana* - pure knowledge principle without anything other than it. The word "*ghana*" speaks of the presence of only a given thing to the total exclusion of anything other than it. At the same time he also expressed that in Brahman there is no *saṃjñā-viśeṣa-jñāna*-knowledge of any particular thing. Not understanding the import of it, Maitreyī complains to Yājñavalkya that he has confused her by contradictory statements. According to her, one and the same thing cannot be both only knowledge and no particular knowledge simultaneously. Yājñavalkya clarifies in the first part of the above cited mantra, how in the state of ignorance, *viśeṣa-jñāna* - particular knowledge of false names and forms - is possible, and shows in the remaining part of the mantra, the absence of names and forms in self-knowledge.

Then what do these statements, like "*vāsanākṣaya* or *manonāśa* alone is *mokṣa*", mean? The answer is that they are in praise of the means to the end and not the end in themselves. It is a common practice in the world to name the means after the end it can help to achieve. Therefore both *vāsanākṣaya* and *manonāśa* which help in accomplishing a ready mind to gain the self-knowledge are extolled by naming them as *mokṣa*. It is like praising "*antaḥkaraṇa śuddhi* itself is *mokṣa*", in light of the fact that without it *aparokṣa-jñāna* is not possible. This does not indicate that knowledge is not required. It is not desirable to quote such statements out of context without referring to relevance of the other two related factors, when *śruti* has clearly specified the role of each of these three facets. A different meaning of such statements will be seen later.

The following description of the culmination of *vairāgya*, *bodha* and *uparati* (i.e. *manonāśa*) also reveals the role of *vāsanākṣaya*, *bodha* and *manonāśa* and what each of them can accomplish:

"The cessation of *vāsanā* is the state of perfect *vairāgya*. The finale of *bodha* - self-knowledge - is the absence of rise of *ahaṃkāra*. The limit of *uparati* or *manonāśa* is the absence of rising up of extinct *vṛtti*." (*Adhyātmopaniṣad*, 41-42).

This quotation shows that *vāsanākṣaya* is a state of perfection in *vairāgya* - dispassion - whereas *manonāśa* is meant to command a mind free from *vṛtti*; but these two on their own cannot destroy ignorance in the absence of knowledge. In contrast to this the finale of *bodha* which has destroyed ignorance and its effects is the absence of any further identification with the embodiment. Thus *vāsanākṣaya* and *manonāśa* can therefore serve only as means to the end, namely, self-knowledge, and not the end by themselves.

Incidentally these two mantras follow those eight of them in *Adhyātmopaniṣad*, which are, as already shown, identical with verses 53 to 62 (except 57 and 58) of the present text.

6. JĪVANMUKTI

In the light of what we have seen so far, the role of *vāsanākṣaya* and *manonāśa* as the means to self-knowledge should be over the moment one gets *aparokṣa jñāna*, and thereafter there should not be any need of developing the two, because knowledge continues to be there once it is gained. If this were true, is it not redundant and even wrong to ask the *jñāni* to continue the pursuit of these two? Yes, though it is redundant for *jñānis*, such pursuit gains relevance in the case of particular type of *mumukṣus*. Vidyāraṇya explains this context as follows, which needs to be understood clearly with an open mind, lest one should draw wrong conclusions:

"It is an accepted fact that in the state of *jīvanmukti* there is the continuity of self-knowledge, whereas *vāsanākṣaya* and *manonāśa* can be accomplished only by efforts. As for instance the *adhikāri* - person eligible for self-knowledge - is of two types: one who has accomplished *upāsanā* and the other who has not done so. Among these two, to the one who takes to the pursuit of self-knowledge only after taking to *upāsanā* up to its successful completion, because *vāsanākṣaya* and *manonāśa* are very firm, the *vidvatsannyāsa* - *sannyāsa* with the accomplishment of knowledge - and *jīvanmukti* get naturally accomplished after gaining knowledge. In fact in Vedānta *śāstra*, such person alone is considered as the main *adhikāri*. But, present day *mumukṣus* are mostly those who have not taken to such *upāsanā* and by mere enthusiasm, immediately take to the pursuit of knowledge. They do accomplish temporary *vāsanākṣaya* and *manonāśa* by which they are able to take to *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana*. By these three taken to intently, the ignorance, doubts and erroneous notions about oneself get destroyed and so self-knowledge is very well gained. Due to the absence of *pramāṇa* - means of knowledge - that can destroy the knowledge so born, and because there is no cause which can produce ignorance, the self-knowledge gained by even such persons can NEVER be shaken off. In contrast to this, both *vāsanākṣaya* and *manonāśa*, on account of lack of intense practice earlier, when obstructed repeatedly by *prārabdha karma* yielding its results, immediately get extinct like a lamp in a windy place." (*Jīvanmuktiviveka*, chapter 2).

This explanation can be understood properly, provided we know what is the nature of *jīvanmukti* as envisaged in the *upaniṣads* and how does it differ from *videhamukti*. It is commonly believed nowadays that the one who has gained *aparokṣa jñāna* is a *jīvanmukta* and so enjoys *jīvanmukti*. However, this belief is not strictly in accordance with the description of these terms given in various *upaniṣads*. From a careful study mainly of *Adhyātma*, *Muktika*, *Annapūrṇa*, *Mahat*, *Varāha* and *Pañigala Upaniṣads*, one can find that *jīvanmukta* is a person who, after having gained *aparokṣa jñāna*, has accomplished *nirvikalpa samādhi* with required stability, by successful *nididhyāsana* practised for sufficiently long periods, eliminating thereby even the least trace of *ahaṃkāra*-identification with body-and habitual errors. Consequently this person no longer needs the practice of *nididhyāsana* and the state of such a person is called *jīvanmukti*. If a person has not taken to intense *upāsana* earlier, then in the context of *jīvanmukti*, *vāsanākṣaya* and *manonāśa* assume importance even after gaining *aparokṣa jñāna*.

7. CONTRAST BETWEEN *JĪVANMUKTI* AND *VIDEHAMUKTI*

Do we then conclude that the one who has gained *aparokṣa jñāna*, but not *samādhi*, cannot get liberation? Certainly not, because *aparokṣa jñāna*, when gained, at the time verily confers *videhamukti*. *Jīvanmukti* which presupposes *samādhi* is not the cause of *videhamukti*, though a *jīvanmukta* definitely gets *videhamukti*. In *videhamukti* that is gained on death there is total freedom, even from the embodiment, and that is the abidance in one's own real nature, like pot space becoming one with total space when the pot is destroyed. Depending on how the word "*deha*" - body - in *videhamukti* - bodiless liberation - is viewed, there are two opinions as to when it is gained, though both are not contradictory. At many places as in *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, the entire group of future possible embodiments including the present one is treated as *deha*, and so it is considered to be gained after *prārabdha karma* is over resulting in the death of the present body. Some others take the word "*deha*" only as the future embodiments, in which case it is accomplished verily at the time of gaining *aparokṣa jñāna*, when the *ahaṃkāra* along with *āgāmi* and *sañcita karmas*, the causes of transmigration, gets destroyed. *Śruti* statements, like "O, Janaka, you have got *abhaya* - fearlessness (i.e. liberation)" (*Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, 4-2-4) and "O, Maitreyī, of such nature is immortality (i.e. liberation)" (*Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, 4-5-15), also confirm this view. Both the views are valid because the end of the present embodiment does not depend on self-knowledge. Thus there is no more possibility of rebirths for the one who has gained *aparokṣa jñāna* - even if *samādhi* or its resultant *jīvanmukti* is not achieved.

The contrast between *videhamukti* and *jīvanmukti* can be very well brought out from the following two passages from *Muktikopaniṣad*:

"Having approached a right type of *guru* in a manner as advised by *śruti*, having studied 108 *upaniṣads* as told by scriptures, having taken to *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana* uninterruptedly, and having gained the destruction of three bodies after the exhaustion of *prārabdha karma*, gaining the state of fullness like the pot space wherein the pot is broken, is *videhamukti*. That itself is called *kaivalyamukti*. For that very reason even the inhabitants of *Brahmaloka* also, having taken to Vedānta *śravaṇa* etc. by exposing to the teaching of *Brahmā* (i.e. *Hiraṇyagarbha*), gain *kaivalyamukti* along with him. Therefore, for all, the *kaivalyamukti* is said to be gained by self-knowledge alone and not by *karma*, *sāṅkhya*, *yoga*, *upāsana* etc." (*Muktikopaniṣad*, 1-7).

This passage is immediately continued in the beginning of the second chapter of this *upaniṣad*, as follows:

".....For a given individual the features of *antaḥkaraṇa* characterised by doership, status of being experiencer, joy and sorrow etc. become the bondage, because they are nothing but afflictions. Its destruction by knowledge is *jīvanmukti*.....The accomplishment of *jīvanmukti* etc. is gained by *samādhi* born of Vedānta *śravaṇa* etc. which is accomplished by one's self efforts. It is gained by the destruction of all *vāsanās*." (*Muktikopaniṣad*, 2-1).

It is worth noting that *vāsanākṣaya* and *samādhi* imbued with knowledge are specifically mentioned even after *aparokṣa jñāna*, as means of *jīvanmukti*, whereas for *videhamukti* they are not so stated. Thus *aparokṣa jñāna* by itself guarantees *videhamukti*.

In the context of *jīvanmukti* which needs *samādhi*, *vāsanākṣaya* and *manonāśa* are again emphasised even after gaining *aparokṣa jñāna* which guarantees *videhamukti*, because both of them serve as the booster to effective *nididhyāsana* which also destroys *vāsanā* in turn in the form of habitual errors. Their details and the emphasis can easily be mistaken at places if taken superficially, to mean either that *vāsanākṣaya* alone is *mokṣa* or that *manonāśa* alone is so. At such places they are meant to praise them as the means to gain *samādhi* which is essential for *jīvanmukti*, and not meant to convey that they can liberate an individual without self-knowledge. It is essential to know the meaning of the word "*jīvanmukti*" in the true perspective and how it differs from *videhamukti* interpreted in either way. Whenever the

words "*mukti*" and "*mokṣa*" appear in the *upaniṣads* they should, if the context demands the distinction, be properly ascertained as *jīvanmukti* or *videhamukti*. Failure to do so can result in the following three wrong notions:

i) *Aparokṣa jñāna* without *samādhi* cannot give liberation.

If this were to be true, all *śrutis* which declare that knowledge alone liberates will be wrong.

ii) *Samādhi* without *aparokṣa jñāna* can give liberation.

That this is wrong for want of destruction of ignorance has been clarified earlier.

iii) *Vāsanākṣaya* and *manonāśa* by themselves are liberation.

The role of these, before and after gaining knowledge, has already been elaborated in detail. Either of the two or both of them together are incapable of conferring liberation of their own accord without knowledge.

FOCUSING ON PARTS WITHOUT THE WHOLE CAN CREATE CONFUSIONS

It is true that the ills born of specialisation which represents only a part without its correlation to the whole, generally run the risk of breeding wrong notions because of the very narrow field which is the focus of the specialist's attention. The *prakriyā* of *vāsanākṣaya* and *manonāśa* is not exception to this. Take for example the *yogasūtras* dealing with *Aṣṭāṅga yoga* which is a specialised technique of *manonāśa*. In it there is no reference to self-knowledge. Yet it is highly unlikely that a person of the stature of Patañjali who has authored these *sūtras* was ignorant of the role of self-knowledge as against the function of *vāsanākṣaya* and *manonāśa* as elaborated in so many *upaniṣads*. The task he had undertaken was confined to giving the details of the specialised technique of *manonāśa*. But later, the inevitable took place. A school of thought emerged claiming that *samādhi* without self-knowledge can liberate. Therefore it is imperative that we do not lose sight of the entirety of this pursuit of self-knowledge while we get preoccupied with its parts, however indispensable they may be. It is also advisable to bear in mind that though *jīvanmukti* invariably leads to *videhamukti* after the *prārabdha karma* is over, *aparokṣa jñāna* can confer *videhamukti* even without *jīvanmukti*. Besides this, the understanding of the nature of the roles played by *vāsanākṣaya* and *manonāśa* in gaining both *aparokṣa jñāna* and *jīvanmukti* also can remove a lot of confusions.

It is worth mentioning that *vāsanākṣaya* and *manonāśa* are discussed in the latter half of the famous *prakaraṇagrantha*, *Vivekacūdāmaṇi*, verily with reference to *jīvanmukti*. Its earlier portion exhausts itself in the ascertainment of self-knowledge, whereas its latter half deals with the topics like *nididhyāsana*, *vāsanākṣaya*, *manonāśa*, *jīvanmukti* and *jīvanmukta*. Actually in the said text, about 90 out of those verses which speak of *vāsanākṣaya* etc. are incorporated as they are, from *Adhyātmopaniṣad*, *Kuṇḍikopaniṣad* (*Sāmaveda*), *Ātmopaniṣad* (*Atharvaveda*), *Muktikopaniṣad* and *Mahopaniṣad*. And from those 90 verses, almost 58 are from *Adhyātmopaniṣad* only. All these verses blend in the context, once *jīvanmukti* is understood in the right sense as described in the *upaniṣads*.

IS JĪVANMUKTINECESSARY?

One more doubt may be raised at the end. If *aparokṣa jñāna* is already gained, why should one put in efforts to gain *jīvanmukti* when *videhamukti* is certain? The entire *jagat* is false and so, if the *jñāni* is afraid of false *jagat*, should we not conclude that the knowledge of such a person is not thorough? Yes, it is true that a *jñāni* who is thorough in self-knowledge should be able to cognise the *jagat* to be false, and interact accordingly. But only to accomplish this state, the *upaniṣads* advise *nididhyāsana* until the habitual errors of mistaken bodily identification and treating the *jagat* as real, are either totally eliminated or till the body falls off due to *prārabdhakṣaya* - ending of *prārabdha karma* - whichever happens earlier. Scriptures do not want to run the risk. We have no external competent means or gadget either to measure the degree of *antaḥkaraṇa śuddhi* of any seeker or to assess how much deep rooted are one's habitual errors after self-knowledge is gained! Therefore having taken to *nididhyāsana* as advised by *śruti* itself, the accomplishment of its perfection in terms of *jñānaniṣṭhā*, a state of *jīvanmukti*, depends on the intensity of one's present efforts as well as *prārabdha karma*. There is no reason why one should not attain *jīvanmukti*. Irrespective of one's success or failure in the perfection of *nididhyāsana*, if one argues that in spite of having the habitual errors *nididhyāsana* need not be taken to, the question arises as to what else are the preoccupations and pursuits of such a person. If there are any of them, other than *nididhyāsana*, his or her *vairāgya* and self-knowledge claimed as acquired require to be examined! Teaching of Vedānta, if one is eligible to do so, can be helpful to do *nididhyāsana* to an extent, and so cannot be looked upon as a separate preoccupation. A true teacher of Vedānta will never deny the role of *nididhyāsana* until it is necessary.

THE PRESENT TWO VERSES

Let us now go back to verses 61 and 62 after a long digression which was necessary to understand the exact nature of *vāsanā prakriyā*. The *mumukṣu* referred to in these two verses is of a type different from the one in the earlier verses. While in the earlier case it was the one who had already gained *aparokṣa jñāna* and by successful *nididhyāsana* had attained *samādhi*, here the seeker had only *parokṣa jñāna* for want of readiness of mind and now attains *samādhi* by other techniques meant specially for it. *Amunā* - by this *samādhi* - the following results are gained:

i) The web of all *vāsanās* which were a hindrance in gaining *aparokṣa jñāna* for want of right disposition is destroyed. We have already seen that *vāsanākṣaya* and *manonāśa* are interdependent and *samādhi*, being a state of *manonāśa*, helps to destroy *vāsanās*.

ii) *Samādhi* completely destroys the accumulated results of actions called *puṇya* and *pāpa*. These *karmaphalas* are only those which hinder gaining of self-knowledge, and not *sañcita karma* which gets totally eliminated only by self-knowledge wherein the *ahaṃkāra* is removed. In this context, the seeker referred to here has got only *parokṣa jñāna* and not *aparokṣa jñāna*.

iii) When the above mentioned two results are effected, the mind of such a person is well set to gain *aparokṣa jñāna*. With the removal of all obstructions, the earlier *parokṣa jñāna* itself matures into *aparokṣa jñāna*. This is just like an electric tube light which when switched on gets illumined at times only after a while. Such a delay is due to some defect in the gadget, which is overcome in course of some time after switching on. In the same way, the present *mumukṣu*, though exposed to *śravaṇa* earlier, could get *aparokṣa jñāna* only after the defects in the mind were rectified by *samādhi*.

The distinction between these two types of persons should be very clear. In the first type, because of having a ready mind *aparokṣa jñāna* was gained and thereafter with successful *nididhyāsana*, *samādhi* was accomplished leading to *jīvanmukti*. In contrast to this the second type of person did not have a ready mind and hence could only get *parokṣa jñāna*. However, he accomplished, later on, *samādhi* which prepared the mind suitably and so he got *aparokṣa jñāna*. Such a person gets *jīvanmukti* because he has already accomplished *samādhi*, which is supplemented now by *aparokṣa jñāna*, and so there may not be any further need for practising *nididhyāsana*. The means followed by the latter person to gain *samādhi* cannot be *nididhyāsana*,

because without *aparokṣa jñāna*, *nididhyāsana* is not possible. As specified in verse 62, it is lacking in the case of the person under consideration. *Vārtikakāra* Sureśvarācārya also describes *nididhyāsana* as *aparāyattabodhaḥ*- independent self-knowledge which is the result of earlier two means, viz. *śravaṇa* and *manana* (*Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad vārtika*, 2-4-217). In other words *nididhyāsana* is the effortless appreciation of *aparokṣa jñāna* revealed by *mahāvākya* to the person who had taken to *śravaṇa* and *manana* with a mind necessarily set and who has no obstructions whatsoever in appreciating such knowledge.

These verses specifying *samādhi* should be interpreted in the context of *jīvanmukti*. This fact also becomes clear if we consider their sources as shown earlier. While *Adhyātmopaniṣad*, from where these verses are incorporated, describes a *jīvanmukta* in detail thereafter, *Paīṅgalopaniṣad* which speaks of a similar topic as in these verses, immediately after it, tells that such a person becomes *jīvanmukta*.

RESULT AND CONCLUSION

Finally the result of self-knowledge is pronounced to induce the seekers to take to the pursuit of gaining this knowledge by making them aware of its unsurpassed greatness. We shall see now that even *parokṣa jñāna*, though short of knowledge of one's real nature, confers very great result, besides prompting one to gain *aparokṣa jñāna*.

परोक्षं ब्रह्मविज्ञानं शाब्दं देशिकपूर्वकम् ।
बुद्धिपूर्वकृतं पापं कृत्स्नं दहति वह्निवत् ॥६३॥

*parokṣaṁ brahmavijñānaṁ śābdaṁ deśikapūrvakam
buddhipūrvakṛtaṁ pāpaṁ kṛtsnaṁ dahati vahnivat - (63)*

देशिकपूर्वकम् - through a *guru* शाब्दं - produced by *mahāvākyas* परोक्षं
- indirect ब्रह्मविज्ञानं - knowledge of Brahman बुद्धिपूर्वकृतं - intentionally
done कृत्स्नं - entire पापं - *pāpas* वह्निवत् - like fire दहति - burns. - (63)

63. The indirect knowledge of Brahman, through a *guru* by means of *mahāvākyas*, like fire destroys (even) all the intentionally done *pāpas*.

RESULT OF *PAROKṢA JÑĀNA*

Deśikapūrvakam knowledge is the one which is gained through the teaching of a competent *guru*. This also shows that Vedānta is not a subject that one can pursue independently. However wise and learned a person may be, inquiry into the nature of oneself is to be conducted in accordance with the teaching of a competent master who teaches strictly in conformity with the *śāstras*.

We have already seen the distinction between *parokṣa* and *aparokṣa jñāna*. Though *parokṣa jñāna* lacks direct appreciation of Brahman as verily one's real nature, it also has tremendous power to destroy all the sins. Intentionally committed sins are born of those actions wherein one knows fully well that they are prohibited by *śāstras*, and yet one indulges in them. When even such sins can be destroyed by *parokṣa jñāna*, it is to be understood that all the sins committed unknowingly would be definitely destroyed by *parokṣa jñāna*. Sage Yājñavalkya states that a *mumukṣu* who is just endowed with values

like *amānitva*, uplifts twenty-one generations (*Paiṅgalopaniṣad*, 4-2). A mere pursuit of gaining self-knowledge is highly rewarding in itself.

RESULT OF *APAROKṢA JÑĀNA*

The author finally describes the result of *aparokṣa jñāna* without leaving any trace of doubt.

अपरोक्षात्मविज्ञानं शाब्दं देशिकपूर्वकम् ।

संसारकारणाज्ञानतमसश्चण्डभास्करः ॥६४॥

aparokṣātmavijñānam śābdam deśikapūrvakam
saṃsāraakāraṇājñānatamasaścaṇḍabhāskaraḥ - (64)

शाब्दं - produced by *mahāvākyas* देशिकपूर्वकम् - through a *guru*
अपरोक्षात्मविज्ञानं - direct knowledge of *ātmā* संसारकारणाज्ञानतमसः - of
the darkness of ignorance which is the cause of *saṃsāra* चण्डभास्करः
- midday blazing sun (अस्ति - is) - 64.

The direct knowledge of *ātmā* produced by *mahāvākyas* through a *guru* is (like) the midday blazing sun to the darkness of ignorance which causes *saṃsāra*.

Aparokṣātmavijñānam means *aparokṣa jñāna* of *ātmā*, which is free from any doubts and errors. The prefix "vi" is added to *jñānam* to show that the knowledge referred to here is *yathārtha* - true to the nature of *ātmā* - and is devoid of any doubts or errors. As told in the earlier verse, of course this is gained through the teaching of a *guru* as revealed by *mahāvākyas* (*śābdam*). This knowledge totally destroys the self-ignorance which is the root cause of *saṃsāra*. Ignorance is compared here to darkness. Just as darkness covers the existing world and thereafter creates wrong notions about the things encompassed by it, so does ignorance by veiling *ātmā* project in its place a *jīva* suffering the *saṃsāra*. Just as the darkness is destroyed by the midday blazing sun, the self-ignorance along with its effect is totally destroyed by *aparokṣa jñāna* as described in the verse.

The verse very significantly reveals that *aparokṣa jñāna* is the destroyer of *saṃsāra* with its cause and thus confers *mokṣa*, and that neither *vāsanākṣaya* nor *saṃādhi* can do so on its own without the said knowledge, which is noteworthy.

CONCLUSION

In the final verse, the author concludes the chapter by telling the result that can be achieved on closely following the path taught here.

इत्थं तत्त्वविवेकं
विधाय विधिवन्मनः समाधाय ।
विगलितसंसृतिबन्धः
प्राप्नोति परं पदं नरो नचिरात् ॥६५॥

*ittham tattvavivekaṁ vidhāya vidhivanmanaḥ samādhāya
vigalitasamsṛtibandhaḥ prāpnoti paraṁ padaṁ nara na
cirāt - (65)*

नरः - a person इत्थं - in this manner तत्त्वविवेकं - discrimination into one's real nature विधाय - having done (तस्मिन् - in it) विधिवत् - as enjoined मनः - mind समाधाय - having firmly fixed विगलितसंसृतिबन्धः - freed from the bondage of *samsāra* परं पदं - highest state न चिरात् - without delay प्राप्नोति - attains. - (65)

65. A person having discriminated one's real nature in this manner and having firmly fixed the mind in it as enjoined, freed from the bondage of *samsāra*, attains the highest state without delay.

The word "ittham" - thus - refers to all that is taught so far. First of all the *mumukṣu* acquires the *sādhana catuṣṭayasampatti* to gain the suitable disposition. With such prepared mind the indestructibility, continuous presence, and oneness of *sampvit*, *caitanya* - knowledge principle - have to be ascertained in all the three states of consciousness and at all the time. This *sampvit* itself is limitless *ānanda* and verily *ātmā* - me. According to *śruti* Brahman also is the same *caitanya* principle and so *ātmā* and Brahman are identical. Yet, *avidyā* - ignorance - not only does not allow us to know what we are in reality but also presents us as *jīvas* suffering the *samsāra*. *Prakṛti* is the cause of *avidyā* and it projects all the duality comprising *Īśvara*, countless *jīvas* having varied embodiments, and the gross creation. The suffering of *jīvas* in *samsāra* is due to mistaken identification with the embodiments, born of ignorance. The liberation is possible only when one conducts inquiry into the five sheaths of embodiments as guided by a competent *guru* and ascertains oneself to be totally free from all of them. All

these five sheaths get negated at one state or the other but *sapvīt-ātmā* - abides throughout and itself is Brahman.

The identity between *jīva* and Brahman, so proved based on reasoning, should be ascertained further in accordance with the *mahāvākyas*, because *śruti* alone is the final means of knowledge and not reasoning. The ascertainment of this identity through the analysis of *mahāvākyas* in the correct manner, constitutes *śravaṇa*. To clear the knowledge so gained from all possible doubts, with the help of reasoning, is *manana*.

In spite of gaining self-knowledge, the habitual identification of oneself with the body and the mistaken notion that the world of objects, beings and events is real, persists. They have to be overcome by intense *nididhyāsana*. So in accordance with *śruti* the author recommends such persons who have got *aparokṣa jñāna*, to take to *nididhyāsana* in the phrase "*vidhivat manaḥ samādhāya*". The mind has to be made to get absorbed in the appreciation of one's real nature. *Vidhivat* - as enjoined - is to remind that by repeated practice, *vṛttis* related to *dhyāta* and *dhyāna* are to be given up, retaining only one preoccupation of *dhyeya* which, when successfully taken to for a long time, leads to *samādhi*. Falsehood of the creation can become evident only when the appreciation of Brahman which is *prapañcopaśama* becomes more natural and spontaneous.

Such *aparokṣa jñāna* totally destroys the bondage of *saṃsāra* and so the *mumukṣu* having accomplished this attains the highest state of discovery that oneself is verily Brahman which itself is *mokṣa* - liberation.

A *mumukṣu* may be curious to know, how long will it take to gain *mokṣa*, after taking to this pursuit. A definite period cannot be specified because it depends on many factors like eligibility, *śraddhā*, *antaḥkaraṇa śuddhi*, intensity of efforts, the bad past obstructions that one may have, and the correctness of the teaching. So, neither the *śāstras* nor the *guru* can guarantee the result within a stipulated period of time. And yet there is no room for despair. To a *mumukṣu* who is on the right track laid down by *śāstras*, an assurance is given that the goal can be gained *na cirāt* - without delay. There is no reason as to why the result should get delayed if the pursuit is taken to properly. Hence the *mumukṣu* should focus his or her attention on the commitment to the pursuit, rather than worrying about the result which will take care of itself.

Here ends the first chapter of Pañcadaśī. Having first analysed our daily experiences to reveal our real nature- *sat, cit, ānanda*, Vidyāraṇya Muni later corroborates this by *śruti* declarations that "I" and Brahman are identical.

The discovery of self-knowledge is the ultimate in human endeavour that all human beings must aspire to. Among all the living species known in creation, human birth with faculties fit for higher pursuits, is the most difficult to come by. This has been very vividly brought out in the initial verses of the text *Vivekacūdāmaṇi*, wherein Ācārya Śaṅkara, after drawing our attention to this fact, exhorts one and all to choose the path of inquiry to accomplish the final goal of discovering our real nature. This is the only infallible remedy against the suffering in *saṃsāra*.

The discriminative and decision-making faculty of the human intellect is primarily designed to ascertain self-knowledge. *Śruti* which is kinder than thousands of mothers put together shows us the path. With compassion it implores not to miss the goal as the opportunity of gaining human embodiment is rare. We should not squander away precious human life over paltry and transitory gains. We should opt for the highest goal before life ebbs away. If we ignore this valuable, benevolent advice, we fail in our duty towards ourselves which no mature person would like to do. Let us rise to the expectation of Mother *Śruti* and make our human life worthy, by discovering the real nature of ourselves, that is ever free from *saṃsāra*.

OM TAT SAT

APPENDIX

(See page 28)

NYĀYA - SYLLOGISM

That memory of ignorance in sleep is preceded by an experience, has to be established based on *nyāya* - inference. It is defined as *parārthānumānam nyāyaḥ* - the *anumānam* - inference - for the sake of making the other person understand. Or that which makes the other gain the inferential knowledge is called *nyāya*.

VYĀPTI

Such inference involves a *vyāpti* - a postulate. A great *tārīkika* - logician - Annambhatta defines *vyāpti* as *sāhacarya niyamaḥ*, i.e. the invariable concomitance or invariable co-existence of two things. What those two invariable things are, which always abide together or which always exist together, can be seen from the following.

When you want to infer something, some *liṅga* - a mark - is necessary. The famous example is: yonder on the mountain, there is smoke. By this one can infer that there is fire on the mountain. But this is *svārthānumānam* - inferring for oneself. You see the smoke, and therefore conclude that there is fire on the mountain.

But if you are asked to make the other person discover that there is smoke on the mountain, you have to give him the logical steps. That is called *parārthānumānam nyāya*. You say that fire is there on the mountain, because there is smoke. Because there is smoke, there is fire. The smoke happens to be the *hetu* - the reason or inferential data - and what you are going to prove is *sādhya* - the fire. The *sādhya* is the proposition or the ascertainment of what you are going to prove or deduce, viz. the mountain is fiery. For this you are making use of the *hetu* - the reason, the smoke. Because there is smoke, the mountain is fiery. This statement - "because there is smoke" - is the *hetu* - the reason.

The invariable co-existence (*niyata - sāhacarya*) of the *hetu*, the smoke, and the *sādhya*, the fire, is defined as *vyāpti*. This definition should suffice our purpose, though many more definitions are found.

FIVE LIMBS OF INFERENCE

According to *naiyāyikas* - the logicians - there are five limbs or five essential factors to arrive at the inferred knowledge. These are -

- (i) *Sādhya* or *pratijñā* - proposition or the major term
- (ii) *Hetu* - reason or the middle term
- (iii) *Udāharaṇām* or *dṛṣṭānta* - illustration
- (iv) *Upanayaḥ* - application, and
- (v) *Nigamanam* - conclusion.

There is also a word called "*liṅga*" - a mark. Generally in *nyāya*, the words "*liṅga*" and "*hetu*" are used as though they are synonyms. But it is not so, because there is a difference between them. *Liṅga* means a mark, whereas *hetu* is a statement which gives the relation between the *liṅga* and *sādhya* - the proposition (i.e. *liṅga pratipādaka vacanaṁ hetuḥ*). For example, I see the smoke. Mere smoke is the mark - *liṅga*. But the statement - "because there is smoke, there is fire" - is the *hetu*.

Applying the illustration to the context or whatever that we are going to infer is called *upanayaḥ* - the application. Finally the inferential knowledge is concluded or deduced. This is *nigamanam* - the conclusion.

PAKṢA

Another word used is *pakṣa* - minor term - location or a subject wherein the presence of "*sādhya*" - the thing to be proved - is doubted (i.e. *sandigdha - sādhyavān pakṣaḥ*). For example - is this mountain fiery or not? What you are going to prove is that the mountain is fiery. The place, the mountain is the *pakṣa*. That the mountain is fiery, you have to establish. It is doubted, because you see the smoke at a distance, but you are not able to straightaway see the presence of the fire there.

Naiyāyikas do not include *pakṣa* separately in the five limbs of an inference, because it is related to *sādhya* - the proposition. We are expected to find it out from *sādhya*.

In the case of our inquiry the knowledge of the ignorance during sleep (*saṁsṛptatamobodhaḥ*) or "I did not know anything in the deep sleep state", is the *pakṣa*. This is not a place, but a subject. The doubt is whether the *pakṣa* is preceded by an experience, to ascertain which we have to apply the five limbs of inference.

A MODEL OF INFERENCE

Before such an application, let us see a model of inference with respect to the fire on the mountain.

i) PROPOSITION - *Pratijñā/sādhya*

Parvato vahnimān - the mountain is fiery. We have made an assertion or a proposition that the mountain is fiery. The question comes - how do you say so?

ii) REASON - *Hetu*

Dhūmatvāt - because the mountain is endowed with smoke. This is the reason we are giving.

iii) ILLUSTRATION - *Udāharanam*

We have to give an illustration. It is as follows: *yo yo dhūmavān saḥ agnimān yathā mahānasaḥ* - whatever that is full of smoke is endowed with fire like a big kitchen.

Mahānasaḥ means a big kitchen, but not a modern kitchen. In a modern kitchen, while cooking with steam or gas, smoke will not be there. In olden days wood was the fuel in the kitchen and so naturally the smoke was there.

iv) APPLICATION - *Upanayaḥ*

Now this illustration has to be applied to the smoke on the mountain. It should be: *tathā ca ayaṃ parvataḥ* - just as the kitchen has the smoke, so is this mountain full of smoke. This is what is called *upanayaḥ* - application.

v) CONCLUSION - *Nigamanam*

This brings us to the *nigamanam* - deduction. The conclusion is: *tasmāt tathā* - therefore the mountain is so (i.e. fiery) like the kitchen. Just as the kitchen with smoke has the fire, so is the mountain with smoke, fiery. This is the final conclusion that we have deduced.

This model of inference has to be applied to the memory of ignorance during sleep in order to deduce that the memory is preceded by an experience of the very same ignorance.

i) PROPOSITION - *Sādhya*

The *pratijñā* or the *sādhya* is: The knowledge (i.e. memory) of ignorance during sleep (*saṁsṛptatamobodhaḥ*), viz. "I did not know anything in sleep" (*na kiñcidavediṣamiti*), is preceded by an experience (*avabuddham* - experienced/or *anubhava pūrvakam* - preceded by an experience). This is what is to be proved.

The *pakṣa* - minor term - is with respect to ignorance during the deep sleep which is a subject unlike the place - mountain in the model that we had seen. The doubt about this ignorance in sleep is whether it was experienced earlier (i.e. *avabuddhaṃ na vā*).

ii) REASON (middle term) - *Hetu*

The reason or inferential data that is being given is *smṛtitvāt* - because it is a memory. That I did not know anything in the deep sleep is a memory.

iii) ILLUSTRATION - *Udāharaṇam*

We have to give the illustration which also includes the *vyāpti* - the invariable co-existence. The illustration is - *yā yā smṛtiḥ sā anubhavapūrvikā - sā me mātā iti smṛtitvāt*.

"All memories are preceded by experience, like the memory - "she is my mother".

"She is my mother", is not perception. "There is a lady", is of course a perception. But "that lady is my mother", is based on the past experience that she tended me, she brought me up with love and care which I recollect. It is not experienced right now as such.

iv) APPLICATION - *Upanayaḥ*

Tathā ca etad (na kiñcid avediṣaṃ iti) jñānam. So is this knowledge, viz. "I did not know anything in sleep." Just as "she is my mother" is a memory and hence is preceded by experience, so is knowledge of ignorance in sleep a memory which has to be preceded by an experience.

v) CONCLUSION - *Nigamanam*

Tasmāt sauṣupta tamaḥ avabuddhaṃ iti nigamanam. Therefore the conclusion is that the ignorance during the sleep is experienced first and it presents itself as memory during the waking state.

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